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The role of the European Union (EU) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was 
strengthened in 2011, when the mandate of the EU Special Representative was transferred from 
the High Representative of the International Community, to the Head of the EU Delegation in 
BiH. The EU thus assumed a leading role within the international community in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, as a state-builder and as democratiser. The EU’s growing prominence puts on it 
even more responsibility for the future of democratisation in BiH, but it continues to suffer from 
inconsistencies between its principles and actions, weak legitimacy, and a lack of credibility. 
Although I subscribe to Ian Manners’ concept of the EU normative power, I argue that the EU 
does not act as normative power in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This thesis argues that the EU is 
a normative power in principle, but not in practice, and provides a critique of the EU’s role in 
promoting and strengthening democracy in BiH. 
 
I attribute the exceptionalism of BiH to a restrictive context that is saturated with ethnic 
nationalism, which permeates all aspects of political life, including constitutional structures, 
institutions, decision-making, political parties, their policies and rhetoric. I argue that in this 
post-conflict society in which democracy has not consolidated, the promotion of EU norms is 
hampered by elite agency, an unfavourable context, and the exiting norms and values that are 
incompatible with EU norms. Based on my findings about the quality of democracy in BiH, I 
label it an eclectically unconsolidated democracy, which contains many features of different 
types of unsuccessful democracies. 
 
I argue that the legitimacy, identity, and effectiveness of the EU normative power have 
been compromised and weakened in the context of an unconsolidated democracy. The case of 
BiH is exceptional, which the EU fails to recognise, and it falsely applies a ‘cookie-cutter 
approach’ that treats it as any other aspiring democracy and potential member state. Rather than 
having a distinct international identity (Manners & Whitman, 1998), the EU suffers from a 
‘confused international identity’, which is a consequence of many discrepancies in the way in 
which various EU actors see their own role in BiH, and how they see the role of the EU. My 
intention is not to dismiss some aspects of EU normative power, but rather to enrich a debate 
by providing an alternative perspective. For that purpose, I apply a tailor-made framework of 
analysis which assesses the level of normative transformation under EU democratisation in the 
case of two dimensions of democratic quality: equality and trust. 
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Chapter I – Introduction 
 
The year 2015 marks the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement 
(DPA) for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Peace Agreement not only stopped a very brutal 
conflict, but it also designed a rigid constitutional structure that has not been altered since. As 
the processes of peace-implementation and institution-building have progressed in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) over time, the role of international actors on the ground evolved as well. 
The EU has since assumed the role of the most prominent international actor in BiH, taking on 
the role of the main state-builder and democratiser, while issues of peace implementation have 
been gradually subdued to the processes of European integration. This evolution of the EU’s 
role in BiH has run in parallel with the processes of evolution of its own institutions, which 
have led to the Lisbon Treaty.  That process has changed the nature and capacities of the EU as 
an actor, which has intensified debates about its effectiveness.  
 
Based on the EU’s experience as the chief democratiser in BiH over the past decade, 
this thesis provides a critique of the EU normative power. I argue that the legitimacy, identity, 
and effectiveness of the EU normative power have been compromised and weakened in the 
context of an unconsolidated democracy. The EU does have a record of leading successful 
democratisations in other countries in Europe and elsewhere. However, the case of BiH has 
been exceptional all along, which the EU failed to recognise, and falsely applied a ‘cookie-
cutter approach’ that treats it as any other aspiring democracy and potential member state. I 
attribute the exceptionalism of BiH to a restrictive context that is saturated with ethnic 
nationalism, which permeates all aspects of political life, including constitutional structures, 
institutions, decision-making, political parties, their policies and rhetoric.  
 
Nationalism in BiH is not just a distraction to peace-building and democratisation; it has 
become a way of life, a way of doing politics. The nationalist elites have spent decades engaging 
in extensive social construction that seeks to impose the nationalist worldview in order to 
supress the tradition of pluralism and peaceful coexistence that was a defining feature of BiH 
society for centuries. To some degree, they have been successful in undermining the trust within 
the society, but they have not entirely eradicated the evident craving among people for more 
tolerance and some normalcy among ethnic groups. The nationalists’ endeavour is ideational, 
it targets the values and norms in a society, and the EU’s inadequate approach to BiH fails to 
address a clash of values between the two normative systems. In order to be able to assess the 
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EU’s ideational influences on the nationalist ideas and values, I choose the concept of EU 
normative power, which was originally introduced by Ian Manners (2002, p. 242).1  
 
Manners (2002) builds upon the concept of the EU as a unique actor and examines how 
the EU’s unique nature and identity determine the promotion of its core values internationally. 
His argument is that the EU is ‘pre-disposed’ to act in a normative way because it is different 
to pre-existing political norms in terms of its “…historical context, hybrid polity and political-
legal constitution” (Manners, 2002, p. 240). Even though I adopt the understanding of the EU 
as a normative power, I argue that the EU does not act as a normative power in BiH, neither is 
it ‘predisposed’ to act normatively. In my view, the EU is a normative power in principle, but 
not in practice. This I attribute to a disconnection between the EU’s principles on one hand, and 
its policies and actions on the other. I see this disconnection as stemming from a lack of self-
perception on the part of EU actors that they represent a normative power.  
 
Rather than having a distinct international identity (Manners & Whitman, 1998), the EU 
suffers from a ‘confused international identity’, which is a consequence of many discrepancies 
in the way in which various EU actors see their own role in BiH, and how they see the role of 
the EU. Also, the EU fails to understand that the challenges it faces in BiH are ideational, and 
that they cannot be neutralised or their effects reversed through rationalist policies alone. The 
two case studies which I present in the empirical Chapters show that the EU normative power 
is challenged by ideational as well as structural/institutional divisions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The substantive challenges to the EU normative power which hinder democratic 
consolidation in this country show that the EU values may not be appealing enough if they 




My objective in this thesis is not to evaluate the EU’s track record in BiH, neither is this 
thesis about Bosnia and Herzegovina’s own record in meeting the EU’s accession requirements. 
My objective is to present a critique of the role of the EU in democratising BiH, and to expose 
the inadequacies of the EU normative power in promoting democratic values to an 
                                                 
1 According to this concept, the EU normative basis stems from the 1973 Copenhagen declaration on European identity, which 
establishes democracy, rule of law, social justice and respect for human rights as ‘the fundamental elements of the European 
identity’ or the ‘core norms’. 
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unconsolidated democracy. BiH is an atypical example of a failing democracy, which the EU 




My research explores democratisation as a particular aspect of the EU’s pursuit of its 
international identity. More specifically, I gauge the concept of EU normative power against 
the backdrop of its efforts to diffuse democratic norms and values to a divided, unconsolidated 
democracy. I account for the processes of norm diffusion, interest and identity formation in 
order to fully apprehend those aspects of transformation through EU democratisation 
(Christiansen, 2001, p. 529). Although I create a framework of analysis for evaluating the 
transformative power of the EU, the examples I assess show that norm transformation under 
EU influence rarely takes place in BiH. 
 
I apply a social-constructivist approach, which looks at the mutually constitutive 
relationship between identity and EU international role (Tonra, 2007). I take the position of 
‘thick’ or ‘critical’ (or ‘radical’) constructivists (Tonra, 2007), claiming that in a socially 
constructed reality an objective, external reality cannot be assumed, which helps me expose the 
inadequacies of the EU’s rationalist approach. With that in mind, I put forward several research 
questions: 
 
What is the ideational impact of the EU’s democratisation efforts on internal divisions 
in a post-conflict society? How the processes which confront the EU normative power, or work 
against it, impact diffusion of EU norms? How do constitutive and transformative aspects of 
promotion and internalisation of EU norms impact domestic norms? Can substantive 
transformation happen when EU norm promotion takes place outside the formal EU structures 
and in more challenging scope conditions? How, if at all, does the EU normative power 
construct the identities and interests of external actors? 
 
I put an emphasis on the substantive aspects of an external democratisation process. I 
borrow a definition of substantive democracy from Kaldor and Vejvoda (1999) who see it as a 
“genuine deepening of democracy, a move beyond promulgation of new rules and toward 
sustained, meaningful democratic practice” (1999, p. 21). The focus on democratic substance, 
or quality of democracy, inevitably bears the risk of being value-laden, with potentially evasive 
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and elusive criteria for measurement and analysis. For that purpose, I relate the ideational 
aspects of EU’s democratisation to the underlying social, historical and cultural context, which 
is described in the next Chapter. That context embodies a number of fault-lines in democracy, 
which include the mismanagement of ethnic relations, the rise and endurance of nationalism 
and ethnic divisions, the myths of ethnic hatred, the ethnic predicament in the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, inconsistent peace implementation, unequal electoral rights, a lack of democratic 
legitimacy, nationalistic political culture, and low levels of trust. I account for both procedural 
and structural fault-lines in democracy in order to show the interaction and ‘constitution’ with 
dimensions which condition democratic consolidation. The focus on EU norms, interests, and 
identity formation, raises questions about the nature of the democratisation process in BiH, 
which I argue is failing. Democracy in BiH has not consolidated, and moreover, it contains 
features of several models of unsuccessful democracies, which is why it can be labelled 
‘defective’, procedural, illiberal, pseudo-democracy, etc.  Because of the multitude of different 
defects in democracy in BiH, I decide to label it an ‘eclectically unconsolidated democracy’ 
and ask several questions to that end:  
 
What conditions the quality of democracy and its sustainability in post-conflict, divided 
societies? How can the quality of democracy be sustained, and how can it be measured? How 
this process can be reinforced at an ideational level by the EU in order to embrace a move 
beyond the ‘formal/procedural’ democratisation? Is the EU’s procedural approach potent 
enough to instigate and promote changes in values in BiH? To which degree will the governance 
structures hinder EU democratisation? Can normative power instigate changes in structures as 
well as values? What is the nature of obstacles to the EU normative power? What kind of 
influences those obstacles have on EU norms and the process of democratisation? What 





My research approach relies on two distinct academic fields – theories of the EU as an 
actor and democratisation theories. Given the nature of the research problem, I consider social 
constructivism as an analytical approach best suited to bring together two academic fields 
through a single framework of analysis. A social constructivist approach enables me to look at 
interactions between agents and structures, and the ideational aspects of the EU’s 
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democratisation efforts abroad. Coupled with the concept of EU normative power, a 
constructivist framework of analysis provides opportunities to move beyond rationalist, 
individualist and structuralist accounts of agent-structure interactions during democratisation. 
However, the main value-added of using constructivism to analyse EU normative influences is 
the ability to capture immaterial social phenomena, and to look into the EU’s identity and self-
perception. 
 
 The study of identity formation gives a more central role to the analysis of language 
and discourse (Christiansen, 2001, p. 541). Thomas Diez (1999) points to an evident neglect of 
the role of language in studies of European integration and provides theoretical groundwork to 
remedy this gap through discourse analysis. I subscribe to the notion that the power of discourse 
becomes crucial to studies which reject the understandings of power as being absolutely or 
relatively material, and which doubt that ‘real’ interests exist independent from the discursive 
context in which interests emerge (Diez, 1999). I support the view that meaning and language 
are central to the research of constitution of identity and interests, and I integrate them in the 
proposed framework of analysis. The objective is to illustrate how identity, discourse and 




Different sub-types of ‘unconsolidated’ democracies discussed in the third Chapter 
demonstrate that the ‘standard’ indicators of democracy miss out on important aspects and 
reasons why those countries have not been able to follow the usual route of democratic 
consolidation. That is why it would be misleading for my research to apply the same criteria of 
assessment of quality of democracy on a ‘non-consolidated’ democracy as it would on those 
which are ‘consolidated’. Such model of assessment of quality of democracy does not exist as 
an integrated concept, and I need to rely on several existing approaches. For that purpose, I 
design an original and detailed framework of analysis, building on a concept developed by 
David Beetham (2003), and that proposed by Diamond and Morlino (2005). 
 
Beetham (2003) shows how procedural progress can be subverted for ideological 
reasons by domestic opponents to democracy. He argues that procedural and substantive 
dimensions can be assessed simultaneously, with a clear conception of democratic norms or 
values, and an understanding of arrangements that enable realisation of those norms. However, 
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Beetham points out that non-consolidated democracies can alert us to features that are taken for 
granted in ‘consolidated’ democracies. He thus suggests assessing what can go wrong with 
them, i.e. identifying ‘democratic flaws’ or ‘subversions’. Even though Beetham himself uses 
the term ‘subversion’, he nonetheless sees it as too restrictive, implying intentionality, whereas 
democracy can also be undermined by unintended inadequacies in institutions, procedures or 
elites. Beetham deliberately excludes from his potential research cases of countries which have 
been “debilitated by a civil war” (2003). Considering that my research case is a post-conflict 
society, I see the use of the term ‘subversion’ as appropriate and desirable, because I want to 
shed some light on the intentional undermining of democratic consolidation in BiH. 
 
The second aspect of my assessment model will be adapted based on a model proposed 
by Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino (2005, p. xxvii). They show how attempts to improve 
procedural democracy can damage substantive democracy. This approach recognises that the 
quality of democracy is value-laden and that there is no universal framework for measuring the 
quality of democracy. As a result, it allows sufficient flexibility to customise its framework to 
the demands and challenges of a specific research case, and its context. This approach links the 
procedural dimensions to democratic substance by measuring eight dimensions (five 
procedural, two substantive, and one result dimension). The procedural dimensions are: the rule 
of law, participation, competition, vertical accountability, and horizontal accountability. 
Substantive dimensions are freedom and equality, and the result dimension is responsiveness 
(2005, p. xxix). This approach accounts for interactions among the proposed measurement 
dimensions, and shows how those interactions can produce further ‘decays’ of the quality of 




1. In terms of the EU’s internal constraints that are attributed to the nature of the EU as an 
actor, two are under-researched. First, the EU-sponsored democratisation suffers from a 
lack of self-perception that the EU is a normative power, which should strive to exert 
normative influence internationally. Because of that, the EU is not ‘pre-disposed’ to act 
normatively. Secondly, the EU undermines ideational and immaterial aspects of 
democratisation in BiH, limiting its efforts to procedural aspects. The EU’s focus on 
procedural democratisation hampers substantive democratisation, which precludes the 




2. BiH is an unconsolidated democracy, which is a result of a restrictive normative, social and 
political context, the domestic agent-structure interaction, and deliberate elite agency, 
which generate two sets of external impediments to democratisation. The first set of external 
impediments are domestic values and norms which are contradictory and incompatible with 
the normative basis of the EU, creating a normative gap between the EU and BiH. The 
second set of external impediments to the spread of EU norms can be described as 
‘subversions’ of democracy, i.e. features evident in unconsolidated democracies, which are 
taken for granted in ‘consolidated’ democracies. The first set of variables are contextually 
predetermined, while the second set are products of deliberate elite agency.  
 
3. Internal constraints that are related to the EU’s approach to democratisation in BiH are 
grounded in the EU’s failure to recognise the exceptionalism of BiH. Due to that 
spuriousness, the EU applies a ‘cookie-cutter approach’ that treats BiH as any other 
transitional society. However, BiH defies democratic transition and is a post-conflict society 
in which democracy is struggling to consolidate. The EU tools and instruments which may 
have worked in early democratisations elsewhere have not produced democratic quality in 
BiH. The EU’s ‘cookie-cutter approach’ underestimates the salience of ethnic nationalism 
in BiH, which presents an ideational obstacle to its democratisation and demands a tailor-
made approach to the unconsolidated democracy in BiH. 
 
Case Study – Democratisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
This research case has been selected because it is a revealing example of the limitations 
and shortcomings of the EU’s normative role in democratising post-conflict, divided societies. 
The political and governance system in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the product of a minimum 
of political agreement that was only possible between then still fighting parties, which signed 
the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. The Peace Agreement created a complex and ineffective 
governance structure, which is mutually constituted with political and social divisions along 
ethnic lines. This power-sharing mechanism was maintained for a decade after Dayton was 
signed by the strong influence of the international community, but as soon as their influence 
decreased, the weakness of the system and depth of those divisions began to be exposed. This 
coincided with the EU assuming the role of the main state-builder and democratiser in BiH, 
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which in my view was premature, as the deterioration of the political situation subsequently 
showed.  
 
I argue that Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a consolidated democracy, and moreover 
that it is a ‘‘defective’’ democracy (Merkel, 2004). Merkel argues that “an emergence of 
(ethnically) exclusive and illiberal democracies is more probable if social capital is accumulated 
along ethnic and religious lines” (2004, p. 53). The more society is organised “along ethnic 
cleavages”, the more it contributes to “political polarisation” and ultimately, to ‘defective’ 
democratisation (Merkel, 2004, p. 53). As a democracy with weak institutions, BiH is 
particularly vulnerable to influences of informal political structures, which dislocate most of 
political life outside its formal institutions and play an important role in the construction of 
identities and interests.  
 
Democracy in BiH is deeply divided along many fault-lines, which I describe in detail 
in the next Chapter. This is why the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina is useful for illustrating 
how nationalist discontents construct divisive and exclusivist policies by hindering formation 
of a unified state identity and interests. Those divisions and the support for ethnic nationalism 
directly confront and contest the EU’s efforts to build a democratic state to which citizens are 
comfortable to entrust their support and are able to identify with. Because of that, BiH is 
particularly useful for observing the process of identity and interest formation, and the role of 
rhetoric and discourse in that process. By over-utilising and sustaining the nationalist rhetoric, 
the nationalist parties have continued to polarise different communities along deep ethnic 
cleavages and have revived strong feelings of past injustices in order to manipulate the public 
support for nourishing the already entrenched divisions.  
 
Using the framework of analysis introduced in the previous section, I focus on assessing 
the quality of democracy in BiH by looking at ‘subversions’ of democratic consolidation such 
as prevalence of nationalist rhetoric and inflammatory discourse. I argue that nationalism is one 
of the biggest challenges to the EU normative power in this context. The current procedural 
approach employed by the EU in its democratisation efforts in BiH has been hampered by ethnic 
nationalism. This puts tangible limits on the EU’s procedural democratisation and constrains it 
substantively. Moreover, I argue that the EU’s and international attempts to improve procedural 
democracy undermine substantive democracy in BiH, which I explain in Chapters III and IV, 




I also see Bosnia and Herzegovina as a useful case study for a social constructivist 
approach to interactions and mutual constitution between divisive structures created in Dayton 
on one hand, and formal and informal agents on the other hand, particularly through discourse 
and language. I present a case that the normative incompatibility between the EU and BiH is 
primarily rooted in the exclusivist and divisive nature of the Dayton structure and predominance 
of nationalist rhetoric. The predominance of nationalist rhetoric indicates that agents and elites 
ignore and undermine the present state. This lack of legitimacy and general lack of 
identification with the state impose a variety of obstacles to the EU diffusion of norms.  
 
The limits of the procedural approach thus show a need for the EU to consider investing 
more efforts into changing perceptions and into promotion of its own values. So far, the EU 
policy in BiH has not addressed this evident gap. I therefore suggest that the salience and 
resonance of EU norms and values need to be supported by their constant public promotion in 
order to make the vision of BiH inside the EU more tangible, realistic and within the reach of 
BiH society. This can be done through policies of socialisation, and be substantiated by 
internalisation efforts through policies of persuasion, dialogue, and exposure to new ideas. The 
EU’s insistence on the policy of conditionality and its procedural approach to democratisation 
in BiH have compromised its legitimacy and credibility. I also suggest that in order for those 
efforts to have more buying power, the EU itself needs to stop compromising its own values 
for the sake of short-term political wins and gains, if it wishes to maintain its integrity, 
credibility and influence on local political actors.  
 
Summary of Chapters 
 
I do not have strict division of Chapters into theoretical and empirical. I integrate theory 
and empirical evidence in all my Chapters, but in Chapters VI and VII I analyse two case 
studies, which shifts the balance in favour of empirical evidence. In the next Chapter I describe 
the background to democratisation in BiH, explaining how major fault-lines in democracy have 
emerged. Given the fact that my approach relies on two academic fields, I discuss each of those 
fields in Chapters III and IV, while referring to specific examples from my main case-study. In 
the fifth Chapter I discuss a social constructivist approach to building a framework of analysis, 
and explain in more detail methodologies applied to each empirical Chapter. The last two 




Chapter II. The second Chapter looks at how fault-lines in democracy in BiH have 
been created, and how they affect the spread of democratic norms by external actors. I look at 
those fault-lines chronologically, going as far back as the final days of the former Yugoslavia, 
which left strong legacies of nationalism and dominance of nationalist parties. The purpose of 
that Chapter is to contextualise democracy and democratisation in BiH, and to provide 
background for the examples used in the empirical Chapters. I relate the fault-lines in 
democracy to my main arguments about the exceptionalism of democracy in BiH, the EU’s 
shortcomings as an external democratiser, the dominance of nationalism, and the structural 
pitfalls created by the Dayton Peace Agreement. 
 
Chapter III. In the third chapter I look at the nature of democracy and democratisation, 
and introduce the role of the EU in that process. I argue that the restrictive domestic context 
imposes structural constraints on the promotion and diffusion of EU norms. I explain the 
concept of substantive democracy, and show how the EU undermines substantive democracy 
by a focus on procedural democratisation.  My second argument is that values and norms 
entrenched in BiH society are incompatible with the normative basis of the EU. And my third 
argument is that the process of democratic consolidation in BiH has not been successful, which 
is why I describe BiH as an eclectically unconsolidated democracy. 
 
Chapter IV. In this Chapter I look at the EU as an actor through the framework of its 
conditionality, and I discuss the main factors that hinder compliance. I argue that the EU’s 
conditionality falsely assumes that domestic actors in BiH desire faster integration into the EU. 
That false assumption dissuades the EU’s approach and misinforms its choice of instruments 
and rewards. I make three core arguments in relation to the EU normative power: that it suffers 
from a ‘confused international identity’, that EU actors fail to identify with the EU normative 
power and lack that self-perception in their policies and actions, and that the EU relies on a 
misplaced ‘cookie-cutter approach’ that underestimates the role of ‘gatekeepers’ to democracy.  
 
Chapter V. The fifth Chapter presents the methodology and framework of analysis. 
Based on a review of literature in this Chapter, I substantiate why I give preference to social 
constructivism as a conceptual approach to assessing norm compliance, internalisation and 
transformation. Among different variants of constructivism, I opt to use a ‘thick’ constructivist 
approach (Tonra, 2007), which takes into account the role of narratives, discourses, and social 
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and political constructions. I develop an analytical strategy, which also includes a framework 
of analysis. Based on the discussion of non-consolidated democracies presented in Chapter III, 
I include the idea of ‘subversions’ of democracy into my framework of analysis. My argument 
is that ‘subversions’ of democracy can reveal some aspects of unsuccessful democratisation, 
which cannot be identified following a standard route of assessment of democracy. Such a 
reversed assessment procedure is at the core of my analysis of the two dimensions of democratic 
quality in Chapters VI and VII. Access to information as well as specific research 
methodologies are elaborated in the final section of this Chapter.  
 
Chapter VI. In this Chapter I discuss the first dimension of democratic quality, which 
is trust, and explain how democracy and trust are related. The case study presented in this 
Chapter is the election campaign rhetoric of a politician from Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, 
leader of the Party of Independent Social-Democrats. Based on the evidence presented through 
my framework of analysis, I show ways in which trust is being deliberately destroyed in BiH 
by dominance of counter-norms, i.e. norms which are constructed to counter the spread of EU 
norms.  
 
Chapter VII. In Chapter VII, I discuss the second dimension of democratic quality, 
which is equality/participation. Following the same Chapter structure as in the previous case, I 
look at how the EU promotes equality as part of its normative basis. I am interested in EU 
mechanisms of norm diffusion, the role of underlying scope conditions, and particularly the 
role of domestic actors. I have done so through the case study of the implementation of the 
judgement by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the "Sejdić/Finci” case, which 









This Chapter shows the way in which the fault-lines in BiH democracy have been 
created and how they continue to shape democracy in BiH. The break-up of former Yugoslavia, 
the rise of nationalism, the war in BiH, and the political processes emerging from the Dayton 
Peace Agreement have produced a number of divisions and cleavages along, ethnic, territorial, 
political, social, and economic lines. Given my focus on the nature of democracy and 
democratisation in BiH, in this Chapter I discuss only the major fault-lines which appeared 
along the process of democratisation, which include the mismanagement of ethnic relations, the 
rise and endurance of nationalism and ethnic divisions, the myths of ethnic hatred, the ethnic 
predicament in the Dayton Peace Agreement, inconsistent peace implementation, unequal 
electoral rights, a lack of democratic legitimacy, nationalistic political culture, and low levels 
of trust.  
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to contextualise the nature of democracy and 
democratisation, and the role of the EU as an external democratiser, which are discussed in the 
following Chapters. It also provides a background for the examples used in the two empirical 
Chapters. In the next Chapter, I argue that due to the severity and intensity of violence during 
the war in BiH, the cultural, ideological, social and other historical legacies have been torn to 
the extent that it is hard to claim continuity or linearity of the process of democratisation. 
Although I reject structuralists’ claims about the centrality of historical legacies in the process 
of democratisation, I nonetheless account for them because they help understand the context 
that is marred with fault-lines in democracy. I therefore relate each of the fault-lines to the main 
arguments in the following chapters – the exceptionalism of democracy in BiH, the EU’s failure 
to act as external democratiser, the power of nationalist rhetoric, and the discriminatory 
Constitution. In a couple of sections in this Chapter I need look as far back as former Yugoslavia 







Management of Ethnic Relations 
 
Although it may seem odd to look as far back in history, the examples from former 
Yugoslavia provided in this section serve to set the historical context to which I return in 
Chapter VI. As I show in that Chapter, the contemporary nationalism depends on constructs 
that are created using past experiences, or denial of some past experiences. When analysing 
distrust in BiH in Chapter VI, I show how nationalist elites deny multi-ethnic coexistence and 
pluralism that was a strength in BiH society before the war. They fabricate myths that presume 
eternal distrust among ethnic groups in BiH, which they use to suppose the inevitability of 
divisions in the society. That is why understanding ethnic relations in former Yugoslavia can 
cast some light on the fault-lines in the management of ethic relations in BiH today. Although 
principally different, the two systems share the notion of discontents and tensions around ethnic 
representation. In Chapter VI, I show how using a technique of ‘un-bridging’ the past legacies 
of trust nationalist elites construct new realities in the present, through the denial of some 
historical facts. Whereas the system of management of ethnic relations in former Yugoslavia 
was designed to neutralise or diminish such nationalistic tendencies, the system of ethnic 
relations in BiH reinforces them. It is a product as well as a cause of the strong dominance of 
nationalism in BiH democracy, to which I keep returning throughout this thesis. I explain in 
Chapter III that the rigid system of ethnic representation designed during peace negotiations in 
Dayton has entrenched ethic divisions, rather than ameliorating their effects, which has resulted 
in a dysfunctional power-sharing system, and a ‘defected’ democracy. 
 
Being itself a mix of ethnicities, which never truly corresponded to the internal borders 
of federal republics, the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was faced 
with numerous dilemmas in managing interethnic relations. Whatever power sharing 
arrangement had been put in place, as long as quotas reflected the proportions of ethnic groups, 
they ran the risk of creating domination in some parts of the country. In order to moderate those 
effects, Yugoslavhood was created as a supranational identity that was being constructed based 
on similarities between all nations of the new state. The supranational identity did not preclude 
the existence of national identities, but it was rather meant to be the ‘channel of synthesis’ for 
national identities (Godina, 1998). The focus of identification was Yugoslavia as a state, rather 




The government also put in place the concept of multi-ethnic coexistence, which was 
then translated into power-sharing mechanisms (McGoldrick, 1999, p. 8). It served as a strategy 
for preventing massive revenge among different nations who had found themselves previously 
on different sides of history during World War II (WWII), and straddled between opposing 
great powers. In principle, this worked in practice. Sekulić, Garth and Randy (1994) state that 
there is “no evidence of urban violence between ethnic groups, ethnic ghettoization, or 
interethnic village confrontations during Tito’s years” (p. 800). Generations who had some 
memory of World War II remained still fairly conscious of ethnic identity, while younger 
generations, particularly in urban areas had a much weaker sense of national identification. 
Social mobility, which was a deliberate state policy, made communities less ethnically 
homogenous and hence less conscious of national identification. Culture, arts, education, 
media, and social relations more generally were made devoid of any national or ethnic symbols, 
while rich in symbols of state identification. A number of ideological concepts were also 
introduced in order to suppress ethnic grievances, such as the concept of 'brotherhood and 
unity', which was meant to build the social fabric of Yugoslavia, and was also enshrined in the 
constitution of SFRY as a social and ideological value. Destroying brotherhood and unity was 
described as “one of the two greatest dangers to socialist Yugoslavia” (Godina, 1998, p. 416). 
 
The Federal Constitution included principles of non-discrimination, and also guarantees 
of the right to choose a nation or nationality, language, alphabet and culture (Várady, 1997, p. 
17). Curbing violent nationalism was also enshrined in the Constitution, and any discrimination 
based on national, racial, or religious hatred and intolerance was unconstitutional and 
punishable. When it comes to the power-sharing mechanisms, non-discrimination was 
translated into the ethnic quotas that were built into the Constitution. However, these 
arrangements were disputed from the very beginning, and the state handled those demands 
through institutional innovations and constitutional changes that were meant to breathe in some 
federalist substance into these discussions (Banac, 2001, p. 463).  This resulted in a series of 
constitutional reforms that addressed domination or underrepresentation of different ethnic 
communities (McGoldrick, 1999, p. 8).2  Ivo Banac (2001) goes as far to say that national 
grievances were taboo under Tito.3 This was despite pressure from Party leaderships of 
Slovenia, Kosovo, and Croatia, which called for more decentralisation of public life and for the 
                                                 
2 Constitutional reforms followed the constitutional crises in 1946, 1963 and 1974. 
3 Josip Broz Tito was the life-time President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Marshall/Supreme 
Commander of the Yugoslav People’s Army, and the General Secretary of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. 
26 
 
decriminalisation of signs and symbols of national identities. Tito's death in 1980 was one of 
the enabling conditions for the federal rules to start collapsing.  
 
In terms of social relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina itself, the wider population 
appeared far more relaxed about interethnic relations than the authorities. There were a large 
number of inter-ethnic marriages, and the brotherhood and unity agenda helped depoliticise the 
issue in the eyes of the population. There was also large mobility of population between 
republics, and from rural to urban areas, as a part of the efforts to industrialise the country. This 
resulted in even more mixing of nations. Urban areas in BiH in particular were very mixed even 
before Yugoslavia, which made inter-ethnic relations easier to manage than at the level of the 
Federation. By the 1970s and 1980s, interethnic relations did not appear to be an issue among 
the wider population in BiH. This is important to emphasise because the contemporary 
nationalist discourse is based on a premise of eternal ethnic hatreds in BiH, constructed through 
a series of myths, to which I return in another section in this Chapter. Those constructions serve 
the purpose of feeding the nationalist discourse and providing it with some substance through 
a series of social-construction techniques which I explain in Chapter VI.  
 
Nationalism Masked as Democratisation 
 
In the next Chapter I return to the peculiar relationship between nationalism and 
democratisation in BiH, which in my view is one of the major fault-lines that is in the way of 
democratic consolidation. This is especially true for the period after the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, which shows patterns that were visible already in the late 1980s. It is important to 
emphasise here that elites in the former Yugoslavia led a political struggle which was not 
liberalisation from an ‘oppressive’ regime in strive for democracy. It was rather national 
homogenisation for the purpose of gaining more power and control for individual Republics 
and ethnic groups. As such, national homogenisation remains an enduring fault-line that haunts 
external democratisation in BiH today, which I discuss again in Chapter IV. 
 
The nationalist parties were gaining strength in late 1980s, and became organised very 
quickly. The very tight relationship between nationalism and democracy was evident in their 
slogans, which centred on claims about a need to break away from the Communist past, from a 
‘repressive’ regime, but also stressing differences between nationalities and resurrecting the 
myths of ancient divisions. The ethnic nationalism that consolidated on the eve of the first multi-
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party elections in BiH held in November 1990, remains a dominant force in BiH today, and I 
return to it in Chapters III and IV. Domination of nationalism in political life became evident 
even during the process of party formation in 1990, when moderate parties appeared weak 
against the rising popularity of nationalist parties.4 Nationalist parties spread their influences 
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, within their respective ethnic groups, working in every 
municipality, village and local community. In particular, they targeted rural areas, which were 
more ethnically homogenous, and where individual ethnic traditions were stronger and 
communities more condensed (Pejanović, 2004). The relationship between democracy and 
nationalism thus established has withstood all the turmoil that ensued after the 1990 elections, 
and was re-installed into the new power-sharing system in the BiH General Elections in 1996. 
I return to the relationship between democracy and nationalism in BiH in Chapter III in order 
to show how this violent form of nationalism has crippled consolidation of democracy in BiH 
since.  
 
In the same fashion as in politics in BiH today, the media campaigns of nationalist 
parties in early 1990s left little or no room to discuss wider democratic or economic reforms, 
so the public space in general became saturated with nationalist rhetoric. Another parallel is the 
creation of fear against other ethnic groups, which was, and still is, the most effective way to 
argue for the support of one nationalist party. This created a sense amongst the wider population 
that the 1990 elections were about the protection of ethnic groups, rather than a first step in 
democratisation of the country. All election campaigns since have centred around the issues of 
protection of ethnic groups, whereas the perceived threats and causes for new fears changed 
over time. 
 
From the point of view of my explanations of the exceptional and peculiar relationship 
between nationalism and democracy in BiH, it is important to stress again that democratisation 
was never nationalists’ goal, even though they used the rhetoric of democratisation to explain 
the political changes which were taking place rapidly in the early 1990s. Their primary 
objective was, and still is today, to gain as much dominance for themselves and their own ethnic 
group. The rhetoric of some nationalist party leaders from the 1990 elections indicated the 
                                                 
4 One left wing party was a successor to the former Communist Party, it named itself the Social-Democratic Party. The other 
major party, the so-called Reformist Party was formed by the last Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Marković. 'Reformists' were 
composed of the ex-communist cadre which still wanted to remain in political structures, but wanted to distance themselves 
from the previous party and regime. The two left-wing parties opposed each other openly in the run-up to the first multi-party 
elections, which immediately shattered any chances of formation of a more democratic block (Pejanović, 2004, p. 19).  
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extent to which they were prepared to achieve that, even at the expense of starting a war (Speech 
by Radovan Karadzic, Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1990).  
 
It should not have come as a surprise then that the first party elections were followed by 
bloody wars within a year after the nationalist parties had won. With the wars in Slovenia and 
Croatia raging in 1991, and following their respective declarations of independence, BiH was 
briefly left within a rump Yugoslavia, whose army at that point was controlled by the Serbian 
leadership. The BiH national assembly voted to organise a referendum on independence, which 
was held on 29 February, 1992. The referendum was mainly boycotted by the Serb population 
in BiH, but the result was 98% in favour of independence based on a 64% turnout 
(“Parliamentarism in Bosnia and Herzegovina in conditions of political pluralism (1990–
1995),” n.d.). Atrocities against the non-Serb population followed soon after the referendum. 
Open warfare followed Bosnia’s international recognition on 6 April, 1992, when Serb forces 
opened fire on peace protesters in Sarajevo, subsequently putting the city under siege for the 
next three and a half years.  
 
The Myths of Ethnic Hatred 
 
The myths of 'ancient hatreds' are a major fault-line that has hindered democratic 
consolidation for the past twenty-five years. I return to this argument in Chapters VI and VII 
by showing that the myths of ethnic hatreds feed the nationalist appetites throughout BiH. Each 
ethnic group in BiH generates its own ancient and modern myths of ethnic supremacy or 
distinctiveness in order to justify and amplify the inter-ethnic cleavages. Nationalists resort to 
those myths in order to deny the legacies of pluralism and multi-ethnic coexistence in BiH, 
which justifies their defence of ethnic divisions in the present. Those myths have also been at 
the core of academic discussions about the break-up of Yugoslavia, and the barbarity of ensuing 
conflicts, as well as to justify the foreign governments’ policies of non-intervention during the 
war in BiH. As I show in Chapters IV, VI, and VII, the EU actors today still resort to those 
explanations in the absence of a strategy to confront nationalism in BiH. 
 
Authors who adopt primordialist arguments in explaining the nature and origins of 
conflicts in former Yugoslavia include Jovan Cvijić (1922, (1931) (cited in Ramet, 2004a)), 
and Dinko Tomašić (1948) (cited in Ramet, 2004b), who states that the Balkans have been 
'uniquely plagued by war and strife'. More recent contributors to this theory is Branislav 
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Anzulović (1999, cited in Ramet, 2004b), who attributes to the Serbs an inclination towards 
violence and a “tendency to view their nation as a collective victim”  (p. 736), and presumes a 
‘particular predisposition to violence’ by the people of former Yugoslavia (Cited in Ramet, 
2004b, p. 738). Lucarelli (2000) sided with a view that the war in BiH “took place in an area 
(the Balkans) that has always been regarded as a possible powder-keg” (p. 1).  
 
Authors who reject primordialist explanations dismiss them on the grounds that the 
people of former Yugoslavia had peaceful relations for decades. Ramet (2004a) asserts that “the 
chief debility of this theory is that it leads its believers away from any understanding of what 
makes states collapse or former neighbours go to war with each other”. She rejects the notion 
“that the remote past should have some special priority over the more proximate past” (2004a, 
p. 739). Sekulić, Massey, and Garth (1994, p. 800) point out that the war in BiH preceded the 
ethnic hatred, which in their view, had to be mobilised. The problem they have with 'ancient 
hatred' explanations is that it 'lacks empirical support', as no evidence could be presented of a 
repressive state apparatus being systematically employed against the ethnic groups in former 
Yugoslavia. This elite-centric view is supported by other authors, who show how collective 
memories were “activated and directed to ethnopolitical goals” by extremist leaders or 
chauvinist elites, who then mobilised the masses (Hodson et al., 1994, p. 801). 
 
Malcolm (1996, p. xxi) believes that the mere misinformation and ignorance about BiH 
history and tradition is what informed theories of 'ancient hatreds'. According to Malcolm, “for 
most of the period after 1878, the different religious or ethnic communities in Bosnia lived 
peacefully together” (p. xxi). In spite of this, the myths of ancient hatreds were widely utilised 
by Radovan Karadžić while trying to discourage international intervention.5 The effect of 
primordialist explanations was therefore most detrimental in the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, in which the absence of foreign intervention opened the way for the most 
notorious atrocities and war crimes that were committed between 1992 and 1995. The most 
infamous examples of foreign politicians who grounded their policies on the basis of theories 
of ancient hatreds are the former US President Bill Clinton and former UK Prime Minister John 
Major (Hodson et al., 1994, p. 800). President Clinton was admittedly prejudiced by Robert 
Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts (1993). Kaplan saw Tuđman and Milošević as 'victims of history', 
thereby reprieving them of their personal responsibility for what had happened (Cited in Ramet, 
                                                 
5 War-time President of Republic of Srpska, indicted for war crimes and acts of genocide. 
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2004b, p. 741).  John Major used eternal ethnic hatreds as an explanation during a debate in 
House of Commons in June 1993 while presenting it as an obstacle against any kind of 
intervention to stop the conflict in BiH (Ramet, 2004b, p. 740). Admittedly, the history of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina provides many instances of divisions and violence. However, it needs 
to be born in mind that “the political history of late twentieth century Bosnia has not been 
determined by what happened in the thirteenth or eighteenth century” (Malcolm, 1996, p. xxii). 
Neither should violent incidents from the past designate the whole society or individual ethnic 
groups as prone to wars, conflicts and divisions. 
 
It needs to be emphasised that this discussion is particularly relevant for explaining the 
rise and endurance of Serb nationalism, which I use as a case study in Chapter VI. Historical 
myths were used particularly for mobilising Serb nationalism prior to the wars in the former 
Yugoslavia, but their contemporary relevance is in their continued mobilisation for the purpose 
of sustaining the nationalist narratives employed by the elites in Republika Srpska today. The 
myths deployed by today’s elites in the RS are mirror images of the myths deployed in the 
1980s and 1990s. As I show in Chapter VI, the elements of ethnic myths which were constructed 
and mustered in the late 1980s by the Serbian political leadership at the time, survived the weak 
international attempts to democratise BiH, and they are engrained in the narratives of today’s 
elites in Republika Srpska.  
 
As just one illustration of those parallels, I refer to Milošević’s control over the Serbian 
media through which he was able to generate and spread those myths using nationalist 
propaganda. The media led a campaign in which other ethnic groups were demonised, Serbs 
victimised, foreigners portrayed as conspirators against Serbia, and fear of other religions was 
also spread. Milošević and his associates delivered inflammatory speeches, used a range of 
symbols and carefully crafted public campaigns which gave rise to nationalism and expanded 
it in a very short time. In a very similar fashion, Milorad Dodik the current president of 
Republika Srpska, has taken control of the public, and to some degree also private media in 
order to shape the nationalistic public opinion. I return to those and Dodik’s other illiberal 
practices in Chapter III. As I show in Chapter VI, he has used exactly the same narratives as 
Milošević to mobilise Serb nationalism, utilising very similar propaganda techniques.  
 
The myths of ‘predisposition to war’ and ‘ancient hatreds’ also informed the views about 
the future of BiH. Campbell (1998) warns of a perception that “more often than not, influential 
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figures have expounded the view that the only realistic outcome in a situation such as Bosnia is 
- in a move that conflates ‘ethnic’ with ‘national’ - partition along ethnic lines so as to create 
separate national spaces” (p. 406). He refers to the neorealist approach of John Mearsheimer 
(1993, 1997), who repeatedly declared that “the best and most realistic option for Bosnia is the 
partition of the country into ethnically homogenous states” (cited in Campbell, 1998, p. 397). 
Mearsheimer argued that “through the redrawing of boundaries and the forced transfer of 
populations, the construction of a Bosnian state for Muslims, a Croatian state for Croats and a 
Serbian state for Serbs is the answer to “intractable ethnic hatreds” (cited in Campbell, 1998, 
p. 397). Campbell argues that such views were translated into subsequent efforts to negotiate 
peace, which preceded the actual Peace Agreement in Dayton. This was partly due to a view 
developed by international actors that the peace solution could only be found on the basis of 
ethnicity, because they saw the war itself as inter-ethnic. In Chapter III, I look into the structural 
obstacles to the promotion of EU norms, which were created through the constitutional 
constraints designed in Dayton. 
 
The Ethnic Predicament in the Dayton Peace Agreement 
 
The conflict in BiH lasted until late 1995 when the Peace Agreement was negotiated 
and eventually signed. The ethnic predicament was carved into the essence of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, thus paving the way for the dominance of ethnicity in power-sharing, design of the 
institutions, the style of politics, and reinforcing the dominance of nationalism. Such a strong 
emphasis put on ethnicity in the Peace Agreement has produced shallow and inefficient 
institutions, which are not able to lead or guarantee the consolidation of democracy. While 
returning to this issue in Chapter III, I show ways in which the ethnic predicament has created 
a style of democracy of exceptional nature, which the EU to some degree condemns, but fails 
to influence or change in the process of democratising BiH.  
 
The EU’s shortcomings in challenging the ethnic paradigm are the subject of Chapter 
IV, which discusses the weakness of the EU’s instruments in an over-ethnicised society. For a 
short while, the thinking behind the international community’s peace negotiating efforts was 
that under their guidance unstable post-conflict BiH would be transformed into “a multi-ethnic, 
pluralist and liberal democracy – a single liberal, pluralist state” (Richmond & Franks, 2009, p. 
21). Although they emphasised a declarative intention to support a unitary state of BiH, 
ethnicity remained at the core of solutions that were proposed in early peace proposals, such as 
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the Cutileiro Statement of Principles.6 The Statement broadly supported the independence and 
integrity of BiH. However, its proposal for constituent units of a supposedly unitary state was 
based on exclusivity of ethnicities, a separatist logic that ruled out any notion of ‘overarching 
authority’ (Campbell, 1998, p. 417). Campbell describes how the effects of the understandings 
of ethnic identity as “pre-given and socially salient” and existing as “the community fault lines 
around which politics will revolve” helped establish firmly the principle of “territorialised 
politics of ethnic/national self-determination” 
(1998, p. 406). This relationship between 
ethnicity and territory pervaded all subsequent 
efforts to find peace. His research shows that 
the ethnographic maps of the 1991 census were 
the foundation for many of the international 
community’s peace negotiating efforts, while 
the alternatives were war-time front-line maps 
which implied that the basis for political 
agreements was acquisition of territory “driven 
by ethnic cleansing” (1998, p. 406).  
 
This approach was also reflected in the composition of the negotiating teams brought to 
the peace talks in Dayton in 1995. The sides that were invited by the international community 
to negotiate the Peace Agreement were each brought to the table in the role of representatives 
of their own ethnic group, and hence demanded concessions for ethnicities (Šarčević, 2009).7 
This gave ‘ethnic groups’ the status of ‘pre-constitutional categories’, and they were moreover 
treated as inherited ‘constants’ which had to be built into the new constitution. In order to 
provide for the interests of three ethnic groups, the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was thus 
designed to give preference to the protection of rights of each ethnic collectivity, rather than 
protecting individual rights. Šarčević (2009, p. 50) describes this outcome as ‘ethnicisation’ of 
the BiH constitutional system, which in his view was not a cause, but a consequence of the 
                                                 
6 The original Carrington–Cutileiro peace plan, named after Lord Carrington and Portuguese ambassador José Cutileiro, who 
drafted a proposal for a peace agreement after the EC Peace Conference held in February 1992. 
7 Even though the delegation representing the internationally recognised Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was formally not 
representing any ethnic groups, and was in fact itself of multi-ethnic composition, the negotiations were carried out in a way 
that treated them as a side primarily representing Bosniacs. Šarčević also provides arguments based on the assessment of the 
political role of then President of Republic of BiH, the late Alija Izetbegović, his positions during negotiations, and an 
overwhelming amount of literature, that he represented the side of the Bosniac people, even though he was a legitimate 
representative of all citizens.   
Figure 1 - Political map of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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international peace-building strategy. The result of that process was the Peace Agreement 
signed in December 1995, which in Annex IV includes the BiH Constitution. The Constitution 
defines a very complex structure which comprises four levels of government: the state, two 
entities (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS)), ten 
cantons, one district, and 142 municipalities. 
 
The entities are designed asymmetrically, so that the Republika Srpska is more 
centralised with a clearer allocation of functions between the entity and local level. On the other 
hand, FBiH is much decentralised, with a local level consisting of sixty-two municipalities as 
well as ten cantons, each having its almost unique system of governance and allocation of 
responsibilities. In its 2005 Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in BiH, the Venice 
Commission found that “the combined effect of these provisions… makes effective government 
extremely difficult, if not impossible” (“Draft Opinion on the constitutional situation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and the powers of the High Representative,” 2005, para. 29). The Venice 
Commission was referring to the decision-making system, which was designed to accommodate 
maximum protections for each ethnicity. 
 
The power-sharing mechanism gives preference to the protection of collective ethnic 
rights, while not fully protecting the rights of minorities or individuals. Mechanisms of 
protection of ‘national interests’ are designed to provide protection to individual ethnic groups 
against majorisation by the others, and are numerous to the point of obscuring the decision-
making process. This includes possession of veto powers by each of the three members of 
Presidency, in regards to which the Venice Commission declared that “it cannot be maintained 
that only Serbs are able and willing to defend the interests of RS and only Croats and Bosniacs 
the interests of the Federation” (“Draft Opinion on the constitutional situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the powers of the High Representative,” 2005). Also, every decision of the 
House of Representatives of State Parliament has to be voted on twice – first, for the 
constitutionally required majority to pass a decision, and secondly, to also receive the required 
majority of votes from members of parliament from each entity (the so called entity-voting). 
On top of which, in the House of Peoples,8 legislation has to be approved by the majority inside 
each people’s caucus. In practice this is also manifested through the behaviour of elected 
representatives of nationalist political parties as representatives of their ethnic communities, 
                                                 
8 Composed of five representatives of each constituent peoples, fifteen in total. 
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rather than as representatives of citizens or constituencies. Finally, there are also mechanisms 
for protection of vital national interests, which are deferred to the Constitutional Court. On that 
point, the Venice Commission says that “granting precisely to those people who are already 
dominant such a veto and not to small groups requiring protection is a questionable practice” 
(“Draft Opinion on the constitutional situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the powers of 
the High Representative,” 2005, para. 21).  
 
 
Figure 2 - Levels of government in BiH (Global Security, 2010) 
   
Due to the demographic consequences of the conflict in BiH, primarily caused by the 
concept of ‘ethnic cleansing’, the ethnic composition of territorial units in BiH is highly 
homogenous.9 Because the post-Dayton electoral constituencies were designed on the basis 
of newly created territorial units, they create a mirror image of ethnic/territorial divisions at 
the level of the state, in Presidency, Parliament, as well as in all executive and judicial 
institutions. Through that mechanism entire groups of population are excluded on the basis of 
their ethnic or territorial belonging, which is one of the main normative clashes with EU 
norms, as I explain in the next Chapter. The most prominent constitutional mechanism of 
exclusion, and a distinctive discrepancy with EU norms, exists in the election of members of 
BiH Presidency.  The Serb member of Presidency can only be elected by voters registered in 
Republika Srpska. This means that Croats and Bosniacs living in Republika Srpska can only 
elect a Serb member of Presidency and cannot themselves be elected, while Serbs living in 
                                                 
9 The population of Republika Srpska is predominantly Serb, with a very low level of return of previously displaced persons 
and refugees. Inside Federation of BiH, seven out of ten cantons which were created as a part of the Washington Peace 
Agreement between Croats and Bosniacs, are predominantly ethnically homogeneous, while only three have some mixed 
population. Apart from a very few exceptions, municipalities also have predominantly one ethnic majority. However, due to 
a lack of census data, this is hard to express in terms of the actual numbers of population. The BiH Constitutional Court also 
states: “Due to massive ethnic cleansing in the course of the war prior to the conclusion of the Dayton Agreement, the 
population figures of 1997 show that the RS is now an ethnically almost homogeneous entity”.  
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Federation of BiH cannot elect a Serb or be themselves elected for Presidency, but need to 
choose between a Croat and Bosniac. Minorities are not allowed to run for the Presidency at 
all, neither are they represented in the House of Peoples. The Venice Commission states that 
this rule assumes “that only members of a particular ethnicity can be regarded as fully loyal 
citizens of the Entity capable of defending its interests” (“Draft Opinion on the constitutional 
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the powers of the High Representative,” 2005). This 
is the most significant fault-line in democracy in BiH that is the cause of many structural 
constraints which impede the promotion of EU norms. 
 
Although aware that these arrangements would be in conflict with human rights, the 
international negotiators considered them to be temporary and that they would gradually be 
phased out (“Case of Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2009, para. 20). According 
to the ECHR judgement, the international negotiators reluctantly accepted these arrangements 
under pressure from some of the parties to the conflict. Another assumption was that the power-
sharing institutions of the state would proliferate under international supervision and 
sponsorship through the state-building agenda. Susan Woodward (1999) emphasises 
detrimental consequences of the internal division, which were cemented in Dayton. She also 
claims that the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina on ethnic lines was the basis of Dayton, 
while ethnicity was the basis of political participation. As such the Peace Agreement legalised 
the war-time partition of the country, instead of helping the erosion of the social and political 
divisions. In that sense, the DPA was designed to “depluralise the nation” and not to 
“denationalise pluralism” (Campbell, 1998, p. 423).  
 
Fault-Lines in Peace Implementation 
 
The EU’s lack of understanding of the exceptionalism of democracy in BiH has roots in 
the perceptions and intentions of the international peacemakers in Dayton. When designing the 
Peace Agreement, they created a power-sharing arrangement which was meant to serve as a 
trust-building mechanism. The ensuing state-building agenda of the international community 
during its peace implementation years was intended not only to strengthen the capacity of 
institutions, but also served as a post-conflict management strategy, and as an exercise in 
political reconciliation.10 The equitable ethnic representation in the legislative, executive, and 
                                                 
10 The international community in BiH still remains quite robust, with the UN and OSCE representatives, the Council of Europe, 
a large US Embassy mission, as well as numerous other organisations. Their mandates have changed over time, but their 
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judicial branches, the ethnic veto powers, the voting system that is again based on ethnic 
representations, were all designed in order to create assurances that no single constituent people 
could be outvoted or underrepresented. However, as I explain in Chapters III, IV and VI, this 
theory was based on a false premise that national elites simply wanted ethnic guarantees, which 
they would abide by in making democracy work without international intervention. This 
misinformed understanding of the elites’ motivations subsequently thwarted many EU efforts 
that used conditionality and cost-benefit analysis to instil EU norms, resulting in a series of 
failures. 
 
The international community misleadingly assumed that ethnicity-based power sharing 
would alleviate ethnic tensions and create more room for dialogue. The main requirement for 
this system to work was domestic political will, which was always lacking. This system worked 
only while there was heavy international presence, as well as a threat of sanctions, particularly 
a threat of removal of officials by the High Representative.11 The High Representative was 
given executive powers to implement peace at the Conference of the Peace Implementation 
Council held in Bonn in 1997. In practice the executive powers were used mainly to enforce 
laws which ensured implementation of the Peace Agreement. However, the 'Bonn powers' also 
enabled the High Representative to dismiss officials who obstructed peace implementation, and 
they were extensively used before 2006.12 Those measures, and very modest political will, 
ensured compliance and the functioning of this power-sharing arrangement in the first ten years 
after the DPA. However, as soon as the OHR moderated the use of sanctions and imposition of 
laws, the system started to crumble, and obstructions intensified. In Chapter IV, I show that the 
abandonment of the state-building agenda and a decade of political stalemate coincided with 
the EU’s appointment as the chief state-builder, and the main external democratiser in BiH. 
 
Although the process of internationally-sponsored state-building was not very smooth 
and involved heavy conditionality in case of specific reforms (e.g. by the IMF, WB, EU, EBRD, 
                                                 
involvement was significant, particularly during the post-war reconstruction, introducing rule of law, establishing a human 
rights regime and instruments, state-building and capacity building of public institutions, judiciary, elections organisation 
and monitoring, strengthening of civil society and media, etc. 
11 The mandate of the Office of the High Representative of the International Community in BiH (OHR) is defined in Annex X 
of the DPA, and it is entrusted with monitoring the implementation of the peace settlement, and especially to promote full 
compliance with all civilian aspects of the Agreement. The High Representative is appointed by the UN General Assembly, 
to which he reports twice a year. The international community also operates through the Peace Implementation Council, 
whose Steering Board composed of resident ambassadors of countries members of the PIC still meet every week in Sarajevo. 
12 By 2014, all officials formerly removed by the High Representative have been rehabilitated and no longer have a ban on 
occupying a public office. 
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CoE, etc.), the fact is that in the period between 2001 and 2006, many new institutions were 
created at state level, and existing ones were made more functional. Some of the largest state-
building reforms led to the creation of the State Judiciary, the public administration at state and 
at lower levels of government, the Election Commission, unification of armies and a single 
Ministry of Defence, the Indirect Tax Administration, unified Intelligence Agency and State 
Investigation and Protection Authority, Communication Regulatory Agency, a unified system 
of management of personal identity information, a single passport, single car registration plates, 
and tens of other executive agencies at state level.  
 
The Study of BiH Governance Structures (2007) noted that the conditionality from the 
EU, and even more importantly from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
were instrumental in promoting domestic adoption of state-building legislation. They note that 
“without detailed, prescriptive conditions, it is doubtful that there would have been any 
voluntary transfer of competencies to the state from the entities” (Foreign Policy Initiative BH, 
2007, p. 11). In early 2006, state-building was still an issue which the international community 
and civil society were debating with the political elites – how to make this multi-layered system 
more functional and how to provide it with substance. However, the intensification of 
nationalist rhetoric by domestic political elites in 2006, shifted the discourse away from 
pragmatic issues of state functionality to the emotionally charged issues. This view is confirmed 
by an EU official in Sarajevo who said that “EU officials, together with other international 
actors, have been active in the past lobbying legislators to bring domestic law, and to a lesser 
extent practice, in line with EU norms, including through the so-called structural dialogues 
between the European Commission and the domestic authorities. This approach was at its height 
when the international community's role in BiH was at its strongest, and is less evident as the 
BiH authorities have shown less and less interest in conforming to EU requirements” (“Personal 
interview with an EU official in Sarajevo,” 2013). In Chapter IV, I discuss further the role of 
the EU as a state-builder, and how the processes of state-building and democratisation of BiH 
were not mutually reinforced, and in Chapters VI and VII, I show the deliberate attempts of 
some domestic elites to reverse the process of state-building and counteract any international 
efforts to strengthen the state. 
 




In the second empirical Chapter, I discuss equality/participation as a substantive 
dimension of democracy, which is not sufficiently supported by the EU, and is deliberately 
undermined by some nationalist elites. At the core of this fault-line is the voting system that 
was established in Dayton, which was also informed by an ethnic view of the conflict and the 
peace settlement. In the manner explained in previous sections, the ethnic predicament was 
translated into a discriminatory electoral system that gives prevalence to collective ethnic rights 
over individual rights. One of the categories thus instituted is that of the ‘constituent peoples’ 
as per the Preamble to the BiH Constitution, Article II.4, Article II.6 and Article III.3 (b) (“The 
General Framework Agreement,” 1995). According to those articles there are three constituent 
peoples - Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs. Although in the very same sentence of the Preamble to 
the Constitution, also mentioned are ‘all others’ as well as ‘citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 
the fact is that the remainder of the Constitution created a political system in which only Serbs, 
Bosniacs and Croats have full political participation and representation. Moreover, the decision-
making mechanisms as well as the representative bodies are designed to be reflections of the 
existence of three separate ‘constituent’ groups. No representation is envisaged or enabled that 
would surpass the category of ‘constituent’ peoples and provide for a wider, cross-ethnic, social 
base. 
 
In its Partial Decision on the Constituent Peoples in BiH, the Constitutional Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina recognised that there is a “lack of a definition of the status of Bosniacs, 
Croats, and Serbs as constituent peoples…” (“Constitutional Court of BiH,” 2000). In 
instituting proceedings before the Constitutional Court of BiH in 1998, Mr. Alija Izetbegović, 
at that time Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, requested evaluation of 
the consistency of the Constitution of Republika Srpska and the Constitution of the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with regard to 
the all three peoples being constituent on the entire territory of BiH. In line with that, the 
Constitutional Court declared the wording Bosniacs and Croats as constituent peoples in the 
Constitution of FBiH unconstitutional. It also decided that Article 1 of the RS Constitution 
“violates the right to liberty of movement and residence, the right to property and the freedom 
of religion in a discriminatory way on the grounds of national origin and religion as guaranteed 
by Article II. paragraphs 3 and 4 in connection with paragraph 5 of the Constitution of BiH” 
(“Constitutional Court of BiH,” 2000). The Court ruling was thus primarily interpreted as 
regards a majority or minority position of constituent peoples in the entities, i.e. it declared that 
“the express recognition of Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs as constituent peoples by the 
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Constitution of BiH can only have the meaning that none of them is constitutionally recognised 
as a majority, or, in other words, that they enjoy equality as groups” (“Constitutional Court of 
BiH,” 2000). Due to a lack of political agreement on implementation of the Constitutional Court 
decision, the High Representative intervened in 2002 and imposed decisions amending the 
Constitutions of FBiH and RS so as to ensure that “constituent peoples and members of the 
group of Others shall be proportionally represented in public institutions” (“Decision on 
Constitutional Amendments in Republika Srpska,” 2002; “Decision Amending the Constitution 
of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2002; Art. LXXXV). However, in spite the 
Court ruling and OHR’s intervention, proportional representation of constituent peoples has 
been only partially applied to some public offices at entity level, while ‘others’ and citizens of 
BiH are still underrepresented, and even unrecognised in the normative framework. 
 
Judges of the BiH Constitutional Court debated heavily the very term ‘constituent 
peoples’, for which they had to resort to the interpretation of the negotiating process in Dayton. 
They thus state that because the term was inserted into the text of the Dayton Constitution at a 
later stage, it leads to a conclusion that “…the adopters of the Dayton Constitution would not 
have designated Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs as constituent peoples in marked contrast to the 
constitutional category of a national minority if they wanted to leave them in such a minority 
position in the respective Entities...” (“Constitutional Court of BiH,” 2000). Although this 
argument worked in favour of the judgement on equality of the three constituent peoples, it 
shows an open recognition of the fact that the Peace Agreement treats minorities and others as 
less equal, regardless of whether that was the intention of peace makers or not. This is further 
accentuated by one section of the Venice Commission opinion, which states that the use of 
terms Bosniac, Croat and Serb “may be more flexible than they appear, as there is no 
constitutional or legal definition of who is a Bosniac, Croat or Serb. Current electoral rules 
simply require electoral candidates to make a declaration as to their ethnicity” (“Opinion on the 
Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 48th Plenary Meeting,” 2001). 
   
The BiH Constitutional Court decision prohibits any special privilege for one or two 
constituent peoples, “any domination in governmental structures or any ethnic homogenisation 
through segregation based on territorial separation”, and states very clearly that “equality of 
groups is not the same as equality of individuals through non-discrimination”. In elaborating 
on the last point, the Constitutional Court said that “the mix of the ethnic principle with the 
non-ethnic principle of citoyenneté in the compromise formula should avoid that special 
40 
 
collective rights violate individual rights by definition” (“Constitutional Court of BiH,” 2000). 
The Constitutional Court thus establishes that “ethnic separation through territorial delimitation 
does not meet the standards of a democratic state and pluralist society as determined by Article 
I. 2. of the Constitution of BiH in conjunction with paragraph three of the Preamble”. Finally, 
it declares that “ethnic segregation can never be a legitimate aim with regard to the principles 
of democratic societies” nor can “ethnic homogeneity based on territorial separation serve as a 
means to uphold peace on these territories”.13 However, political inequality continues to exist 
in the BiH Constitution, in spite the EU’s continued attempts to remove it on the grounds of 
institutionalised discrimination. 
 
Fault-lines in Democratic Legitimacy 
 
Democratic legitimacy in BiH is undermined by different forms of divisions and 
cleavages that exist in the society, which are debated in Chapter III. Legitimacy is crucial for 
the success of the democratisation process; it is a necessary but insufficient condition for 
democracy to survive, but it is not easy to obtain in new democracies “where legacies of hate, 
mistrust and conflict remain” (Potter, 2005, p. 527). Diamond (1999) claims that “at the mass 
level, there must be a broad normative and behavioural consensus – one that cuts across class, 
ethnic, nationality, and other cleavages – on the legitimacy of the constitutional system, 
however poor or unsatisfying its performance may be at any point in time” (p. 65). This is 
evidenced when “no significant collective actors challenge the legitimacy of democratic 
institutions or regularly violate its constitutional norms, procedures, and laws. Any democracy 
will have its share of cranks, extremists, and rejectionists on the margins of political (and social) 
life. If democracy is to be consolidated, however, these antidemocrats must be truly marginal” 
(L. Diamond, 1999, p. 67). However, democratic legitimacy in BiH is challenged at many 
levels, and in different ways, not out of ignorance, but by those who can be described as ‘anti-
democrats’ whose actions are not marginal, but deliberate actions undermining the state. Those 
different levels in which democratic legitimacy can be undermined include: geographical, 
constitutional and political legitimacy (Potter, 2005).   
 
I argue that different groups in BiH challenge the legitimacy of BiH on each of those 
grounds. Geographical legitimacy means that “those who live within the state accept its 
                                                 
13 This was an argument asserted by the representative of the National Assembly of Replublika Srpska in the Court proceeding. 
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territorial definition and the appropriateness of their place in it” (Potter, 2005, p. 525). 
Democracy is under threat if people do not consider the state legitimate, “in the extreme case, 
the threat might take the form of a secessionist movement” (2005, p. 525). I show examples of 
this in Chapter VI, when discussing an election narrative of SNSD that promotes secession of 
Republika Srpska from BiH. Constitutional legitimacy refers to the acceptance of constitutional 
structure of political power, which in the case of BiH is challenged by different groups, each 
on their own terms and out of their own motivations. The EC Progress Report for 2009 
highlights some examples of the undermining of constitutional legitimacy in which “nationalist 
rhetoric from all political leaders challenging the DPA and, by implication, the constitutional 
order remained commonplace“ (European Commission, 2010). The EC points to the 
questioning of the existence of Republika Srpska by politicians in FBiH, who claim that it is 
the result of a genocide. Politicians from Republika Srpska, on the other hand, frequently 
challenge the State institutions, competencies and laws, including in the context of the European 
accession of BiH. Political legitimacy relates to the extent the electorate considers the 
government to be legitimate (Potter, 2005, p. 526). I argue that the political legitimacy of the 
state has been undermined in a number of ways, mainly through excessive possibilities for 
political obstructionism, the misuse of constitutional provisions for the protection of ethnic 
interests, such as the entity voting and the vital national interest. If elites and representative 
groups show continuous support for democracy, so will the wider public (L. Diamond, 1999, p. 
70). This I argue is not evident in the case of BiH, where elites undermine the public trust and 
belief in the political system. In Chapters VI and VII, I show that democratic legitimacy in BiH 
has been undermined primarily through elite-agency in all three of its aspects mentioned here. 
 
Nationalistic Political Culture 
 
Chapter VI looks at nationalistic political culture expressed in negative narratives, and 
the rhetoric which undermines the state and its institutions, damages the inter-ethnic relations, 
and threatens the future of the country. Nationalism is also considered as one of the main 
impediments to the diffusion of EU norms in BiH, often mobilised for the purpose of 
constructing counter-norms and mobilising ethnic homogenisation. Nationalism is seen as one 
of the most prominent confining conditions shaping the political culture, because it has “an 
enormous potential for mobilising identities and political emotions, not to mention for being 
exploited by ruthless politicians...”, for which I provide ample evidence in Chapter VI 
(Gallagher & Pridham, 2000, p. 16). The 1960s literature which introduced the notion of 
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political culture, treats it as “people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, 
and evaluations about the political system of their country and the role of the self in that system” 
(L. Diamond, 1999, p. 163). The primary function of political culture is to “balance cleavage 
and conflict with the need for consensus” (L. Diamond, 1999, p. 166).  
 
As discussed in previous sections, and as I explain in the following Chapters, the 
political culture in BiH is determined by interaction of a number of factors: the prevalence of 
nationalist rhetoric, the lack of state and social identity, inflammatory discourse, unhelpful 
religious communities, political interference in the judiciary and media, weak civil society, lack 
of consensual politics, etc. The European Commission’s Progress Reports on BiH point to a 
number of cases which substantiate those claims, including voting along ethnic lines in 
Parliament, failure to comply fully with the requirements of the European Convention for 
Human Rights (ECHR), inflammatory rhetoric on identity and ethnicity-related issues which 
impact legislative reforms requiring transfer of competencies from Entities to the State, etc. 
(European Commission, 2010). Nationalism in BiH permeates ethnicity based party-
politicking, creates confrontational discourse, puts political pressure on the press and media, 
causes reform stalemate, inspires inflammatory political rhetoric, and extends perpetuation of 
political crisis. The lack of legitimacy discussed earlier, and the general lack of identification 
with the Dayton state, primarily by its political leaders, the historical legacies, as well as the 
consequences of the war, partly explain why nationalism proves to be a dominant force. By 
placing itself at the core of political rhetoric, nationalism is well positioned to expand into other 
areas where there is a vacuum – institutional structures, political interests and identities.  
 
Nationalistic political culture nurtures instability (and vice versa), it uses symbols and 
myths to sustain the group homogeneity and is thus opposed to religious and ethnic diversity 
(Bianchini in Gallagher & Pridham, 2000).  I use an assessment approach in Chapter VI to 
examine trust in BiH by showing how nationalist myths and symbols are used to construct and 
sustain homogeneity within an ethnic group. I pay particular attention in Chapter VI to the use 
of ‘hate-language’ as a means of sustaining nationalism, generating fear, and undermining 
pluralism (Gallagher, 2000, p. 123).  
 
Dahl ((1971), cited in Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000) adopted a view 
that “nationality differences within states restricted participation for some citizens” (p. 19). The 
causes of that could be attributed to the institutional failure, to which people respond by 
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emphasising their cultural differences and engaging in ethnic outbidding (Przeworski et al., 
2000, p. 21). Nationalism, according to this view, does not cause the collapse of central 
institutions; it is the failures of the centre that provide a “context in which regionally based 
nationalists can effectively mobilise to promote an autonomy movement” (Przeworski et al., 
2000, p. 22). In the case of BiH evidence can be found towards both sides of this argument. As 
discussed in previous sections, nationalism was employed in order to amplify differences 
between ethnic communities and to mobilise populations in the former state and in the current 
state against the central government. At the same time, the weak and shallow institutions created 
in Dayton do inspire adverse feelings, and are not able to counteract continued nationalistic 
endeavours in undermining the state. The constitutional arrangement created in Dayton does 
not enjoy legitimacy of any of the three major ethnic groups in BiH, for different reasons.  
 
Pridham (2000) sees nationalism as one of the most prominent fault-lines that influences 
the political culture of elites. He argues that nationalism mobilises identities and political 
emotions, and is also exploited by politicians (2000, p. 16). Crucial to the construction of 
nationalistic political culture in BiH are the rhetoric, language and discourses (Christiansen, 
2001, p. 5). The role of dominant narratives and their discursive power are reflections of actors 
interests and beliefs, which in the case of BiH are fashioned in an inflammatory manner, further 
drifting apart the already divergent positions on ethnicity, the state, democracy, etc. The best 
illustration of those practises is a statement of the RS President, Milorad Dodik, who explained 
the purpose of his rhetoric: “when I speak at election rallies, I speak about integration, Europe, 
rule of law, economy, future… and my audiences behave as if in theatre.  And then I throw at 
them a slogan ‘We won’t let go of Republika Srpska’ and my job is done. Neither I nor they 
know what this means, or who’s taking it away from us. But the theatre audiences suddenly 
reach a boiling point, and that is how I recruit a large part of my voters” (Kurspahić, 2012).  
 
The case study I use in Chapter VI is based on Dodik’s 2010 election campaign in which 
he deployed a number of negative narratives that undermine democracy in BiH, and the 
integrity of the state. Dodik was for a long time considered to be a moderate politician, 
originally elected to the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the first 
multiparty parliamentary elections in 1990, as a representative of a non-nationalist party, the 
Reformists. During the conflict in BiH, he became a member of the National Assembly of 
Republika Srpska, and acted as opposition to the governing Serb Democratic Party (SDS) until 
the Peace Agreement was signed. He then formed a new opposition party and came to power 
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in Republika Srpska in 1998 for a short period of time, backed by strong international support 
and assistance. He enjoyed generous international support and assistance throughout his fight 
to return to power which he managed again in early 2006 through a political deal with the ever 
weakening SDS.  
 
In order to win forthcoming elections in Republika Srpska in October 2006, Dodik 
turned to nationalist rhetoric, which he successfully sustained for the next four years. During 
that time, the intensity and intention of his policies and rhetoric exceeded that of SDS, which 
bore the legacy of war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and ambition to split up the country. His 
rhetoric was closely matched by that of a Bosniac politician, Haris Silajdžić, leader of Party for 
BiH (SBiH). In a fashion similar to that of Dodik, Silajdžić saw the nationalist rhetoric as a way 
to return to power. He used to be the war-time Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, who disagreed with policies of SDA, his party at the time, and 
departed from them in order to create his own political party, SBiH.  
 
SBiH gained popularity for a short time, placing themselves closer to the centre than 
SDA. However, the party was based pretty much on Silajdžić’s war time legacies and his 
charisma, and started to loose support following their ineffective participation in the 2001 - 
2003 government formed by the Alliance for Changes. Silajdžić saw an opportunity to return 
to power again in 2006, when he filed a candidacy for the Presidency of BiH. His election 
strategy was two-fold: he decided to play the nationalist card, calling for the abolition of 
Republika Srpska, and also ran an intensive campaign against a package of constitutional 
amendments, known as the ‘April package’.14  
 
Silajdžić is often accused of provoking Dodik’s nationalism, although those claims are 
difficult to substantiate given that Dodik had wholeheartedly adopted the nationalist agenda and 
sustained it ever since. Nonetheless, Dodik and Silajdžić can both be blamed for dramatically 
polarising political and social life along ethnic lines within a short period of time. The following 
nine years have been marred by an unprecedented political stalemate with lowest government 
                                                 
14 The ‘April package’ of constitutional reforms was proposed in early 2006. It was the first and last serious attempt to change 
the Dayton Constitution in order to make the state more participatory, less discriminatory, and more functional. The package 
was initially negotiated among members of various political parties, facilitated by a local NGO, the Dayton Project. Once 
elaborated into a set of amendments, the ‘April package’ was endorsed by the US Department of State, the EU, and European 
countries individually, as well as members of the Peace Implementation Council. It was also supported by parties from 
Republika Srpska. However, it failed in parliament by the votes of two of Silajdžić’s supporters in Parliament. 
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activity, which partly reversed ten years of peace building and reforms that had opened up ways 
for BiH to join the EU and NATO. The rhetoric deployed by both leaders inflamed the general 
political discourse and imposed zero-sum positions on both sides. Silajdžić was not re-elected 
in 2010, and his party lost all seats in state Parliament at the 2014 general elections. He left the 
SBiH Party in 2010, and has not participated publicly in political life in BiH since. 
 
Dodik, on the other hand, has been able to sustain and benefit electorally from the 
nationalist rhetoric in all subsequent elections. It is, however, important to note that his 
nationalist rhetoric came as a surprise to both local political actors, as well as the international 
community which carried a large part of responsibility for Dodik’s political success. During 
their moderate years, Dodik’s party SNSD was a long standing partner of the National 
Democratic Institute from Washington and other foreign political foundations, which provided 
training on campaigning, message and platform development, voter communication, etc. 
(“NDI,” n.d.). On top of the acquired techniques to formulate a message and frame issues, 
Dodik’s Government also sought help from professionals and signed a contract with a couple 
of lobbying and PR firms from the United States, which resulted in a carefully planned and very 
successfully delivered election strategy, as well as a lobbying campaign in Washington D.C. 
and Brussels. Although initially used to win the 2006 elections, over four years of the 
government mandate, this strategy turned into a more ambitious project of undermining the 
state of BiH and requesting more autonomy, and even independence of Republika Srpska. 
Dodik’s rhetoric was carefully engineered to serve that goal, slowly crumbling the little trust 
that had been built in the first ten years following the Peace Agreement, as I explain in Chapter 
VI.  
 
Given the fact that by the year 2006 most of the other parties from Republika Srpska 
had moderated their discourse compared to the first few years after the war, Dodik’s radicalised 
campaign was not expected within the RS either. Nationalist extremism on the part of the 
primarily right-wing RS parties in the few years prior to 2006 was expressed more in terms of 
opposition to reforms and transfer of competencies to the State level, rather than as an outright 
policy towards RS secession and autonomy. That was hardly even a part of the political rhetoric, 
also due to the fact that the High Representative of the International Community in BiH (HRep) 
had been energetically removing officials on the grounds of any serious undermining of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement in the period between 1997 and 2005. As the influence of the 
international community declined in 2005, Dodik saw this as an opportunity to revive the 
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nationalist and secessionist rhetoric and deployed it in a successful attempt to mobilise voters 
on the grounds of extremism and fear of others. His cause was helped by ten years of the 
international community’s deliberate circumventing of nationalist parties in RS, which had 
weakened the strongest Serb Democratic Party (SDS), and also open international support for 
Dodik himself. Also, by 2006 the then leadership of SDS had started to openly favour pragmatic 
policies of moving on with practical and technical reforms required by the EU, including their 
support for the ‘April package’ that would have made the State more functional. Dodik used 
this fact heavily against the SDS while radicalising the RS electorate and opened the way for a 
revived opposition to the State. His rhetoric and the promise of organising a referendum on 
RS’s independence in 2018, have polarised society at levels unimaginable even in 1995. 
 
Low Levels of Trust  
 
The second substantive dimension of democratic quality that is analysed in Chapter VI 
is trust. The weakening of the institutions, the intensification of nationalist rhetoric, and the 
reform stalemate that was thus created, generated a sense of despair and apathy among the 
population since 2006, which created unprecedented social fault-lines manifested in declining 
levels of trust. A Report conducted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
in 2009 “The Ties that Bind” suggests that relations between the various ethnic groups in BiH 
had deteriorated since 2006, which they partly attribute to the rise of the nationalist rhetoric of 
Dodik and Silajdžić. The Survey showed that the Interethnic Stability Index was down on the 
previous reporting period, and attributes this fall to the worsening political situation in the 
country, and the long-standing failure of political negotiations between the political leaders, 
principally on constitutional change. Furthermore, the Report states that “there is little bridging 
or linking social capital. The resulting social fabric is characterised by fragmentation and 
segmentation rather than cohesion and solidarity” (UNDP, 2009b, p. 10).  
 
Other reports corroborate those findings. The UNDP National Human Development 
Report for 2009 examines the very low levels of social trust in BiH, and finds that very few 
interviewees feel that most people can be trusted. Although as they argue, it would be expected 
that the level of trust would increase over time and as the community moved further away from 
the past conflict, it is clearly the case that the level of trust had fallen as the political situation 
deteriorated after 2006. In support of that argument, the UNDP’s Early Warning Survey 
conducted on the basis of the results of the public opinion poll in November 2009, shows that 
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there have been very few positive developments in BiH in terms of political life and in how the 
domestic political process is unfolding. In actual fact, they state that the opposite is the case as 
the political crisis has deepened further (UNDP, 2009a, p. 6). Most of this research, whether 
looking at institutions or individuals, is essentially concerned with inter-ethnic trust. The inter-
ethnic trust that was gradually built after the conflict in BiH was fragile to begin with, but a 
number of institutional mechanisms were put in place in order to safeguard those efforts. 
However, the power-sharing mechanisms, which rely so heavily on ethnic consensus, were 
dependent on a high degree of political will in order to function fully. As mentioned in previous 
sections, whenever political will was absent, institutional mechanisms became powerless in 
protecting inter-ethnic trust against the rhetoric that deliberately sought to undermine it.  
 
In the same manner in which trust can be viewed from a cultural and institutional 
perspective, distrust can also be viewed using those two perspectives. Mishler and Rose (2001, 
p. 37) hypothesise that four factors influence varying degrees of trust, including national 
culture, individual socialisation, government performance, and individual evaluations. Several 
studies which look into the case of BiH take a cultural perspective, basing it on primordialist 
theories of ancient hatreds, and assume that the legacy of distrust in BiH is eternal and precedes 
the conflict. However, the majority of literature I reviewed not only dismisses such notions, but 
even shows that the level of distrust among people with personal experience of the conflict is 
not as high as expected. Ward et al. (2007) link trust to peace, which can be constructed or is 
more of ‘a natural societal trait’. They argue that, conversely, conflict destroys trust, which is 
why their research focuses on factors that are likely to bring about or promote trust, in particular 
inter-ethnic trust in post-conflict societies. One important finding they point to is that although 
the overall level of trust in BiH is low, it is clear that “inter-ethnic trust is not uniformly 
negative, as suggested by some” (Ward et al., 2007, p. 65).  
 
Pickering (2006, p. 85) examines the development of social routes for resisting 
interethnic conflict and focuses on how ordinary people react to the policies of elites. In line 
with the findings of the UNDP survey, Pickering also finds that people struggle with “raw 
wartime memories, propaganda, impoverishment, … an outflow of intellectuals, and nationalist 
rule” (2006, p. 87). Research conducted by Whitt and Wilson (2007) “lends further credence to 
the argument that the roots of the Bosnian conflict are not derived from widespread and 
enduring ethnic hatred. Instead, our results underscore the importance of institutional and 
entrepreneurial explanations of the Bosnian conflict and for understanding post-war divisions 
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in Bosnian society” (p. 666). Although different studies reviewed in this section point to a 
variety of underlying socio-economic and cultural conditions that contributed to the decline of 
trust, they mostly miss out on elite-agency as a key factor in explaining why the underlying 
causes of distrust were triggered to cause such a sharp decline since 2006 elections. My 
argument is that the sudden decline in trust, so long after peace was signed, can only be fully 
explained by looking at deliberate attempts of political elites to destroy generalised trust in BiH 





The purpose of this Chapter was to contextualise democracy and democratisation in BiH 
through a discussion of social and political fault-lines. I have argued that the fault-lines which 
have been created since the late 1980s provide explanations of the endurance of nationalism, 
and its peculiar relationship with democracy in BiH. Understanding the exceptionalism of that 
relationship is crucial to explaining the nature of resistance to democratic consolidation, which 
the EU faces in BiH. In Chapters IV, VI and VII, I focus more on the EU’s own shortcomings 
in overcoming those obstacles. However, I needed to emphasise through this Chapter the 
magnitude of structural as well as ideational obstacles to democratic consolidation. Also 
important for my arguments in subsequent Chapters is the understanding of the tenacity of 
endeavours that create new, and strengthen the existing fault-lines in democracy. I will make a 
strong argument in the next Chapter that those endeavours are primarily results of deliberate 
elite-agency, but also reflections of the restrictive political context.  
 
As I have emphasised in this Chapter, in order to explain the role of the international 
players in BiH, and the EU in particular, it is important to fully comprehend the philosophy 
behind the ‘peace-making’ aspect of the DPA. As I have reiterated already, that philosophy was 
to keep the three groups apart so as not to go to war again, and to give each as much as possible 
of the political rights they desired in order to stop fighting, even if at the expense of the political 
rights of minorities. This false assumption was adopted by the EU as the main state- and 
democracy-builder in BiH, which undermined any serious prospects of strengthening and 
consolidating democracy. The EU thus consoled itself with enabling inter-ethnic cooperation 
through the power-sharing institutions, hoping that it would eventually create progress. 
However, as I argued in this Chapter, the ethnic power-sharing to a large degree legitimised the 
49 
 
ethnic partition of a complex and heterogeneous society (Campbell, 1998). Under the pressure 
to achieve peace and given the complex nature of the conflict, the results were imperfect, 
comprising many fault-lines, but resembling a ‘permanent ceasefire’ (Chivvis, 2010).  
 
Implicit to this philosophy are many structural fault-lines, to which I return in the next 
Chapter in more detail. First and foremost, the Dayton Peace Agreement built discrimination 
into the voting system, which the international community and the EU tolerated until 2009. 
However, the partial judgement by the European Court of Human Rights in the ‘Sejdić/Finci’ 
case in 2009 demanded that this system would be changed. The judgement confirmed that 
ethnicity-based exclusion was introduced in Dayton in the pursuit of the restoration of peace, 
but that the time had come to change it (“Case of Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 
2009, para. 45). Part and parcel of that discriminatory system is the preoccupation with 
representation of ‘constituent peoples’, which instilled institutional mechanisms of 
discrimination.  
 
As stated, I put strong emphasis on the role of the nationalist elites in crumbling 
democracy in BiH, and for that purpose it was important to explain how the nationalist legacies 
were created and sustained through the electoral system in BiH. The new electoral system was 
applied for the first time in 1996, just months after peace was signed, allowing the war-time 
ethnic elites to re-enter the new political system. Ironically, the elections were based on the new 
voting rules created by those same elites in Dayton under international supervision. Entrenching 
the political elites of the time so firmly and so early on into the political system ensured that 
the war-time legacies gained legitimacy and imposed even more firmly their visions of society, 
crowding out any political ideas that would advocate democratisation. This was particularly 
important for the endurance of nationalism, as most of the re-elected parties were the nationalist 
parties which were elected in the 1991 elections. Their appetite for nationalism had intensified 
and strengthened after the war, exacerbated by the atrocities committed during the war. The 
fear of other ethnic groups had grown multi-fold after the war, creating fertile ground for 
emotional manipulation by the nationalist elites, and resulting in low levels of trust in the 
society. 
 
The international supervision of the implementation of the Peace Agreement, the heavy 
interventions of the international community in state-building, and demands created by the EU 
and NATO accession, held this system together for a while, and the country made significant 
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progress between 2001 and 2006. However, deterioration of the political situation since 2006 
has placed nationalism back at the centre of politics and public life in BiH ever since. The 
society has polarised even further, while there have been successions of futile governments 
which jumped from one crisis to another, creating a sense of permanent crisis. Although the EU 
signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with BiH in 2008, following the 
EU’s extensive concessions on some of the conditionality as discussed in Chapter IV, the SAA 
only came into force in 2015. The reform stalemate that has marked the period in-between has 
generated a widespread sense of apathy among the population, which resorted to extensive 
support for nationalist parties again in the 2014 General Elections.  
 
Democracy and democratisation in BiH have been developing in such an adversarial 
and divisive context, burdened by the fault-lines that lead to an intensified disintegration of the 
society. In the following Chapters, I argue that those fault-lines are the cause of a decline in 
democracy in BiH, which can be described as ‘‘defective’’, ‘illiberal’, or ‘pseudo-democracy’. 
The fault-lines which thus undermine democracy include ethnic polarisation, weak and shallow 
institutions, a lack of legitimacy, a discriminatory electoral system, nationalistic political 
culture, and low levels of trust. The EU on its part fails to account for all the fault-lines in a 
hostile domestic context that have either deepened, or have been newly created since 2006, all 








This thesis exposes the limits of the EU normative power in democratising BiH as a 
post-conflict society. In the next Chapter, I look at the ineffectiveness of the EU conditionality 
in BiH, particularly in regards to the EU’s own limitations and shortcomings in promoting 
democratic values. In this Chapter, I continue discussion about ways in which the nature of 
democracy and democratisation in BiH thwart the EU’s efforts.  
 
My first argument is related to the nature of obstacles to EU democratisation in BiH. 
Correctly assessing the nature of democracy in BiH is important for understanding different 
obstacles which the EU faces in promoting democracy. As discussed in the previous Chapter, 
this restrictive domestic context poses structural/institutional, as well as ideational impediments 
to the spread of EU norms, which is why the EU’s ‘cookie-cutter approach’ that was applied 
elsewhere in the region and in CEE, is not contributing to substantive democracy in BiH. In the 
next Chapter, I discuss the EU’s procedural democratisation, and argue that it undermines 
substantive democracy in BiH. In this Chapter, I address the second part of that argument by 
explaining what substantive democracy represents, and which aspects of substantive democracy 
are side-lined by the focus on procedural democracy. That task is even more demanding given 
my preference for understanding democracy as an open-ended, highly contextualised process 
(Whitehead, 2002). That is why I do not entirely reject the procedural and structural aspects of 
democratisation; on the contrary, they are accounted for in order to determine how they are 
mutually constituted with dimensions of substantive democracy. That choice determines my 
use of a constructivist approach in designing a framework of analysis in Chapter V.  
 
My second argument in this Chapter is that values and norms entrenched in BiH society 
(ethnic division, predominance of collective over individual rights, nationalism, etc.) are 
contradictory and incompatible with the normative basis of the EU (democracy, rule of law, 
social justice and respect for human rights). In the empirical Chapters I show how that 
contradiction is manifested in practice. In this Chapter, however, I begin to lay out the basics 
of the clash of values that exists between BiH and the EU in order to show that EU values may 
not be appealing enough if they jeopardise the status-quo. Relying on some basic assumptions 
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presented in the previous Chapter, my central argument in this Chapter is that ethnic nationalism 
is a barrier to salience of EU democratic norms, and an ideational obstacle to democratisation.  
 
My third argument in this Chapter is that BiH continues to be an unconsolidated 
democracy that contains features of different models of unsuccessful democracies that I 
describe as an eclectically unconsolidated democracy. Democratic consolidation of BiH is still 
under construction, and has not produced democratic quality. 
 
I resort to interpretativist approaches, which do not predict the outcome of 
democratisation in deterministic terms, but see it as open-ended and dependent on the context 
(Whitehead, 2002; Diamond, 1999).15 Democracy can be weakened or even diminish “not 
merely through the breakdown of formal institutions but also through the more insidious 
processes of decay” (1999, p. 19). This ‘insidious decay’ is a neglected but important feature 
of new democracies, and extremely important for recognising flaws in the quality of democracy 
in BiH. However, apart from the institutional decay, I am also interested in the decay which 
results from elite-agency. In Chapter V I explain the use of a related, but more elite-centred 
criteria of ‘subversions’ of democracy, which can explain reversals to undemocratic practices.  
 
In the remainder of this Chapter, I proceed by discussing the nature of democracy in 
BiH from the perspective of definitions of democracy, and make a case that BiH is a democracy 
in procedural, but not in a substantive sense. In the second part of this Chapter, I describe BiH 
as an unconsolidated democracy that contains features of many different models of unsuccessful 
democratisations. In the third part of the Chapter, I describe BiH as an ‘eclectically 
unconsolidated democracy’, and explain how I intend to analyse it as such.  
 
Between Procedural and Substantive Definitions of Democracy 
 
As I argue throughout this thesis, BiH is not an example of an emerging democracy, 
which the EU was involved with in Central and Eastern Europe. BiH is a case that shows 
reversals to undemocratic practices, and the centrifugal forces which drive EU norms away 
from democracy in BiH. The EU lacks that understanding and applies its misplaced ‘cookie-
cutter approach’, which undermines substantive democracy in BiH. In order to be able to 
                                                 
15 Interpretativist approaches see democratisation as an open-ended process, which is seen as dynamic, complex and not linear. 
This approach abandons the quest for a universally applicable concept and emphasises the importance of a context. 
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underline the important difference between ‘procedural’ and ‘substantive’ democracy in BiH, I 
resort to several definitions of democracy.  
 
There can be no single definition of democracy, or as Dahl (2000) put it: “democracy 
has been discussed off and on for about twenty-five hundred years, enough time to provide a 
tidy set of ideas about democracy on which everyone, or nearly everyone, could agree. For 
better or for worse, this is not the case” (pp. 2–3). However, I am more interested in individual 
elements of democracy, procedural and substantive, rather than the universality of the concept. 
As I will show in this section, BiH fulfils the main procedural requirements of a democracy, 
but its democracy is short on substance. Defining correctly the type of democracy in BiH serves 
the purpose of describing the restrictive domestic context, and the nature of impediments to EU 
norms. It shows that obstacles to democracy are not just structural, but are also ideational and 
strongly embedded in the type of unconsolidated democracy that BiH has become. In the 
following sections I discuss some of the elements of democracy which are undermined in BiH, 
including political competition, freedom of speech, free media, civil society and the freedom to 
form associations, equality and trust, and the role of informal structures. 
 
Democracy in BiH fits the minimalist definition of democracy, which requires 
institutional arrangements enabling political competition (Schumpeter, 1962, p. 242), or 
elements of opposition and participation (Przeworski, 2000, pp. 50–51). Political competition 
was enabled as soon as the first general elections in BiH as an independent state, which were 
held in 1996. The overall winning parties were the same parties that won in 1991, the nationalist 
parties claiming to represent the interests of respective ethnic groups, Party for Democratic 
Action (SDA), Croat Democratic Union (HDZ), and Serb Democratic Party (SDS). Most of the 
war-time leaders were re-elected into the new state institutions. The subsequent general 
elections were held in 1998, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014. Although political competition 
is enabled, the fact is that nationalist parties held majorities ever since, with the exception of 
the elections in 2000 and 2010, when some opposition parties formed governments at different 
levels for a short time, and with the help of nationalist parties in the second instance.  
 
In the RS, political competition was always problematic, existing only in form, but not 
in substance. Although there have been frequent changes of political parties in government 
before 2006, most of them won on the basis of nationalist rhetoric, rather than on programmatic 
issues. As I discuss in Chapter VI, the choice of nationalist rhetoric for parties in the RS is a 
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matter of pragmatism that ensures the winning of votes. The best example is the Party of 
Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) under the leadership of Milorad Dodik, which managed 
to form a majority government for the first time in 1998 based on an economic agenda, but soon 
lost elections, and decided to deploy strong nationalist narratives in all elections since 2006 in 
order to secure stable governments. A somewhat reformed SDS party returned to the RS 
Government only briefly between 2005-2006, after which SNSD took over power again in all 
subsequent elections including those held in 2014. Political competition in BiH thus remains 
only at procedural level, fulfilling the basic requirement of holding regular elections and 
occasionally changing the government. However, when looking at substance of political 
competition that is dominated by nationalist narratives, the rhetoric and policies thus generated 
show how elite-agency and nationalist values actually thwart political competition as a 
democratic norm.  
 
Apart from the basic institutional arrangements enabling competition, BiH also fulfils 
the procedural requirements on opposition and participation. In 2014, there were one hundred 
and eighty three political parties registered in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is more than in 
any other country in the region. Although there is no recent data about the registered number 
of civil society organisations, according to the last such study conducted in 2008, that number 
might be as high as 12,000 (Žeravčić, 2008). However, from a substantive perspective, both 
political competition and participation are very weak. Weaknesses in civil society in BiH are 
usually attributed to low-capacity, poor organisation and weak articulation of interests inside 
the civil society. However, such a view does not take into account the enormous tenacity of the 
elites and their capacity to resist pressures from civil society organisations (Diamandouros & 
Larrabee, 2000, p. 31). According to Diamandouros and Larrabee, this capacity to resist is 
particularly rooted in the dominant pattern of state-society relations in South-East Europe, 
where the ‘highly personalised and unmediated exercise of power’ weaken the role of formal 
structures. Civil society plays an indispensable role during the consolidation, in creation of 
democratic political culture, in setting the norms of democratic behaviour, and in sustaining 
democracy. I argue in Chapters VI and VII that the absence of such influences are one of the 
reasons why democratic norms have not taken root in BiH. By being an ‘elite-packed’ 
democracy (L. Diamond, 1999), BiH suffers from the fact that the political parties have 
monopolised the political process and robbed civil society of their autonomy and substantive 
influence (1999, p. 97). In Chapter VI, I take into account the role of elites in resisting pressures 
from civil society, as well as the historical and cultural legacies that determine the patterns of 
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state-society relations, which are highly personalised and undermine the role of formal 
structures. 
 
In order to highlight the ideational impediments to the EU’s promotion of democracy in 
BiH, I also look into definitions which include some elements of quality of democracy. One 
such definition is provided by Dahl (1962), who defines “polyarchies” as the polities and social 
organisations at or above the threshold identified by seven basic elements. Of those, BiH fulfils 
partly two: elected officials do exercise control over governmental decisions; and elected 
officials are chosen and removed in frequent, fair and free elections. However, it comes short 
on the condition requiring that all adults have the right to vote in elections. It will be recalled 
from the previous Chapter, that there are constitutional restrictions in place in regards to the 
choice of candidates in elections.  
 
There are restrictions in regards to the fourth element too, because not all adults have 
the right to run for public office, and this discrimination is at the core of the ECHR’s ruling in 
the Sejdić/Finci case. The most prominent constitutional mechanism that is based on exclusion 
is the election of members of BiH Presidency.  The Serb member of Presidency can only be 
elected by voters registered in Republika Srpska.16 This means that Croats and Bosniacs and all 
others living in Republika Srpska can in practice only elect a Serb member of Presidency and 
cannot themselves be elected, while Serbs living in Federation of BiH cannot elect a Serb or be 
themselves elected for Presidency, but need to choose between Croat and Bosniac candidates. 
Minorities and those that do not declare themselves as belonging to any of the three ethnic 
groups are not at all allowed to run for the Presidency, neither are they represented in the House 
of Peoples. This also includes individuals who come from so called ‘mixed marriages’, i.e. 
whose parents belong to two different ethnic groups. This case is analysed as the main empirical 
example in Chapter VII. 
 
In regards to the remaining three elements, it can be said that there are mechanisms in 
place to fulfil those conditions, but there is a question as to how effective or efficient they are. 
The freedom of expression is guaranteed in the Constitution,17 but that freedom is not 
“effectively enforced” as required by Dahl’s definition. Although freedom of expression ranks 
very high as an EU norm, over the past few years it has been seriously jeopardised in Republika 
                                                 
16 The state Presidency is composed of three members, each from one ethnic group/constituent peoples. 
17 The General Framework for Peace, Annex IV – Constitution, Article II.3.h. 
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Srpska. This culminated in the RS Government’s decision in early 2015 to criminalise social 
media postings that disrupt social order, display symbols, images, drawings or texts containing 
indecent, offensive or disturbing content or insult or engage in rude or insolent behaviour. The 
Law on Public Peace and Order was approved by the National Assembly of Republika Srpska 
in February 2015, which was condemned by a number of international organisations, including 
the EU and OSCE (OSCE, 2015). OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Dunja 
Mijatović stated: “I am disappointed that so many local and international voices of concern 
were simply ignored - this new law paves way for legal restrictions to online free expression 
and free media. By including social media in the law, there is a danger that officials could 
interpret ill-defined terms to sanction and limit the free flow of information and free expression 
online.” (OSCE, 2015).  
 
The fifth element of a ‘polyarchy’ is that citizens have access to alternative sources of 
information that are not monopolised by the government, which is the case to some degree, but 
the new RS Law on Public Peace and Order might limit that access by putting restrictions on 
social media, which remain more independent than other electronic and print media. The public 
broadcasters and other media are “divided on ethno-territorial lines, reflecting divisions in the 
body politic. Attempts to operate a multi-ethnic, state-wide public broadcaster have been 
undermined by political obstruction, particularly from the Republika Srpska (RS) political elite. 
The RS president called for the state public broadcaster to be abolished in December 2011” 
(Bertelsmann Foundation, 2014, p. 10). It is important to note here that the Government of the 
RS regularly subsidises the private media in the amount of approximately three million Euros 
per year, without any transparent criteria (“Personal interview with Aleksandar Trifunović, 
BUKA Portal,” 2015). This raises doubts about the impartiality of the private electronic media, 
while the public media remain under considerable control of the RS Government.  
 
 And finally, the citizens’ right to form and join autonomous associations, including 
political associations, has also been threatened in the RS in 2015. Even though there is state-
level and entity-level legislation regulating the work of Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs), in May 2015, the RS Government decided to put into procedure a draft Law on 
Publicity of Work of Non-Profit Organisations. According to an independent analysis, the Law 
“discriminates against NGOs, it limits citizens’ rights, undermines democracy and free society” 
(“BUKA analiza,” 2015). It prohibits any action by non-governmental organisations intended 
to create public opinion for achieving political goals. The draft Law was withdrawn from the 
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agenda following strong rhetoric from the international community, and because of inadequate 
support among members of the RS National Assembly. 
 
Schmitter and Karl (1991) supplement Dahl’s seven ‘procedural minimum’ conditions 
for democracy with another two - popularly elected officials must be able to exercise their 
constitutional power without being subjected to overriding opposition from un-elected officials, 
and the polity must be self-governing, independent from some other political system. Although 
those conditions are formally fulfilled in BiH, both are undermined by the strong role of 
informal structures. A study that examined the relationship between formal and informal 
institutions concluded that there is “a mutually endogenous relationship between confidence in 
formal institutions and reliance on informal institutions” acknowledging also that there is “a 
substituting relationship between formal and informal institutions” (Efendic, Pugh, & Adnett, 
2011, pp. 532–4). Another influential non-elected actor in public and political life are religious 
communities which “became key components of influential informal elite structures during the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia. Religious leaders continue to use their positions to shape political 
discourse and events in the country” (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2014, p. 7). 
 
The examples in this section show that democracy in BiH poses a number of structural 
and ideational impediments to EU norms. I have used definitions of democracy in order to 
highlight the exceptional development of democracy in BiH, which defies procedural and 
substantive definitions. The nature and magnitude of impediments to democracy thus 
emphasised show that democracy in BiH has not consolidated. 
 
Problems of Democratic Consolidation 
 
I borrow the term ‘consolidation of democracy’ from different theories of transition. 
However, I reject the linearity of the transition approaches, and insist on understanding 
democracy as an open-ended, contextualised process. In this section I suggest that consolidation 
should be understood as a normative framework for analysis, rather than as a stage of 
democratic transition. In that sense, I seek to show the absence of substantive features of 
democracy through the assessment of consolidation of democracy in BiH, i.e. seeing 




In this section I come to the third argument presented in this Chapter, that 
unconsolidated democracies create unprecedented obstacles to the promotion of EU norms. As 
a democracy which is attempting to consolidate, BiH cannot be treated the same as emerging 
democracies. It should rather be looked upon as a case of reversal to undemocratic practices, 
which the EU is addressing adequately. In the next Chapter I return to the inadequacy of the 
EU’s response to the challenges posed by an unconsolidated democracy. I first return to 
defining and describing BiH as an unconsolidated democracy. 
 
Unconsolidated democracies. Diamond (1996) has argued that Huntington’s (1993) 
third ‘wave’18 of democratisation was ‘drawing to a close’, but was not complete. Democracies 
thus created have not consolidated, and many of them even show signs of possible democratic 
decline and regression to some ‘old’ practices. In this section I argue that democracy in BiH 
has some attributes of each of those unsuccessful democracies, which is why I prefer to call it 
an eclectically unconsolidated democracy. Calling such a democracy the right name is not only 
a matter of terminology. Labelling it correctly helps frame my arguments that the EU is not 
adequately addressing the nature of the problem in BiH. The main reason why I need to 
determine the nature and level of the failure to democratise BiH is to be more precise in 
assessing the underlying context in which defects occur, and defining the character of potential 
resistance to democratisation. Identifying the obstacles will further inform my discussion about 
appropriateness of democratisation policies, and measuring defects (or ‘subversions’, a term 
that I borrow and adopt) in Chapters V, VI and VII.  
 
In the previous section I argued that BiH fulfils some of the basic criteria of a procedural 
democracy, but that it comes short of democratic substance. Diamond (1996, p. 21) considers 
electoral democracy to be one of the contemporary minimalist conceptions of democracy. The 
expansion and growing number of electoral democracies is in itself evidence of the superficial 
nature of the ‘third-wave’ democratisation and transitional theories (Diamond, 1999, p. 55). He 
argues that instead of a full regression to authoritarianism, the ‘third wave’ democracies are 
more likely to continue in the direction in which they have been developing, and the best that 
                                                 
18 Samuel Huntington (1993) describes the spread of democracy in terms of the ‘three waves of democratisation’ and attributes 
the regime changes in the last wave (1970s, 1980s) to multiple factors: deepening legitimacy problems of the authoritarian 
regimes; global economic growth, which raised living standards, level of education and urbanisation, which increased popular 
expectations and demand for regime change; changes in religious institutions, which found themselves in opposition to the 
authoritarian regimes; external factors, which promoted human rights and democratisation; geographic proximity and the 
‘snowballing effect’ which encouraged the spread of democracy across national borders. 
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can be expected is their consolidation as mere electoral democracies, through legitimation and 
institutionalisation (Diamond, 1999, p. 22). Depending on the character and level of their failure 
to consolidate, the cases of unsuccessful democratisations can be labelled as delegative, 
illiberal, ‘‘defective’’ and pseudo-democracies.  
 
Delegative democracies. Diamond (1999) argues that conditions which make electoral 
democracies shallow, unaccountable, and illiberal can be attributed to the weakness of political 
institutions. Democracies in which “the gap between democratic form and substance in the 
world is an institutional gap” are labelled as delegative democracies (Diamond, 1999, p. 34). 
The institutional gap between procedural and substantive democracy is of particular relevance 
to BiH, which suffers from the weakness of institutions that is a consequence of a number of 
factors.  As described in the previous Chapter, the Dayton Peace Agreement created a limited 
number of institutions at state level, while coordination between different levels of government 
has been poor and inefficient. The internationally driven state-building process was intended to 
strengthen the existing institutions, and create new ones in line with the country’s needs and 
international commitments. Although some progress has been achieved and many new 
institutions created, the system as a whole remains shallow and weak.  
 
The state has limited decision-making capacities, with the entities and national caucuses 
in the parliament able to paralyse decision-making process by extensive veto mechanisms built 
into the institutional structure (Bieber, 2011, p. 1788). Mechanisms of protection of ‘national 
interests’ are designed to provide protection only to constituent ethnic groups against majority 
decisions by others, and are numerous to the point of obscuring the decision-making process, 
as described in the previous Chapter. The extensive use of veto mechanisms, often inspired by 
a denial of the state’s competencies by entity representatives, or purely for the purpose of 
political obstruction, have impacted the flow of the decision-making process and ultimately the 
quality of legislation passed through a labyrinth of vetoes. The decision-making process in most 
cases is steered not in the direction of legislating the will of citizens, but in the direction of 
avoiding or overcoming the barriers placed by ethnic veto powers.  
 
The Study of BiH Governance Structures notes that “much of the post-war ‘state-
building’ process in BiH has been based on the principle of ‘institutional layering’, in which 
pre-war, wartime and post-war institutions have been allowed to coexist, with serious mandate 
and authority overlaps” (Foreign Policy Initiative BH, 2007, p. 52). The structural weakness of 
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institutions therefore stems from such a complex distribution of powers, the extensive use of 
veto mechanisms, and the unfinished process of state-building, which cumulatively qualify BiH 
as partly being a delegative democracy.  
 
Pseudodemocracies. Lipset (1981), Linz (1996) and Diamond (1999) label 
‘pseudodemocracies’ as those democracies which are less than minimally democratic but still 
not authoritarian. Diamond (1999) argues that the existence of formally democratic political 
institutions “masks the reality of authoritarian domination” (p. 15). This type includes semi-
democracies, which are dominated by a single ruling party, which discourages opposition, 
denies it the right to compete for power, and regularly ‘wins massively’.  
 
Although BiH as a multiparty electoral system is not a semi-democracy, it does contain 
some features which would partly qualify it as a pseudodemocracy. Some of those features have 
been discussed already and include the weakness of institutions, the existence and strong 
influence of informal structures, low participation, dominance of nationalist parties, and 
inefficient opposition. However, even more important for the arguments I make in Chapter VI 
is the element of “highly personalistic and poorly institutionalised” undemocratic dominance 
of the ruling party (L. Diamond et al., 1999, p. 16). This is not a prevailing feature in all of BiH, 
and political parties are internally institutionalised and democratic to different degrees. Some 
parties have regular internal elections, whereas some hold party elections just for the sake of 
form. In most cases, the party leaderships have been in place for ten years or more. The current 
president of the HDZ, Dragan Čović was elected in 2005, the late Sulejman Tihić was president 
of SDA between 2001 and 2014, Milorad Dodik has been president of SNSD since its formation 
in 1996. Zlatko Lagumdžija was the president of SDP between 1997 and 2014, Mladen Bosić 
has been president of SDS since 2006, and Fahrudin Radončić, the president of one of the 
youngest parties SBB (Party for Better Future), has presided over it since 2009 without any 
chance of contestation. As a result of such protracted and uncontested party leaderships, the 
parties had become highly personalistic, and this feature of the main political parties in the 
country has reflected on the style of politics and governance as well.  
 
There are some variations between individual parties and their leaders, but the only 
example of undemocratic dominance of the ruling party is that of SNSD and Milorad Dodik in 
Republika Srpska. This is not a feature unique to the RS, but unique to this particular party. 
Other political parties which governed in the RS between 2001 and 2006, primarily SDS and 
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PDP, had started to make some progress in democratising the country and making the state 
institutions stronger and more functional. During those five years, those political parties had 
participated in the most intensive period of state-building, which resulted in a series of 
successful reforms, such as the unification of armies and formation of a single Ministry of 
Defence at state level, unification of indirect tax systems, unification of intelligence agencies, 
establishment of a single system of citizens records, etc. Reforms carried out in that period 
enabled the initiation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU. However, 
since Milorad Dodik won power in 2006, the RS authorities have blocked major reforms from 
the EU agenda, while the political situation in the RS itself has started to feature many illiberal 
practices, some of which I have mentioned already. In Chapter VI, I provide additional evidence 
which shows how Dodik uses nationalistic narratives and undemocratic practices primarily to 
secure a strong grip on power and preserve his dominance in the RS, but also to counteract the 
EU's efforts to strengthen democracy in the country. In that Chapter I focus more on his 
‘personalistic’ style of government, which is a strong feature of a pseudodemocracy. 
 
Illiberal democracies. ‘Illiberal’ democracies are ‘third-wave’ democracies where 
resurgence to authoritarian practices is present and evident. Their institutions are weak, hollow 
and unstable, but they still abide by the basic criteria for being an electoral democracy. 
According to Diamond (1999, p. 55), two important ‘empirical gaps’ exist, between liberal 
democracy and electoral democracy, and between liberal democracy and ‘pseudodemocracies’. 
The difference between illiberal and pseudodemocracies is that in the latter the election system 
is also hollow and weak.  
 
Although slightly further away from my case study and not so relevant for my empirical 
Chapters, this concept is nonetheless useful as it points to the weaknesses of the electoral 
system, which is the subject of my Chapter on political equality and participation. When it 
comes to the ‘resurgence to authoritarian practices’, this has become a defining feature of 
Dodik’s governance in Republika Srpska, especially since 2010 when his majority strengthened 
and he was elected as the President of the RS with overwhelming majority. His rule has since 
been described as ‘demokratura’ (Kebo, 2013) – a compound word consisting of demokratija 
(democracy) and diktatura (dictatorship), which designates his style of government as short of 
a democracy, but not a fully-fledged dictatorship. I depict Dodik’s specific undemocratic 
practices in Chapter VI, which include frequent verbal attacks and humiliations of journalists, 
sexist, racist and chauvinistic insults, curses and threats to journalists (“History of Dodik’s 
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‘Media Freedoms,’” 2015), accusations of NGOs receiving money from abroad in order to 
destabilise the RS (“The era of Dodik ends?,” 2013), etc. This is once again a feature peculiar 
to Dodik's style of government, and is not widespread in the country. However, because of its 
institutional weaknesses the state is powerless to prevent or sanction undemocratic behaviour 
and illiberal practices, and Dodik’s policies and behaviour have to a large degree shaped the 
content and style of politics in Bosnia since 2006.   
 
‘defective’ democracies. Merkel (2004) states that the paradigm ‘electoral democracy’ 
insufficiently describes the stage of development of democracy in a country, because it falsely 
implies consolidation of democracy. As such, it misleads and narrows down discussions on 
democratic development to a mere account of existence of free elections (2004, p. 33). His 
concept of ‘embedded democracies’ consists of five ‘partial regimes’: electoral regime, political 
rights, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and effective power to govern. Absence of any 
elements of ‘partial’ regimes, or a lack of interdependence between individual partial regimes, 
indicates that such democracy might be ‘‘defective’’. Particularly relevant for BiH is Merkel’s 
argument that “an emergence of (ethnically) exclusive and illiberal democracies is more 
probable if social capital is accumulated along ethnic and religious lines” - the more society is 
organised “along ethnic cleavages”, the more it contributes to “political polarisation” and 
ultimately, to ‘‘defective’’ democratisation (2004, p. 53). A democracy is considered to be 
embedded if it is capable of “coping with the structural conditions of modern rule”, i.e. if it is 
able to manage complex internal conditions and challenging external environments (2004, p. 
36). Practically, an embedded democracy should not be vulnerable to destabilising internal or 
external conditions. In this section I show to which extent democracy in BiH is not able to cope 
with the internal and external challenges, which has resulted in a series of government crisis 
over the past ten years. As the following examples show, between 2004 and 2015, there has 
been a government crisis every year, which paralysed government activities for months and 
even years. Examples presented in this section show to which degree democracy in BiH is 
vulnerable to intentional undermining of its functionality. 
 
In December 2004, then Prime Minister of the RS, Dragan Mikerević, as well as a couple 
of ministers from the RS in the BiH Council of Ministers (CoM) resigned following a decision 
of the High Representative at the time, Paddy Ashdown, to remove six RS officials and freeze 
their assets on account of obstruction of the defence and police reform, and a lack of cooperation 
with the Hague War Crimes Tribunal (“Put postdejtonske BiH ka Briselu,” 2004). This crisis 
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stretched through to 2005, when the two minsters in the CoM eventually renounced their 
resignations. In the following year, between May and June 2006, members of the House of 
Representatives of BiH Parliament from Republika Srpska boycotted the work of the Parliament 
by not attending its sessions because the CoM had not met their request to form a Commission 
for investigation of atrocities committed in Sarajevo between 1992 and 1995 (“Poslanici iz RS-
a ni danas nisu došli na sjednicu predstavničkog doma Parlamenta BiH,” 2006).  
 
In 2007, the then High Representative, Miroslav Lajčak, imposed changes to the Law 
on Council of Ministers and the Rules of Procedures of BiH House of Representatives, which 
would stop government boycotts by absenteeism that triggered a resignation of the Chairman 
of the CoM at the time, Nikola Špirić, and another months-long crisis of the government 
(“Špirić,” 2007). Most of the year 2008 was marked by a political crisis, which sparked after 
Dodik proposed that the implementation of the police reforms be continued without the SDA, 
whose leader, Sulejman Tihić, rejected the earlier agreed upon declaration regarding the police 
reform (“Bosnia descends into fresh political crisis - - on,” 2008). The crisis aggravated after 
Dodik intensified his campaign for the autonomy and secession of the RS, leading some 
analysts to suspect the renewed threats of violence and conflicts (Bilefsky, 2008).   
 
Next year, in February 2009, the Bosnian Serb leaders again threatened to pull out of 
state institutions and threatened with requests for the RS independence, after the country’s state 
police agency sent a report to the State Prosecutor’s Office with allegations against Dodik on 
the account of alleged corruption, fraud and misuse of finances involving several important 
government contracts, including a $146 million contract for the government building in Banja 
Luka (Bilefsky, 2009). Formation of the FBiH Government and BiH Council of Ministers 
following the 2010 General Elections took over a year, slowing down all government activity 
in that period. The situation was exacerbated by a decision of the Central Election Commission, 
which declared the election of the President of FBiH, and his subsequent decisions that included 
appointment of the government, as illegal. The High Representative, Valentin Inzko, intervened 
and suspended the two rulings until the Constitutional Court of the FBiH responded to the 
previous requests for their review, which enabled the formation of FBiH Government and 
avoided a legal crisis that would have been caused by a legal uncertainty inflicted by the Central 




However, that government too was riddled with uncertainties. The frequent changes of 
coalition partners (first the removal of SDA from the government in 2013, and then also of SBB 
in early 2014), a lack of agreement on the key issues on the government’s agenda such as budget 
adoption and BiH Law on Residence, and repeated calls for the RS independence, caused a 
series of crises between 2012 and 2014, paralysing government institutions for weeks and 
months. The ensuing government had a similar fate. The FBiH Government which was formed 
after the 2014 General Elections was short-lived, and it entered a crisis only one month after its 
formation that has resulted in ministerial resignations and change of coalition partners.  
 
Boycotts continued in 2015 as well. The SNSD Members of Parliament  in the BiH 
House of Representatives have walked out of every session of the Parliament since January 
2015, after their refusal to attend sessions chaired by SDA representative, Šefik Džaferović, 
who was reported as allegedly being involved or having information about crimes committed 
against Serbs during the war (“Napuštanjem sjednice Parlamentarne skupštine nije ugroženo 
entitetsko glasanje,” 2015). In March 2015, the BiH Office of the Prosecutor declared that those 
allegations were unfounded and there were no legal grounds for investigation, but SNSD 
continued to boycott sessions of the Parliament nonetheless (“Tužilaštvo BiH odbacilo optužbe 
protiv Džaferovića,” 2015). 
 
Taking into account all evidence presented in this section, democracy in BiH can be 
characterised as having weak and hollow institutions, strong informal structures of power, 
highly personalistic policies dominated by political elites, a weak and unstable electoral system, 
inability of the system to manage complex internal conditions and challenging external 
environments, a decision-making system dislocated outside formal institutions, social capital 
accumulated along ethnic cleavages resulting in political and social polarisation, etc. Given my 
claim that individual features of each of the four concepts of unsuccessful democratisations are 
present and evident in the case of BiH democratisation, democracy thus described can be 
labelled as eclectically unconsolidated.  
 
An Eclectically Unconsolidated Democracy 
 
I decide to call such democracy eclectic because its dysfunctionality is derived from a 
broad and diverse range of sources. The compilation of the features which make it dysfunctional 
and unconsolidated can be found in different models of unsuccessful democratisations, which 
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are not necessarily related, they are unpredictable in terms of their scale and presence in 
different stages of democratisation process, and provide little grounds for determining modes 
of causality and consistency. In other words, I see democracy in BiH as eclectic because it is 
inconsistently and sporadically unsuccessful, while remaining highly dysfunctional.  
 
Analysing an eclectically unconsolidated democracy. In order to be able to assess the 
nature of obstacles which BiH as an unconsolidated democracy poses for the spread of EU 
norms, I need to identify specific variables which determine the nature and level of the failure 
to democratise BiH, define the underlying context in which defects occur, and define the 
character of potential resistance to democratisation. In Chapter V, I introduce the notion of 
‘subversions’ of democracy, which I consider to be important criteria for measuring the quality 
of democracy. As mentioned earlier, I look at consolidation as an outcome rather than as a 
process of democratisation, and as a “behavioural and attitudinal embrace of democratic 
principles and methods by both elites and masses” (L. J. Diamond, 2002, p. 20). It is a concept 
which describes a deeper and more authentic democracy, which I borrow as a key criterion for 




In this Chapter, I have looked at the peculiarity of democracy and democratisation in 
BiH in order to lay out the basic features of the context, actors and domestic norms, which the 
EU is trying to influence and change by acting as a normative power. A key to my argument 
that the EU is not able to spread democratic norms in BiH is an understanding of BiH as an 
exceptional case with characteristics that individually, and combined, present extraordinary 
impediments to EU norms. The key underlying conditions understated or neglected by the EU 
in that process have been: the exclusive electoral system, a complex and crippling decision-
making system that puts ethnicity at its core, the social capital accumulated along ethnic lines, 
and nationalism as the dominant political platform, ideology and political raison d’etre. 
 
In this chapter I made three core arguments: first, that the restrictive domestic context 
poses structural and ideational impediments to the spread of EU norms; second, that values and 
norms existing in BiH society are incompatible with the normative basis of the EU; and third, 
that BiH is an ‘eclectically unconsolidated democracy’. In the next Chapter I will show that the 
EU as the main external democratiser in BiH is ill-prepared to face the challenges created by 
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internal divisions in BiH, the overwhelming ethnic rationale and dominance of nationalism on 
politics and society, while relying on weak government institutions as a key partner in that 
endeavour.  
 
At the core of the EU’s misplaced approach to BiH is the lack of understanding of the 
key problems which have hampered democratisation so far. The disintegrative nature of the 
entire government system in BiH is incompatible with the integrative nature of the EU accession 
process.  This restrictive context is delineated by both structural/institutional limits, as well as 
substantive/ideational obstacles, which are threatened by the EU’s democratic norms. 
Furthermore, the EU-sponsored democratisation is compromised by nationalism as a barrier to 
salience of EU norms and as an ideational obstacle to democracy. The EU acts as if the 
government system in BiH is devoid of nationalism, while, in fact, nationalism is at the centre 
of constitution, the power-sharing arrangement, government structures, politics and democracy 
in BiH. Nationalism in BiH has been institutionalised through the constitutional structure and 
the power-sharing arrangement, as I discussed in Chapter II. 
 
Based on the evidence of unsuccessful democratisation in BiH, another assumption can 
be made, which I will discuss in the next Chapter. External democratisation is often considered 
imperative during the initial or early stages in a country’s break-up from authoritarian rule. 
Such thinking assumes that democratisation proceeded successfully on its own terms after that. 
The lack of such linearity of democratisation in the case of BiH also makes it an exceptional 
case. In the early years following the war, BiH was under three parallel processes: state-
building, post-war recovery, and democratisation, which were heavily assisted by international 
actors. When the EU assumed the dual role of a state-builder and external democratiser, it based 
its approach on a false premise that those processes would continue routinely, without external 
intervention. This wrong presumption derailed EU democratisation efforts in the direction of 
superficial procedural requirements, while the core problems of BiH dysfunctionality as 
democracy remain. The EU also wrongly assumes that BiH elites would make efforts to 
cooperate in that endeavour, and neglect the deliberate and insidious decay of democracy that 
can be largely attributed to elite-agency. Much of that decay has developed during the EU’s 
mandate as the chief democratiser in the country, which is why the EU partly bears the 




Relying on the experience of democratising the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 
the EU ignores the nature of democracy in BiH. The inflexible integration agenda obfuscates 
the EU’s view of a need to democratise the country in a substantive sense before it is capable 
and ready for the accession process. This leads it to apply the procedural instruments of norm 
diffusion, which are not effective in BiH, while its political conditionality is inconsistent and 
sporadically used. In this Chapter, I laid out the contours of the contradiction and clash of 
normative frameworks between BiH and the EU. In Chapters VI and VII, I present further 
empirical evidence to support this claim, while in the next Chapter I make a case that the EU’s 
focus on procedural democratisation distracts it away from the substantive elements of 
democracy.  
 
Another important development discussed in this Chapter is that democratisation in BiH 
was not a result of a long historical struggle, but rather it is an assumed process that followed 
after the Peace Agreement was signed, which set the new rules of the game. The Peace 
Agreement itself created an intrinsic link between democratisation and nationalism in which 
democratisation conceals the destructive effects of nationalism. Those processes are masked by 
the rhetoric that is identical for both democratisation and ethnic homogenisation, thus making 
it more difficult to discern one process from another. What the EU perceives to be a stalemate 
in procedural democratisation is in fact intensification of the decay of substantive democracy 









This chapter explores the limitations of the EU as an actor in the context of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. I take the position that the EU is an actor, and define it as an independent entity 
with its own identity and interests, decision-making powers, and capabilities to construct and 
perform that identity, and pursue its interests internally and externally.19 In this Chapter I look 
at the EU as an actor through the theoretical framework on EU conditionality in BiH in order 
to identify factors hindering compliance with EU norms. In the empirical chapters I assess 
specific mechanisms of norm diffusion, as well as contextual variables affecting compliance. 
Throughout this thesis I argue against explanations which support the application of EU 
conditionality in the context of BiH.  
 
External democratisation has been extensively discussed within the framework of 
linkage to the West and Western leverage, which are considered as most effective when 
combined (Levitsky & Way, 2005, p. 21)20. However, those explanations are related mainly to 
early democratisations, which followed after liberation from an authoritarian regime. As I 
discussed in more detail in Chapter II, the most intensive period of democratisation in BiH 
followed after a violent conflict, and it cannot be treated as an emerging democracy. That is 
why twenty five years since the first multi-party democratic elections were held in the country, 
the EU-sponsored democratisation can hardly be explained in terms of early democratisation 
efforts that could rely on linkage and leverage. Although Levitsky and Way see the EU 
enlargement as an exception to the ‘blunt’ political conditionality unsuccessfully applied 
elsewhere, I argue that the case of democratisation in BiH shows many shortcomings of the EU 
enlargement as a framework for democratisation in post-conflict societies (2005, p. 22). Strong 
linkage and leverage with the EU are evident in BiH, but I believe they are ineffective due to 
                                                 
19 Whether the EU is an actor is subject to many debates and opposing views.  One view is that the “EU is neither a state nor 
non-state actor” (Ginsberg, 1999, p. 432). Another view is that the EU is at the same time an actor, a process and a project 
(Manners & Lucarelli, 2006, p. 7). The EU’s actorness can be defined using institutional (White, 1999;  Carlsnaes, Sjursen, 
& White, 2004; Ginsberg, 1999), functional (Schmitter & Karl, 1991) and synthetic explanations (Ginsberg, 1999; Gunnar 
Sjöstedt, 1998; Allen and Smith, 1998). 
20 Leverage is defined as governments’ vulnerability to external pressure, i.e. elite-based influences by external actors. Linkage 
is defined as the density of a country’s ties to Western actors, i.e. bottom-up connections through actors other than the elites. 
(Levitsky & Way, 2014, p. 21) 
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the constraints posed by domestic context, impeding domestic norms, role of national elites, 
and the EU’s failure to recognise those limitations and address them adequately. 
 
Factors affecting the EU’s conditionality in BiH have been explained through a number 
of variables: weak legitimacy of EU demands (Noutcheva, 2009), cost-benefit calculations and 
limited appeal of EU norms (Džihić & Wieser, 2011), the strength of identity and sovereignty 
issues (Freyburg & Richter, 2010), a lack of clarity and consistency in EU approaches 
(Anastasakis, 2008), material incentives (Vachudova, 2014), etc. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 
have included governance as a third model of democracy promotion, which “rests in functional 
cooperation between administrations” (2011, p. 885). The third model is rather new to the 
relationship between the EU and BiH, which signed the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement in 2008, and had an Interim Agreement in force between 2008 and 2015. 
Nonetheless, I make a case that the constraining factors hindering this relationship are 
detrimental to the spread of EU norms regardless of the model of democratisation which the 
EU applies. In this chapter, I focus on conditionality as the most dominant mechanism that the 
EU has used in the context of BiH. 
 
In order to focus on the ideational aspects of the EU as a democracy promoter, I borrow 
the concept of EU normative power from Ian Manners (2002), who argues that the EU 
normative power stems from a basis of core norms and values of the EU. The three key features 
of a normative power which I focus on in this Chapter are: the EU’s ‘pre-disposition’ to act 
normatively, the importance it attaches to norms and values, and its transformative power. In 
this chapter I show that those three key features are undermined by the EU’s confused identity 
about what kind of power it is, a discrepancy between its principles and policies, and a ‘cookie-
cutter approach’ that heavily relies on conditionality. I accept that the EU can be defined as a 
normative power, but I argue that it does not act as a normative power in BiH. In the following 
sections I will relate to theoretical arguments on the effectiveness of conditionality in external 
democratisation while making three core arguments: 
 
i. As a normative power, the EU should have a coherent and identifiable international 
identity that is based on a set of common norms, which the EU should promote inside 
and outside its borders. However, I argue that the EU international identity is torn 
between divergent self-perceptions of its various actors.  Based on the examples in the 
first section of this Chapter, I argue that the EU actors accept a certain set of norms 
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internally, but that they compromise them externally in the face of contextual and actor-
based challenges. Given that it willingly compromises its norms and its international 
identity externally, the EU cannot be ‘predisposed’ to act normatively (Manners, 2002).  
 
ii. The recurring inconsistencies in the promotion of EU norms and values undermine the 
very nature of the EU as a ‘normative power’. I argue that this is due to a discrepancy 
between the EU principles and its policies, which is a result of a lack of ‘self-perception’ 
of the EU as a normative power, and a hesitancy to fully embrace the identity of a 
normative power. In other words, those who act on behalf of the EU do not identify with 
its normative role, and they lack an awareness of how the EU principles should inform 
the use of instruments, the shaping of policies, and choice of actions. I argue that their 
actions are driven more by pragmatic choices on the ground, than by a strategic choice 
to promote the EU principles. 
 
iii. The EU’s ‘cookie-cutter approach’, which relies heavily on the classic use of 
conditionality in external democratisation fails to address the core obstacles in BiH’s 
context – the existence of ‘gatekeepers’ to democratisation, and the changing and 
volatile international context, while being reluctant to use sanctions. I argue that the 
reliance on conditionality, and an approach that treats BiH as any other aspirant country, 
without recognising its exceptionalism, has crippled the EU’s attempts to democratise 
BiH.  
 
I am addressing each argument through three questions about the EU that are put 
forward in the context of BiH: what it is, what it does, and how it does it; i.e. the EU’s 
international identity, substance of its policies and actions, and instruments it uses.  
 
The EU’s Confused International Identity 
 
A complementary approach to the notions of the EU’s actorness is the concept of 
‘international identity’ (Manners & Whitman, 1998). Manners and Whitman (1998) challenge 
the way in which the EU identity is commonly perceived. They propose a shift from purely 
descriptive views of EU identity, to the view of ‘international identity’ as an ontology in itself. 
The EU international identity they define is identifiable and coherent, but is not a synonym for 
'foreign policy' or 'external relations' (Manners & Whitman, 1998, p. 237). It is rather a network 
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of relations that the EU has cultivated, and maintains through a set of instruments. Karen Smith 
(2003) equates the question of what sort of actor the EU is, with the question of its ‘international 
identity’. Her conceptualisation of the EU’s international identity is defined in terms of what 
the system produces (what policy results), and how it pursues its policy objectives. In the 
following sections I search for those two aspects of the EU’s international identity through 
examples of the EU’s recent democratisation approaches in BiH. I argue that the EU 
international identity is not identifiable or coherent as previously suggested by Manners and 
Whitman (1998). The way in which the EU pursues its objectives is a result of an interaction 
between member state interests, contextual variables, and complex decision-making at the level 
of the EU, rather than a reflection of EU norms and principles. Noutcheva (2009) argues that 
“the EU’s involvement in the region for the time being cannot be clearly categorised under 
either foreign or enlargement policy“ (p. 1066). Moreover, I argue that the EU in BiH suffers 
from a confused international identity, which is a consequence of the way in which the various 
EU actors see their role in BiH, and how they see the role of the EU. In the case of BiH, that 
confusion of identity is manifest in four ways:  
 
a. in confusing the technical or political aspects of the EU accession of BiH;  
b. indecisiveness and dissent among various EU actors on key problems in BiH;  
c. divergent views of EU actors on the role of the EU as a state-builder, and failure 
to create a substantive connection between state-building and the EU accession 
process;  
d. inadequate EU response to the manipulation of issues by national elites in BiH, 
especially the ethnicisation and politicisation of technical EU conditions. 
 
EU accession - technical or political process? This riddle has affected several aspects 
of the EU’s approach to BiH: choice of actors, choice of conditions and rewards, the dynamic 
and process of negotiations. In discussion with many interviewees it was pointed out that 
generally speaking the view of the actors from the  European Commission is that the accession 
process is mainly technical, while those representing member states, as well as those at higher 
levels of the EU, view the process as predominantly political (“Personal interview with a senior 
BiH diplomat in Brussels,” 2014; “Personal interview with a participant in negotiations on 
implementation of the Sejdić/Finci ruling,” 2014). I argue that the balance shifts in favour of 
the political or technical approaches depending on the level of involvement of the EU’s different 
actors. As long as the European Commission (EC) is in the driving seat, an issue mainly retains 
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its technical character. The more an issue is elevated to a diplomatic level, whether at the level 
of the EU or its member states, the more it becomes political. The result is that many issues 
which are in fact technical in nature are sometimes politicised, while issues which are clearly 
political in nature are sometimes wrongly addressed through a technical process. In both cases, 
treating an issue faultily as political or technical results in inadequate use of instruments and 
conditionality.  
 
In early negotiations about the implementation of the Sejdić/Finci ruling, between 2009 
and 2013, the EU officials treated this issue as primarily technical (“Personal interview with a 
participant in negotiations on implementation of the Sejdić/Finci ruling,” 2014), as is described 
at greater length in Chapter VII. Interviewees from the European Commission confirmed that 
they view the framework for accession primarily as a technical process, whether looking at this 
specific issue, or speaking more broadly. They believe that the technical nature of the process 
cannot be, and should not be, easily influenced or changed by political means. EC officials 
insist that the accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina must follow the same path as any other 
potential candidate country, particularly those within the Western Balkan region, which were 
all encompassed by the Stabilisation and Association Process (“Personal interview with a senior 
EU official in Brussels,” 2012; “Personal communication with an EC official in Brussels,” 
2012). This is also the underlying thinking behind the ‘cookie-cutter approach’, which I discuss 
in the last section of this Chapter. 
 
For a long time, the EU lacked the understanding that the Sejdić/Finci case was a 
political issue and tried to resolve it through technical means. It was around the time of the 2014 
European Elections that high ranking officials in the European Commission acknowledged that 
the BiH accession process had come to a halt. Taking action in the last few months of his term, 
Štefan Füle, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood at the 
time, opted to try to resolve the issues of implementation of the Sejdić/Finci ruling through a 
political approach by initiating a High Level Dialogue with Bosnian political leaders. The High 
Level Dialogue had several rounds, including a 13 hours meeting behind closed doors, which 
resulted in a complete failure. Following the last failed attempt to negotiate a solution with 
Bosnian leaders in Sarajevo in February 2014, Štefan Füle defensively stated: “This is not my 
failure. This is the failure of the leaders” (Malagic, 2014). During the ensuing press conference, 
Füle removed all doubts about the nature of this condition: “it is an international obligation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina that, following the will of the Member States, is now a key to progress 
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on the EU path” (“Press Conference by European Commissioner for Enlargement and 
Neigbourhood Policy, Štefan Füle, during his visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2014). Füle 
confirmed those were clearly political conditions after almost five years of failed technical 
negotiations on the issue. What was recognised late in the process is that being clearly political 
conditions, this reform needed a political approach rather than a technical one. Füle admitted 
that the process was initially treated in a technical manner, but subsequently recognised as 
political, which justified a need to use all means possible: "Do not forget that since 2010, three 
formal initiatives had been tried, via the Bosnia and Herzegovina institutions, to resolve this 
matter. They had not met with success. It was right that we tried to resolve it, working with the 
political leaders, because we could leave no possible method aside“ (“Press Conference by 
European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, Štefan Füle, during his 
visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2014). One interviewee explains that a failure to address this 
issue adequately before 2014 was due to it being relegated to a low level priority, which was 
delegated to lower ranking officials within the European Commission, i.e. the technical people 
who do not have the remit to deal with it in a political manner. Once raised to the level of the 
Commissioner, the issue gained political significance and opened up possibilities for the use of 
a wider range of instruments, including the High Level Dialogue (“Personal interview with a 
former BiH diplomat,” 2014).  
 
Within the context of BiH, confusing the technical and political conditions has not only 
resulted in an ineffective conditionality, but it has impacted the legitimacy of the EU as an actor. 
The legitimacy of the EU as an actor, and the legitimacy of its demands are considered to be 
the key to compliance with the EU conditionality (Noutcheva, 2009). The EU’s weakened 
legitimacy has in many ways affected the substance and form of the accession process in BiH. 
In the following examples I show that the confusion between the EU’s political and its technical 
role in BiH has compromised its international identity and has undermined the consistency and 
clarity of the EU’s conditionality. 
 
Indecisiveness and dissent among EU actors. Once exposed to a larger number of 
actors within the EU, the issue became subject to their own motivations, intentions, capabilities 
and political will. The views of different EU actors were often dissenting, especially between 
the European Commission and EU Parliament, as I show in the examples in this section. Füle’s 
own motivations have been subject to a debate, which reveal interesting relations among the 
EU actors. One interpretation is that the issue was raised to the political level because of Füle’s 
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personal ambitions in the forthcoming European elections. This group of interviewees believe 
that Füle’s personal desire to declare a success in the region at the end of his term as 
Commissioner was the main motivation behind his willingness to engage so heavily through 
the High Level Dialogue (“Personal interview with a senior BiH diplomat in Brussels,” 2014; 
“Personal interview with a senior official from BiH MFA,” 2015; “Personal interview with a 
mid-ranking diplomat from the BiH MFA,” 2014).  
 
However, those who participated in the actual negotiations chaired by Füle dismiss his 
personal motivations as the main driving factor (“Personal interview with a participant in 
negotiations on implementation of the Sejdić/Finci ruling,” 2014; “Personal interview with a 
former BiH diplomat,” 2014). In fact, they argue that Füle had been successful in bringing 
together BiH political leaders, and in proposing solutions which would have been 
implementable and effective. They have claimed that Füle’s personal persistence, rather than 
the engagement of any EU institution, sustained negotiations through seven rounds between 
2013 and 2014. On the occasion of the last meeting, Füle had allegedly invested extraordinary 
personal energy to come to an agreeable solution, and transmitted immense frustration that he 
was not backed by the political representative of the US State Department, who attended the 
meeting, but did not get involved. Füle also seemed to be left alone by the EU member states, 
which did not engage in finding a solution, or putting pressure on the BiH political leaders to 
support the solution that Füle proposed. Interviewees who participated in those meetings state 
that there was a visible lack of decisiveness of the political level of the EU, US, and member 
states. One interviewee said that “Füle’s efforts would have been successful had the EU member 
states supported him at that point” (“Personal interview with a participant in negotiations on 
implementation of the Sejdić/Finci ruling,” 2014). He also claims that Füle seemed abandoned 
even by the rest of the European Commission, which was not willing to put his solution forward 
as their firm commitment. The indecisiveness of EU actors was apparent to the public in the 
aftermath of failed negotiations, when the EU again opted not to expose the parties which had 
actually refused Füle’s proposals and blamed all party leaders equally.  
 
The party which actually refused Füle’s proposal of a solution on the Sejdić/Finci issue 
was HDZ, which ground their electoral support within the Croat people. As I discuss in much 
greater detail in Chapter VII, HDZ took the opportunity of the negotiations on the Sejdić/Finci 
ruling to put the question of Croat representation in BiH institutions on the table. In the 2006 
General Elections, a Croat member of the BiH Presidency, Željko Komšić, a Social-Democratic 
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Party candidate, was directly elected. That was the first time that an HDZ candidate for the 
Croat member of the Presidency was not elected directly. HDZ claimed that Komšić was elected 
also by the votes of the Bošnjak and other people, which is why they claimed he could not be a 
‘legitimate Croat representative’. HDZ constructed and successfully sustained the concept of 
legitimate ethnic representation, even though it goes directly against the right of all people to 
freely choose members of the Presidency, which is the gist of the ECHR ruling. Their rhetoric 
was further intensified following the 2010 elections, when HDZ was not included in the 
government coalition in FBiH, which they used to emphasise the issue of ‘legitimate ethnic 
representatives’.  
 
What is relevant for the arguments in this section is the fact that representatives in the 
European Commission and some member states accepted and adopted HDZ’s rhetoric that the 
issue of Croat representation needed to be addressed through the solution to the Sejdić/Finci 
case. Once the EU agreed to address this issue in the Sejdić/Finci negotiations, they conceded 
to the ethnic prism of the problem, and abandoned the prism of citizenship. This went against 
the very nature of the ECHR’s ruling, which demanded equality of all BiH citizens in the 
election process, regardless of their ethnic background. Nonetheless, Füle’s proposal did go 
quite a long way to meet the demands of the HDZ for pragmatic reasons, but there was a limit 
to which they could be pragmatic without going against the ECHR ruling. In spite of the EU’s 
willingness to find compromise and a pragmatic approach, the HDZ still tabled maximalist 
demands and refused the compromise solution, which meant the end of the negotiations 
(“Personal interview with a participant in negotiations on implementation of the Sejdić/Finci 
ruling,” 2014; “Personal interview with a former BiH diplomat,” 2014).  
 
In the aftermath of failed negotiations lead by Füle the issue of the Sejdić/Finci ruling 
was addressed by Croatian HDZ Members of the European Parliament (MEP). Supported by 
other Croatian MEPs, they used the occasion of the adoption of the Resolution on the 2014 
Progress Report on BiH, to include HDZ’s language on legitimate ethnic representation: “the 
future constitutional reform should also take into account the principles of federalism, 
decentralisation, subsidiarity and legitimate representation to ensure the efficient and smooth 
integration of BiH into the EU” (European Parliament, 2015). They also referred to HDZ's deal-
breaking demand to include the cantonal level of government in the EU coordination 
mechanism: “Calls on the political leaders to give priority to establishing an effective EU 
coordination mechanism, efficiently linking institutions at all governance levels” (European 
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Parliament, 2015). The European Commission had openly refused such demands during 
negotiations purely for practical reasons, as the presence of the cantons would have made the 
coordination mechanism too complex to manage. The European Parliament (EP) resolution 
showed a lack of consistency and agreement between different EU actors on those two 
important issues. Although the European Parliament resolution supported the EU’s approach to 
BiH, it essentially supported the request of a domestic political party, which caused the 
breakdown of previous negotiations. This again showed how heavier involvement of the EU’s 
technical or political actors can determine the nature of the EU’s intervention, and the choice 
made between technical and political instruments. 
 
Divergent views of the EU as a state-builder. The reverse example, when the EU treats 
technical issues as political, can be seen in the EU’s role in state-building in BiH. In June 2012, 
the European Commission introduced another requirement for the entry into force of the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with BiH. The EC asked BiH authorities “to 
agree on an effective coordination mechanism for engagement with the EU which will enable 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to come to an agreed position on EU issues“ (European Commission, 
2012). This also became a precondition for both the use of new IPA II funds and for answering 
the Questionnaire that would be sent to BiH by the European Commission as part of the 
accession process. Most of the state-building measures in BiH, including the coordination 
mechanism, were intended to fill in the legal and constitutional gaps left in the Dayton Peace 
Agreement (DPA). The DPA originally created very few basic functions of the state,21 and 
major domestic and international efforts invested between 1995 and 2005 resulted in significant 
expansions of the competencies, including defence, intelligence, single indirect taxation 
authority, and many others. The expansion of the functions and competencies of the state 
required strong political support domestically and internationally, including heavy pressure and 
conditionality from the international agencies in BiH, as well as legal impositions by the Office 
of the High Representative. A significant turn in this approach occurred around the tenth 
anniversary of the Dayton Peace Accords in 2005, when “the state building in BiH had become 
largely an EU affair” (Bieber, 2011, p. 1789).22 Since then the state-building process has come 
                                                 
21 The original competencies of the state included foreign policy, foreign trade policy, customs policy, monetary policy, 
finances of the institutions and of the international obligations, immigration, refugee, and asylum policy and regulation, 
international and inter-Entity criminal law enforcement, including relations with Interpol, establishment and operation of 
common and international communications facilities, regulation of inter-Entity transportation, air traffic control (General 
Framework for Peace, 1995, Annex IV, Article III 1.). 
22 Between 2002 and 2010, the High Representative was 'double hatted', being also the EU Special Representative. Once the 
two functions were 'decoupled', the role of the OHR dimished, and the EU took over the prerogatives in driving the main 
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to a halt, or at best, the watered down solutions have been put in place. The European Union’s 
ineffectiveness as a state builder thus became fully exposed (Bieber, 2011).  
 
A former high-ranking BiH diplomat who used to be involved in negotiations with the 
EU expressed a view that the EC officials fail to see a clear link between state-building reforms 
and reforms required by the accession process. (“Personal interview with a former BiH 
diplomat,” 2014). During his service in Brussels, the European Commission officials used to 
categorically refuse the notion that the state-building process was their responsibility, claiming 
that it was rather the responsibility of domestic political leaders (“Personal interview with a 
mid-ranking diplomat from the BiH MFA,” 2014). In my view, the EC misses the crucial point 
about how EU accession reforms can underpin state-building in BiH, and thus support 
democratisation of the country.  
 
Instead, the EU too readily accepts the view of the national elites that certain state-
building reforms impinge on ethnic issues. This has been the case in many examples: the 
framework for regulating the state aid, the strategy for agricultural reform, the Law on Wine, 
and even the participation of BiH in the EU Community Programmes, such as MEDIA, and 
ERASMUS+. Those were all situations in which the EU originally requested that a single 
authority be established at state level, responsible for harmonising policies and legislation 
across the country, only to give in to the claims of the elites, primarily from Republika Srpska, 
that such undertaking would lead to centralisation of the country, which they claim is against 
the Serb national interests. By taking such view for granted, the EC accepts the politicisation 
and ethnicisation of issues that are primarily technical in nature. The manipulation of those 
issues by the national elites thus becomes legitimised by the EU’s acceptance that they are 
issues of high ethnic relevance. In response, the EU makes compromises and gives concessions 
on ethnic rather than technical grounds, which cripples their attempts to find a workable or 
functional solution. As a result, the EU agrees to solutions which represent the lowest common 
denominator among maximalist demands of each ethnic elite, which in the end weakens instead 
of strengthening the state. That way, instead of being a state-builder, the EU actually contributes 
to the weakening of the state.  
                                                 
reform processes. Soonafter, the EU also took over the leadership of the international military and police missions in BiH. 
The last major US-led state-building effort was constitutional reform in 2006, which resulted in the so called 'April package' 
of amendments, which was refused by BiH Parliament in April 2006 by a slim majority of one vote. It included amendments 
related to the coordiantion mechanism and the discrimination in the election of Presidency and House of People (subsequently 




Bieber (2011) also attributes the EU’s ineffectiveness to “the inability to transfer 
accession conditionality to state building and in the disjointed and haphazard manner in which 
state building has been pursued by the EU” (p. 1785). However, other authors believe that the 
roots of the problem are not so much within the EU itself, but in the nature of the state-building 
in BiH. Those authors refer to the transfer of competencies to the state level, which has in many 
cases been required by the EU integration, as being of high relevance for ethnic identity (Džihić 
& Wieser, 2011, p. 1808). Bieber (2011) has argued that state-building generally “extends 
beyond a mere collection of institution-building measures: it focuses on core governing 
functions, and thus directly impacts on the sovereignty of a state“ (p. 1791). They argue that as 
such, those issues incur high political costs for the elites, which results in low compliance. The 
view that the issues of high ethnic appeal, which impinge on the issues of sovereignty or 
identity, create greater challenges to the EU’s leverage is widespread (Noutcheva, 2009; 
Vachudova, 2014; Džihić & Wieser, 2011). Although I agree with this view, I oppose the view 
that the state-building process per se has been ethnically sensitive, especially when entailing 
the transfer of competencies or coordination between levels of government. I argue that those 
issues have been fashioned into ethnic issues by domestic elites, which have in the meanwhile 
learned how to manipulate the EU conditionality in the case of nationally sensitive issues. 
 
Ethnicisation and politicisation of EU conditions. As I will discuss at greater length 
in Chapters VI and VII, some of the genuinely technical EU conditions have been fashioned 
into ethnic or national issues by domestic political elites through the process of social 
construction. By using a number of rhetorical and narrative techniques, some BiH elites create 
ethnic constructs out of the EU state-building requirements mainly for two purposes: to justify 
their resistance to EU conditionality, and as a ‘political shelter’ (Noutcheva & Aydin-Düzgit, 
2012), or even a political cloak that masks their true intentions and motivations. In the context 
where domestic elites openly resist EU efforts and pose counter-narratives, which directly 
undermine the EU norms, neither linkage nor leverage can be effective (Schimmelfennig, 
2000). I believe that the assumption of authors such as Vachudova (2014) that it is in the interest 
of BiH elites to comply for the purpose of faster EU membership is misplaced. The expected 
domestic costs of non-compliance do not actually affect domestic elites, who seek rewards in 
keeping the status quo. Because of that, I cannot accept an argument that conditionality can be 
credible because the “EU is willing to stop the process when a government is not making 
progress on crucial domestic reforms” (Vachudova, 2014, p. 134), simply because in many 
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cases which I will discuss in this thesis, the elites actually benefit from the lack of progress and 
oftentimes, they themselves deliberately stop the process. Any change of the context that 
actually challenges the status quo, even if inspired by faster EU accession, may not be in the 
interests of domestic elites, as I will substantiate in chapters VI and VII.  
 
That is why I argue that an assessment of the effectiveness of the EU’s conditionality in 
the case of state-building purely in terms of the costs of compliance would be an 
oversimplification. Viewing the EU rewards as simply weighed against so called ethnic issues, 
diverts attention away from the root causes of the problems of low compliance, which 
Vachudova (2014) describes as the Bosnian elites' ability “to manipulate the EU to get around 
its requirements” (p. 134). In my view, the EU underestimates the ability of domestic elites to 
manipulate the EU conditionality and the negotiating process. That is why I disagree with 
authors who see the EU conditionality as simply weakened by the limited appeal of EU rewards 
for the national elites (Džihić & Wieser, 2011). The problem is not only in the strength of the 
EU appeal. My argument is that the problem also lies within the national elites in BiH and their 
true motives, and with an unfavourable context that creates a fertile ground for generating 
competing domestic norms, which contest the appeal of EU norms. Those counter-norms, or 
subversions of democracy as I call them more specifically in the next Chapter, are purposefully 
constructed to undermine international influences in BiH. The EU’s fault is in failing to 
recognise the true intentions and motivations of national elites and their ulterior motives, in 
accepting the rules of the game which they impose, and in treating all national elites as potential 
champions of democratisation, when in reality, they just might be the opposite.  
 
Compromised EU Conditionality 
 
In making the case for the EU international identity, Manners and Whitman (1998) 
accept “the premise that Europe, Western Europe, the European Union and its Member States 
represent a set of varied but interrelated identities constructed and represented through different 
means and mechanisms” (p. 235). In this section I have looked at one element of the EU's 
international identity, which Manners and Whitman (1998) describe as the “EU's attempt to 
assert its identity rather than to reach a definitive definition of its status in international 
relations” (p. 238). Counter to the arguments of Manners and Whitman (1998), the examples I 
used show that the EU international identity is not coherent or even identifiable as an 
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independent ontology, but rather riddled with divergent and sometimes opposing approaches of 
different EU actors. 
 
The varied positions of the EU actors on human rights issues such as is the example of 
the Sejdić/Finci ruling can be viewed as a “dynamic relationship among political identity, 
legitimacy and politics” (Balfour, R. in Cerutti & Lucarelli, 2008a). This contention between 
EU institutions and member states over the interpretation of conditions and application of 
conditionality is also addressed by Anastasakis (2008). He states that although the European 
Commission is equipped with technical capacities to oversee assessment of conditionality, 
when it comes to interpretation of conditions that are nationally sensitive for a country, then 
external actors may become divided between a more rigorous or flexible approach to 
conditionality (Anastasakis, 2008, p. 372). Balfour also sees the application of human rights 
issues, such as is the Sejdić/Finci ruling, as a “divisive endeavour between the member states”, 
which forces the EU to make compromises which undermine their values (In Cerutti & 
Lucarelli, 2008b, p. 169).  
 
However, the question I ask is whether any explanation can justify division among EU 
actors on an issue that is as strongly embedded in the EU normative framework, as is the case 
with the ECHR ruling in the Sejdić/Finci case. As I will argue more in Chapter VII, the poor 
effectiveness of EU conditionality in this case is falsely attributed to the sensitiveness of an 
issue. Equality as a core EU and European norm, especially when expressed as explicitly as in 
an ECHR ruling, should not be compromised by extensive and exaggerated consideration for 
national norms. The essence of the EU’s external democratisation should be exactly the 
opposite – to change domestic norms that are in breach of European norms, especially on human 
rights issues, and not to compromise its own norms out of a concern for being seen as 
insensitive. I thus agree with Balfour that even though divisions between EU actors may not be 
on values themselves, they eventually divide on the issue of the means and opportunities to 
promote norms externally (In Cerutti & Lucarelli, 2008b, p. 171).  
 
Therefore, although there may be a broad consensus on the content of a norm, the EU 
conditionality is compromised by differences between EU actors in the choice of means and 
opportunities to promote them. The EU actors thus emanate a confused international identity, 
which lacks assertiveness and decisiveness within the BiH context. That undermines the EU 
legitimacy and hence, thwarts the effectiveness of its conditionality. Such a mix of different 
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and conflicting identities being asserted in the EU’s pursuit of its international objectives cannot 
result in a single international identity, but only in a compromised, and sometimes confused 
international identity. Although the EU alone cannot and should not be blamed for the failure 
to move BiH forward in the accession process, the EU’s frequent changes in approach have 
contributed to the inconsistencies in its goals and objectives, as discussed in the following 
section. 
 
Normative Power vs. Rationalist Power 
 
As argued by Džihić and Wieser (2011), the EU became the main actor of external 
democracy promotion in BiH and the Western Balkans following the Thessaloniki Summit in 
2003. The Declaration thus signed by all countries from the region, as well as the EU, sent a 
message of respect for the EU principles and values: “We all share the values of democracy, 
the rule of law, respect for human and minority rights, solidarity and a market economy, fully 
aware that they constitute the very foundations of the European Union” (2003, para. 1). 
However, over the past ten years, the EU has often departed from those principles, although the 
EU representatives would not concede to any inconsistency.  
 
Low compliance that results from inconsistent EU approaches has been extensively 
discussed by many authors (Noutcheva, 2009; Vachudova, 2014; Anastasakis, 2008; Levitsky 
& Way, 2014). Anastasakis (2008) explains the changing of the criteria as influenced by “the 
changing international circumstances, the internal EU anxieties and balances, and the regional 
and country-specific contexts” (Anastasakis, 2008, p. 368), some of which I have discussed in 
the previous section. In this section I partly address the third factor, the 'country-specific 
context' as the predominant constraining factor. However, that alone is not sufficient 
explanation. The inconsistency which becomes prominent in this section is that between the EU 
being a normative power and the EU acting as a 'rational' power. One aspect of this discrepancy 
is addressed by Noutcheva (2009), who has argued that the EU’s policy in the Western Balkans 
is “better explained by the rational motives of the EU member states rather than by the EU’s 
norms and rules of governance or by universal principles of fairness and justice“ (p. 1081). I 
argue that the factor of ‘rational motives of members states’ creates a discrepancy between the 





The most striking example of past inconsistencies is the police reform, which has been 
thoroughly documented by Aybet and Bieber (2011). The reform of the complex system of 
policing in BiH has been linked to the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
(SAA) with the EU. The original demand from the European Commission was that the police 
reform would rest on three principles23 (EC, 2005). However, after almost three years of 
unsuccessful negotiations, and a series of actions that undermined the international community 
in general, “a watered-down police reform package” (Aybet & Bieber, 2011, p. 1925) was 
adopted, with the three principles being more or less abandoned. It enabled the EU to declare 
that the condition had been met, the SAA was signed in June 2008. 
 
The police reform was not originally a technical condition in the EU accession process, 
because it could not be grounded in any part of the Acquis Communautaire. However, it was a 
good opportunity for the EU to build its credibility as a state-builder. The police reform became 
a condition for the signing of the SAA upon the insistence of the former High Representative 
and EU Special Representative, Paddy Ashdown (Aybet & Bieber, 2011, p. 1918). This gave 
the process the much necessary dimension of the political conditionality, which it had lacked 
in previous reforms. Ashdown secured the backing of his own country, the United Kingdom, 
and also had a direct channel of communication with Chris Patten, the European Commissioner 
for External Relations at the time, both of which he utilised to place the police reform as a 
condition for the SAA (“Personal interview with a senior BiH diplomat in Brussels,” 2014). 
The European Stability Initiative reported that the European Commission (EC) eventually 
succumbed to pressure by the OHR and introduced police reform as a condition for the signing 
of an SAA (“Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU,” 2014). However, the EC subsequently 
abandoned the three principles in the search for a compromise that would lead towards the 
signing of the SAA. This example revealed the inconsistency in the EU approach, and also 
disagreements among its various actors on how principled the EU should be in the face of strong 
opposition from domestic actors. Even more importantly, it revealed how uncomfortable and 
indecisive the European Commission was in setting the political criteria, and in supporting it. 
The EU looked particularly weak in its role as a state-builder, to which I return at later point. 
 
Another example is a demand for the closure of the Office of the High Representative 
(OHR). The European Commission's Enlargement Strategy, published on 14 October 2009, 
                                                 
23 That the legislative and budgetary competencies for all police matters are vested at the state level, that there is no political 
interference with operational policing, and that the functional local police areas are defined according to the technical criteria. 
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stated that "the European Union would not be able to consider an application for membership 
by Bosnia and Herzegovina until the OHR has been closed". This condition was softened at the 
General Affairs Council on 7 December 2009. The Council reiterated determination to close 
down the OHR, but concluded that the EU would not be in a position to consider an application 
for membership "until the transition of the OHR to a reinforced EU presence has been decided" 
(EU General Affairs Council, 2009). By the meeting of the EU General Affairs Council held 
on 14 December 2010, this condition was abandoned and no longer mentioned by the EU. As 
confirmed by a couple of interviewees, the reasons why the OHR closure was abandoned as a 
condition is the deterioration of the political situation in BiH, in which the OHR was seen as an 
instrument of stability in case of a worsening of the crisis (“Personal interview with a senior 
official from BiH MFA,” 2015). 
 
The initiative to include the OHR’s closure as a condition for the accession process of 
BiH originally came from Germany. For the past ten years, the most agile advocate of the 
OHR’s closure was Russia, but Russia did not make it official before 2009. German diplomats 
had started to test the waters for the OHR’s closure as early as 2008 (Senior German diplomat, 
personal communication, January 2008). Over the course of 2009, the German diplomats 
became more vocal in those demands, and gradually put pressure on the European Commission 
to include it in the 2009 Enlargement Strategy for BiH (“Personal interview with a senior 
official from BiH MFA,” 2015). The biggest opponent to this initiative within the EU was the 
United Kingdom, and outside the EU, it was the United States. While the main political 
processes in BiH were pushed by the US in the period between 2001 and 2006, Germany did 
not engage so heavily bilaterally in BiH. However, as the US influence weakened following a 
mutual agreement that the EU would become more prominent within BiH, Germany became 
more engaged both bilaterally and through the EU structures. A month after the October 2010 
General Elections in BiH, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel invited the leaders of the five 
largest political parties to Berlin, with the exception of the RS Prime Minister at the time, 
Milorad Dodik. As reported by the Democratisation Policy Council, the talks which were 
repeated again in early 2011 were fruitless in finding a deal on constitutional reform in BiH 
(including the implementation of the Sejdić/Finci ruling), but they also ‘irritated’ the EU and 
other member states because the talks were meant to be secretive, and other European capitals 




In March 2011, the EU Foreign Affairs Council decided to “establish a reinforced, single 
EU Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina who will take the lead in supporting Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on EU related matters“ (EU Foreign Affairs Council, 2011). The objective of this 
exercise was to 'decouple' the EU Special Representative and the High Representative of the 
International Community, which was a single person up until then (Weber, n.d., p. 14). 
Germany had limited influence within the OHR structures where it shared power with the US, 
Russia and other members of the Peace Implementation Council. Strengthening the role of the 
EU at the expense of the OHR gave Germany greater influence over the EU agenda in BiH. 
Germany seized the momentum of a strengthened EU presence in 2011, and sent a letter to 
other member states complaining that the OHR no longer had a strong political influence, and 
that it needed to close down ‘as soon as possible’ in order not to hinder the European future of 
the country (“Personal interview with a senior BiH diplomat in Brussels,” 2014).  
 
The third example of an inconsistent approach that was driven by member states is the 
‘renewed approach to Bosnia and Herzegovina’, adopted by the Council of the European Union 
on December 15, 2014 (Council of the European Union, 2014). At the very beginning of their 
statement, the Council emphasised that they are ‘renewing’ rather than changing their approach, 
and that they will do so “without changing the EU accession conditions”. However, in a fashion 
much similar to the example of the police reform, the EU did in fact alter and lower the criteria 
in order to unblock the accession process of BiH. It did so gradually over a period of four years. 
On 14 December 2010, the Council of the EU concluded that “Bosnia and Herzegovina needs 
to align its constitutional framework with the European Convention on Human Rights“ in order 
for the SAA to come into force (Council of the EU, 2010). Four months later, on 21 March 
2011, the Foreign Affairs Council concluded also that “as a matter of priority, the country needs 
to bring the Constitution into compliance with the European Convention of Human Rights”. 
However, it softened the language and lowered the bar by adding that “a credible effort in this 
regard is key to fulfilling the country's obligations under the Interim/Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement” (EU Foreign Affairs Council, 2011). The EU never defined what the 
‘credible effort’ would mean or represent. In December 2014, the Council of the EU reiterated 
that implementation of the ECHR ruling remains a condition. However, it declared that it is no 
longer a condition for entry into the force of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, but 
has been relegated to some later stage of the accession process, without defining at which stage 




The three examples show inconsistency in policy, inconsistency between the EU values 
and its policies, and a discrepancy between EU norms and the rationality of member states. 
They show that EU norms have succumbed to pragmatic goals and rational objectives. The 
issue of norm compliance is a running theme throughout this thesis, and I will touch upon it 
from various angles in subsequent sections and chapters, particularly through the role of 
domestic elites and the constraining context. What the examples presented here show is the 
variance in compliance which originates from the EU’s own inconsistencies and ulterior 
motivations of member states. When it comes to the EU’s own inconsistencies, Vachudova 
(2014) has shown that the EU weakens its hand by “being inconsistent in laying out and 
enforcing the requirements for moving forward in the pre-accession process” (p. 124). In terms 
of the rationality of member states, Noutcheva (2009) has argued that the elites in the Western 
Balkans are well aware that the EU is riddled by a dilemma - whether it is “genuinely concerned 
about spreading its norms”, or it acts out of rational interest to ensure the stability in the region 
and in Europe (p. 1076). This, she argues, has resulted in ‘fake or partial’ compliance. “When 
the EU’s policy lacks strong normative foundations, political leaders in non-EU countries tend 
to reject EU-sponsored ideas about what is right and appropriate…” and they refuse the 
legitimacy of the EU’s demands, while reverting to “domestic sources of legitimacy, no matter 
whether these are based on rationality or identity” (Noutcheva, 2009, p. 1076). The lowering of 
the bar, or the ‘softening of EU conditionality' diminishes the significance of the EU 
conditionality in the eyes of domestic elites, especially those which oppose the accession 
process, and inspires them to question, and ultimately to manipulate the EU demands (Džihić 
& Wieser, 2011, p. 1814). The EU's inconsistency and the undermining of its normative basis 
is a tool in the hands of domestic elites, who use it to not only undermine the EU conditions, 
but to undermine the EU's credibility and its international identity (Noutcheva, 2009, p. 1081). 
 
EU Conditionality – a ‘Cookie-Cutter Approach’ 
 
In this section I look at conditionality in terms of the basic argument that it is based on 
a cost-benefit calculation of domestic actors when faced with the choice of rewards or sanctions 
for compliance with EU norms (Levitsky & Way, 2005; Schimmelfennig, 2000; Richter, 2012). 
Compliance is claimed to be most effective when both the linkage and leverage are high 
(Levitsky & Way, 2005, p. 22). However, in this section I show that there has been low 
compliance in BiH in spite of strong ties with the EU in terms of both the linkage and leverage, 
and as of lately, including governance as a model of democracy promotion (Lavenex & 
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Schimmelfennig, 2011). Low compliance in BiH has also been attributed to limited incentives 
(Džihić & Wieser, 2011), but the following examples show that compliance does not occur even 
when the incentives have been rather generous. Another argument is that if the costs of 
compliance are too high for domestic elites, they will not be willing to make the required change 
(Džihić & Wieser, 2011). This argument too is dismissed by a case which shows that even when 
the EU lowers the bar to require minimum or no costs for domestic elites, they still do not 
comply. Instead, I side with Tolstrup’s (2014) view that political choices made by domestic 
actors determine leverage because “domestic elites act as “gatekeepers” who can and do decide 
to increase or decrease ties with this or that external actor“ (p. 23). In Chapter VI, I provide a 
detailed account of the way in which domestic elites in BiH engage in ‘thinning’ the EU 
leverage (Tolstrup, 2014). In this section, I use Tolstrup’s arguments to illustrate the link 
between ‘gatekeepers’ and EU conditionality in BiH. I look at three factors that significantly 
impact non-compliance in BiH: political choices made by domestic ‘gate-keepers’ (Tolstrup, 
2014), the absence of sanctions from the EU conditionality, and a changing international 
environment (Anastasakis, 2008). 
 
The EU’s new approach to BiH, which I mentioned in previous sections was formally 
launched on November 5, 2014 by the German and British foreign ministers, Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier and Philip Hammond.  The new initiative is a classic case of political conditionality 
and a ‘cookie-cutter approach’ that offers to simply reward compliance, oblivious to the 
domestic structural, normative and political constraints. In an open letter to the people of BiH, 
the two foreign ministers offered ‘dramatic progress’ towards EU membership if political 
leaders agree on a set of socio-economic reforms, previously agreed in the EU’s initiative 
‘Compact for Growth and Jobs’ (“UK, Germany Launch Joint Initiative on Bosnia,” 2014). 
They sent a message to the people that “if your political leaders can do this, then we ask the 
European Union, in response, to bring the long-delayed Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement into force so that BiH can benefit from the much needed financial investment that 
comes with it” (“UK, Germany Launch Joint Initiative on Bosnia,” 2014). This first step would 
be followed by a series of other steps and rewards until BiH would be granted the candidate 
status. This initiative followed soon after the General Elections in BiH which were held a month 
before. The formation of a new government was an occasion which the UK and German 
governments deemed a good opportunity to change the EU’s approach. Although both 
conditions, implementation of the Sejdić/Finci ruling and coordination mechanism, remained 
in place, it was the sequencing of each condition and attachment of a tangible reward to each 
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one that was meant to make the difference in the dynamics of the accession process. In other 
words, although softened, the EU conditionality was made more explicit. The new initiative 
thus increased the rewards by offering ‘dramatic progress’ towards membership, and lowered 
the cost by removing the implementation of the Sejdić/Finci case as a condition for the entry 
into force of the SAA. It did not envisage any sanctions in the case of non-compliance.  
 
This kind of rationale for the change of the approach is explained by Milada Vachudova, 
who says that in BiH “the EU has backed away from some of its requirements for the entry into 
force of the SAA – not because it is trying to relegate Bosnia to second-tier membership, but 
because it is desperate to see Bosnia move forward in the process since an SAA would give the 
EU more tools to influence Bosnian politics” (Vachudova, 2014, p. 134). Besides being 
convincing in terms of the motivations of the UK and German administrations, Vachudova’s 
explanation also confirms the argument that the EU member states rather choose pragmatic 
solutions over the EU principles and values when faced with the realities of politics in BiH. 
Such an approach results in inconsistent policies, as well as the loss of identity and credibility 
of the EU as an actor. Richter argues that consistency “requires that rewards are explicitly and 
reliably linked to the fulfilment of EU criteria” (Richter, 2012, p. 512). Looking at the three 
examples discussed in the preceding section, we can see that although rewards are explicitly 
linked to some EU criteria, they are not linked to them reliably. The inconsistency is evident 
both in the interpretation of the criteria, and the arbitrary granting of rewards for pragmatic 
reasons and for a self-serving agenda.  
 
The EU also gave a rhetorical boost to the new conditionality through a narrative that 
would demonstrate their strong commitment. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, shared great enthusiasm that this change in 
approach, and inherently of the EU's conditionality, is the beginning of a new era in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina's EU accession: "Yes, there can be a new start for the EU and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. We are ready to engage. We are ready to reciprocate in the moment when this 
commitment will be adopted by the parliament. This could be a turning point in the way of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina towards the European Union." (Council of the European Union, 2014). 
The rhetoric was matched by more intensive contacts - a condition as low as adoption of a 
statement required three official visits to Sarajevo by Mogherini within less than six months 
since her appointment as the EU High Representative, more than to any other single country in 
the world. The statement was endorsed and finally adopted by BiH Parliament on 23 February, 
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2015, only after very intensive contacts and personal visits to BiH Parliament by Mogherini, 
the German and UK Foreign Ministers Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Phillip Hammond. The 
authorities of Republika Srpska reluctantly agreed to support this statement and its adoption 
was delayed several times due to a lack of support from the RS, as well as President Dodik's 
initial open refusal to provide his endorsement.  
 
The level of commitment by Mogherini was an indication of the extent to which the EU 
was desperate to move the country forward. While addressing the BiH Parliament on the day 
they adopted the statement, Mogherini pronounced it a ‘historical moment’ three times during 
her short speech (European External Action Service, 2015). However, moments prior to 
Mogherini’s address to Parliament, representatives of Dodik’s Party of Independent Social-
Democrats (SNSD) left the room, resulting in the upper house of Parliament being left without 
enough Serb representatives for a decision-making quorum. The stated reasons for their 
departure were media allegations that the Chairman of the lower house may have been involved 
in war crimes against Serbs, which is why they decided to boycott all Parliament sessions during 
his chairmanship. However, the joint session of two houses scheduled for that day did not have 
any other item on the agenda, and was organised purely for the purpose of Mogherini’s address. 
The striking absence of SNSD’s representatives from the Parliament and their symbolic walk-
out was therefore a manifestation of the way in which ‘gatekeepers’ can thwart linkage 
symbolically and procedurally.  However, no reaction from the EU ensued, they praised all 
parties equally for their support, and did not in any way condemn SNSD’s behaviour.  
  
In June 2014, the SAA came into force following the adoption of the Statement of 
Commitment of BiH institutions to adopt the new reform agenda, containing a set of measures 
meant to “establish institutional functionality and efficiency, to launch reforms at all 
governance levels, to accelerate the process of reconciliation and to strengthen administrative 
capacity” (Presidency of BiH, Parliament of BiH, 2015). Adoption of the Statement replaced 
the previous condition on implementing the Sejdić/Finci ruling. The next expected step would 
be putting into place a mechanism for coordination of EU affairs, which would be rewarded by 
an invitation to submit an application for membership. That step would need to be followed by 
implementation of the Sejdić/Finci ruling, after which the UK and German governments would 
support the granting of candidate status to BiH. The philosophy behind the new approach was 
that a new political climate would be created by “stabilising and stimulating the economy, 
creating jobs, strengthening the rule of law, reducing bureaucracy and cutting the costs of 
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government” (“UK, Germany Launch Joint Initiative on Bosnia,” 2014). This set of tasks was 
formulated through a document called the Reform Agenda, which was adopted by the Council 
of Ministers of BiH and the Government of FBiH in June 2015, but it was rejected by the RS 
Government, thus bringing the whole process back to square one, and bringing to a close the 
EU’s newly established conditionality before the process could even begin.  
 
The EU did not issue any public statements to condemn the lack of compliance by the 
RS Government, while sanctions were never on the table anyway. The EU officials did not see 
any need for sanctions, because in their view compliance should be the free choice of domestic 
political elites, made without any external pressure (“Personal interview with a senior EU 
official in Brussels,” 2012). In response to the failure to fully adopt the reform agenda, the EU 
Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes 
Hahn, cancelled his planned visit to Sarajevo. The EU Delegation in Sarajevo issued a press 
statement expressing their disappointment that the visit had to be cancelled and urged all “BiH 
authorities to find agreement on the outstanding issues without delay” (Delegation of the EU to 
BiH, 2015), even though it was a single domestic actor which failed to deliver on the joint 
promise to adopt the reform agenda. This once again showed the EU’s complete miscalculation 
of sanctions and elites’ interests, and their false assumption that faster EU integration is in the 
interest of all national elites equally. 
 
The official reason for the change of EU’s approach initiated by the UK and Germany 
was said to be citizens’ protests that took place in February 2014. In an unprecedented turnout 
since the war, demonstrations took place throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, although with 
very modest turnout in cities of Republika Srpska. Protests were sustained for days and in some 
places took a more violent form, demolishing government buildings and setting the building of 
BiH Presidency on fire.  Citizens demanded more jobs and better living conditions, as well as 
fight against corruption and improved economy. The UK and German delegations had 
discussed a new approach as early as February 27, 2014, at the time of the protests, when the 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel met UK Prime Minister David Cameron in London, but the 
actual initiative was not launched until later in the year (“Merkel dashes Cameron’s hopes for 
fundamental reform of EU,” 2014).24  
                                                 
24 The Croatian foreign minister, Vesna Pusić, also launched an initiative for a new approach in BiH in order to break the 
current deadlock. Her proposal went as far as requesting EU membership for BiH under the condition that the pace and 




Although citizens’ protests may have been the cause for the new approach, external 
contextual factors also need to be taken into account. I argue that the shift in the EU policy 
towards BiH was also made in reaction to Russia’s growing influence in the Western Balkans, 
and in relation to the crisis in Ukraine. The protests of BiH citizens coincided with the protests 
of Ukrainian citizens that also began in February 2014. The deterioration of the situation in 
Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea by Russian troops in March 2014, had some spill over 
in the Balkans, which alerted the EU member states. The RS President Milorad Dodik was 
among the first foreign politicians to back the referendum in Crimea on joining Russia as 
“legitimate and democratic in accordance with international law and the U.N.-guaranteed right 
to self-determination” (“With an eye on Crimea, Bosnian Serb leader calls for confederation,” 
2014). Dodik followed up by a concrete move of visiting Moscow in the middle of the Crimea 
crisis, where he was awarded by Russian Patriarch Kirill for his efforts “to consolidate the unity 
of Orthodox nations” (“Russia stoking Bosnian Serb separatism in echo of Crimea,” 2014). 
This was, on one hand, an opportunity for Russia to reward anti-EU behaviour, and, on the 
other hand, an example of Dodik's own opportunism in seeking any chance to sustain the 
symbolic narrative on the historical and cultural/religious legacies between the RS and Russia. 
Furthermore, in 2014 Russia threw its strongest blow to the EU efforts in BiH when they denied 
their support for the EU membership efforts of BiH. For the first time in 14 years, Russia 
abstained from the vote at the occasion of the UN Security Council debate about the extension 
of the mandate of EU Forces in BiH. Russia's ambassador to Bosnia, Petar Ivancov stated that 
they do not want “the resolution to be used as an instrument to advance objectives that we were 
not part of, and that is Bosnia-Herzegovina becoming part of NATO or the European Union” 
(Cerkez, 2014). A couple of interviewees confirmed the view that the EU’s change of heart on 
BiH is “partly a response to Putin’s policies in the region and in Ukraine, and Dodik’s open 
support to Putin” (“Personal interview with a participant in negotiations on implementation of 
the Sejdić/Finci ruling,” 2014). 
 
As the example of a ‘new approach’ showed, the EU miscalculated the costs and benefits 
of compliance for the domestic elites. Although the EU had ample experience of low 
compliance that could not be explained in the simple terms of cost-benefit calculation, its 
assumptions are still based on the experiences in democratising the countries in Central and 
                                                 
Slovenian Foreign Minister Karl Erjavec also sent a petition to Baroness Catherine Ashton in February, requesting that the 
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is pushed higher on the EU agenda. 
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Eastern Europe (CEE), where calculations between costs and benefits were more clean-cut. In 
BiH, the context is more complex, volatile and unpredictable than in the CEE (Anastasakis, 
2008), although there is equally widespread public support for EU integration.25 The problem 
for the EU is a declarative support of all political parties and national elites for the EU 
integration, which the EU takes for granted. Even though it is formally hard to divide political 
parties between pro-European and anti-European as suggested by Konitzer (2011), the parties 
can be divided between liberal and illiberal, however fine-lined that distinction may be. 
Although this was a crucial distinction in choosing partners in the CEE countries, the EU is not 
willing to make that distinction in BiH. That is why it keeps falling into the same trap of trying 
to reward good behaviour, which is lacking, while refusing to sanction the ample examples of 
obstructive behaviour. In doing so, the EU fails to see that withholding benefits is not 
considered a valid sanction by some national elites. If making a choice between all seemingly 
pro-European parties is difficult on ideological or normative grounds, the EU could judge each 
party based on their actions and specific positions on issues that are subject to negotiations. 
However, a clear resistance to such ideas by the EU leaves doubt in regards to its ability to 
repeat its former successes of democratisation in BiH through a basic conditionality approach 
applied in the CEE countries (Freyburg & Richter, 2010).  
 
Another key obstacle is the existence of ‘gatekeepers’, which are not new to the EU 
either. The EU already had to face ‘gatekeepers’ during Mečiar’s government in Slovakia, 
Tuđman in Croatia, and Milošević in Serbia. Konitzer (2011) rightly rejects “the idea that 
parties and party leaders will inevitably evolve or lead their parties into pro-EU directions” (p. 
1855). In spite of the past evidence elsewhere in Europe, and experiences within the Bosnian 
context, the EU continues to treat national elites as rational actors, who might be cajoled or 
compelled to make the required change through the offer of rationalist choices. Sceptical of that 
scenario, Konitzer boils down the success or failure of EU efforts to a number of factors, two 
of which apply to my arguments about 'gatekeepers'. The first critical prerequisite for 
meaningful change is the removal of a stigmatised charismatic leader, such as was the death of 
Tuđman and Milošević, which opened up room for programmatic manoeuvres within their 
respective parties (Konitzer, 2011, p. 1884). The second factor is the EU’s faulted rewarding of 
'less principled extroverts in favour of introverts' who may provide viable policy alternatives 
                                                 









This chapter has examined the limitations of the EU as an actor in BiH through the 
concept of EU normative power, and within the framework of literature on EU conditionality. 
I have challenged the notion that the EU is predisposed to act normatively, I have shown the 
weak link between EU norms and its actions in BiH, and underscored the shortcomings of the 
EU’s ‘cookie-cutter approach’ in the use of conditionality. 
 
Manners’ (2002) argument that the EU is ‘predisposed’ to act normatively cannot be 
justified because: EU actions result in unprincipled interpretations of its own norms; member 
states sometimes have conflicting objectives; challenging aspirations of non-EU players; and 
domestic actors and context pose unprecedented challenges. The EU rather acts pragmatically 
in line with its internal and external context, and in reaction to challenges and opportunities that 
arise. In doing so, the EU compromises its own values, and its international identity and 
uniqueness as an actor that promotes norms externally. I have argued that the EU’s self-
perception as a normative power is diluted by a discrepancy between its principles and its 
policies in BiH, by the choice of pragmatic solutions instead of principled belief in its norms, 
and dissenting views of the EU’s various actors about its role and the nature of the EU as an 
actor. The EU actions lack normative legitimacy, and the domestic elites know how to take 
advantage of that weakness and to manipulate it. I agree with Anastasakis (2008), who states 
that the EU blends normative, functional and real-politik dimensions, which results in a lack of 
clarity about the EU’s role in BiH. Those inconsistencies and unprincipled behaviours are a 
reflection as well as a cause of the confused identity of the EU as a power. The result is a 
confused and compromised EU international identity, and ineffective external democratisation.  
 
The EU’s confused international identity, constraining domestic and international 
contexts, as well as normatively defiant domestic elites, individually and cumulatively 
compromise the concept of EU conditionality. I have argued against the application of 
conditionality in BiH, because it misses the target, it misinterprets motivations of domestic 
elites, it offers inadequate incentives, and is weak on sanctions. The example of BiH 
undermines the basic assumptions of the three models of external democracy promotion – the 
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linkage, leverage, and governance. Conditionality has not worked in BiH in an ideal situation 
in which the linkage and leverage are both high, not even after a governance model had been 
established through a new contractual relationship between the EU and BiH. The result has 
been no compliance, even in a situation when incentives were high and costs very low. I 
attribute this to constraining and volatile domestic and international contexts, the role of 
domestic elites as ‘gatekeepers’ to external democratisation, and the EU’s inability to recognise 
the exceptionalism of this situation and to adapt to it. All three factors are addressed respectively 
in individual empirical chapters. 
 
In the next Chapter, I discuss the need for the EU to promote substantive democracy, 
which should set the boundaries of what is ‘normal’ in a democratic society. That too should 
be the essence of the EU’s normative agenda (Manners 2002). However, the evidence presented 
in this Chapter supports Anastasakis' (2008) argument that “what is ‘normal’ for the EU is not 
always perceived as ‘normal’ and ‘appropriate’ by applicant countries, especially in post-
conflict societies where the notion of normalcy and justice is affected by irreconcilable 
perceptions and misperceptions” (p. 370). The conceptions of what is ‘normal’ in a democracy 
differs not only between the EU and domestic actors, but also among various national actors, 
especially when it comes to the issues of constitutional change and power-sharing arrangements 
in BiH (Anastasakis, 2008, p. 371). The EU not only fails to see those divergent aspirations, 
but it also fails to consider or condemn behaviour and actions of domestic actors which are not 
only undemocratic, but cannot be considered ‘normal’ in a democratic society. Due to that 
obliviousness, the EU not only fails to recognise and sanction undemocratic behaviour, but in 
some cases it even adapts to it. I have briefly referred to some examples in support of that 








The failure of EU democracy promotion in BiH can be attributed to a number of internal 
and external factors. Factors internal to the EU can be attributed to the nature of the EU as an 
actor, and how it approaches democratisation in BiH. Factors external to the EU are related to 
the nature of democracy and democratisation in BiH. Based on that, I have proposed three 
hypotheses: 
 
1. In terms of the EU’s internal constraints that are attributed to the nature of the EU as an 
actor, two are under-researched. First, the EU-sponsored democratisation suffers from 
a lack of self-perception that the EU is a normative power, which should strive to exert 
normative influence internationally. Because of that, the EU is not ‘pre-disposed’ to act 
normatively. Secondly, the EU undermines ideational and immaterial aspects of 
democratisation in BiH, limiting its efforts to procedural aspects. The EU’s focus on 
procedural democratisation hampers substantive democratisation, which precludes the 
transformation and internalisation of EU democratic norms in BiH.  
 
2. BiH is an unconsolidated democracy, which is a result of a restrictive normative, 
social and political context, the domestic agent-structure interaction, and deliberate elite 
agency, which generate two sets of external impediments to democratisation. The first 
set of external impediments are domestic values and norms which are contradictory and 
incompatible with the normative basis of the EU, creating a normative gap between the 
EU and BiH. The second set of external impediments to the spread of EU norms can be 
described as ‘subversions’ of democracy, i.e. features evident in unconsolidated 
democracies, which are taken for granted in ‘consolidated’ democracies. The first set of 
variables are contextually predetermined, while the second set are a product of 
deliberate elite agency.  
 
3. Internal constraints that are related to the EU’s approach to democratisation in BiH are 
grounded in the EU’s failure to recognise the exceptionalism of BiH. Due to that 
spuriousness, the EU applies a ‘cookie-cutter approach’ that treats BiH as any other 
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transitional society. However, BiH defies democratic transition and is a post-conflict 
society in which democracy is struggling to consolidate. The EU tools and instruments 
which may have worked in early democratisations elsewhere have not produced 
democratic quality in BiH. The EU’s ‘cookie-cutter approach’ underestimates the 
salience of ethnic nationalism in BiH, which presents an ideational obstacle to its 
democratisation and demands a tailor-made approach to the unconsolidated democracy 
in BiH. 
 
A Social-Constructivist Approach  
 
I use a social-constructivist approach because it enables me to address different aspects 
of the three hypotheses: the role of agents and structures, domestic and international; the 
importance of the context and agent-structure interaction; and the ideational and immaterial 
aspects of democracy promotion.  Interaction between actors can be understood as a pattern of 
action that is mutually constitutive by and with identities and structures, as well as the 
underlying context and scope conditions (Ruggie, 1998, p. 879). Their actions have ‘intended 
and unintended consequences’, which also depend on the interaction with structures. Structures 
also evolve and are constituted through interaction with actors. Structures are not ‘fixed or 
external’ to agent interaction, nor are identities of actors formed exogenously. Actors and 
structures are mutually constituted through patterns of opportunity and constraint offered by 
structures, which actors are aware of, and in relation to which they take certain positions 
(Bretherton, 2006, p. 21).  Actors’ identity and behaviour is also shaped by the context of social 
and cultural norms, and historical circumstances that influence their interests. The role of 
context and scope conditions are thus given a central place in constructivist research, which 
looks at the way in which “changing identities and interests are invested with social and political 
meaning” (Fierke & Wiener, 1999, p. 123).  
 
Variants of constructivism have been determined according to where they stand along 
the rationalist – reflectivist divide, distinguishing between the ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ constructivism. 
‘Thin’ constructivism is seen as ‘less radical’ (Christiansen, 2001, p. 535), studying the impact 
of norms on actors’ identities, interests and behaviour (Haas, 1961; Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001; 
O’Brennan, 2000). It supposes the constructive power of language in the processes of ‘arguing’ 
(Risse, 1999) or ‘persuasion’ (Checkel, 2001). This variant is termed by Ruggie (1998, p. 881) 
as ‘postmodernist constructivism’, and emphasises the linguistic construction of subjects. The 
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term ‘thick’ constructivism was coined by Tonra (2007). Wiener (2001) sees this variant as 
more ‘radical’, seeking to understand the ways in which the world is constructed. Its main 
assumption is that, “language constitutes meaning within specific contexts, leading to rule 
following” (p. 535).  
 
The early constructivist research of EU integration sided more with its ‘thin’ variants, 
focusing largely on final outcomes, such as internalisation and institutionalisation of rules and 
norms, and construction of political communities. Less attention was paid to the processes of 
construction, constitution and transformation of identities. One of the areas underappreciated 
by ‘thin’ constructivism is agency, which is an important element in my hypotheses. This is 
why I opt for a ‘thick’ constructivist approach, which enables me to study many aspects of EU 
normative power, including diffusion and internalisation of norms, identity formation, and 
studying the context and scope conditions. Instead of viewing constructivism as a theory of 
European integration, I rather prefer to apply “constructivist thinking about European 
integration” (Christiansen, 2001, p. 11). 
 
Applying a Social-Constructivist Approach 
 
When it comes to the processes of EU integration and enlargement, constructivist 
research has mainly looked at the context in which identities and interests are mutually 
constituted through interaction with EU structures (Fierke & Wiener, 1999, p. 125). Their key 
concern has been the context in which the EU expansion would be meaningful and rational. My 
interest is in the mechanics of the construction of norms in BiH through interaction with the 
EU, which is challenged by a restrictive domestic context, potentially competing norms, and 
encumbering elite-agency. 
 
 I consider approaches which look at the transformative power of the EU simply in terms 
of procedural aspects as too descriptive and in risk of omitting the important processes of 
substantive subversion of democratisation. Procedural approaches overlook the constitutive and 
transformative aspects of promotion and internalisation of EU norms because they fail to 
‘deconstruct’ the nature of EU power, which is why they need to be supplemented by an 
assessment of substantive transformation. In Chapter VII, I turn to the processes of interest and 
identity formation in order to fully apprehend those aspects of transformation through EU 




When it comes to identity formation constructivists place different weight on 
international or domestic norms in shaping state identities. More emphasis can be placed also 
on the impact of the international environment, while identity is mainly a domestic attribute 
based on national ideologies and a sense of collective distinctiveness (Finnemore & Sikkink, 
2001). In the following empirical Chapters I will look at both, the impact of the international 
environment, and the role of domestic factors, primarily nationalism, on identity formation in 
BiH in relation to EU norms. Christensen et al. (2001) argue that “if the study of identity 
formation is accepted as a crucial component of constructivist research, the role of language 
and of discourses becomes crucial” (p. 541). I apply discourse analysis in Chapter VI to analyse 
the use of nationalist rhetoric and discourse in the construction of interests in BiH. I subscribe 
to the notion that interests and identities cannot exist independent of the context in which agents 
and structures interact (Diez, 1999; Manners & Lucarelli, 2006). I analyse the nationalist 
rhetoric of Milorad Dodik as a performative act that constructs actors’ interests in a structural 
context that is characterised by ethnic divisions and weak institutions. His rhetoric is intended 
to shape collective understandings of that context and the identities of the actors involved 
(Manners & Lucarelli, 2006, p. 4).  
 
 I apply constructivist ‘thinking’ in my research approach, which demands 





Constructivists view norms as “…shared, collective understandings that make 
behavioural claims on actors” (Checkel, 1999, p. 551). Norms can shape and be shaped (or 
constructed) in a relationship between actors, context, and structures (Fierke & Wiener, 1999, 
p. 125). Compliance with norms may be conditioned by characteristics of norms 
(appropriateness, validity, ideational commitment), by the role of norm entrepreneurs, norm 
origin, and norm character. I analyse each of these elements of EU norms in Chapters VI and 
VII in relation to two specific democratic norms, trust and equality/participation. 
 
Norm characteristics. The first feature of norms that shape the behaviour of actors with 
a certain identity is appropriateness of behaviour (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). Norm 
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conformance may be driven by material self-interest, so that norms and rationality could not be 
separated (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Motivations implied by this concept may include habit, 
duty, sense of obligation and responsibility as well as principled belief (1998, p. 888). 
Alternatively, the motivations might stem from the fact that behavioural alternatives were never 
considered, that behavioural alternatives are considered useless or normatively objectionable, 
and that certain behaviour is chosen because it is considered appropriate for maximising social 
rewards (Johnston, 2005, p. 1041). Secondly, universal validity of norms mobilises compliance 
in collectivities with a ‘thick’ sense of cultural identity (Sjursen, 2006, p. 175). They are not 
specific cultural values, but norms that have more universal appeal and establish what is ‘fair 
or just’, bearing a persuasive sense of validity and legitimacy. The third set of norm features 
that condition compliance include subjective criteria such as ‘empathy, altruism, and ideational 
commitment’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 898). Norm compliance thus takes place due to 
a belief in the ideals and values embodied in the norms.  
 
Norm entrepreneurs. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) emphasise that norm 
entrepreneurs are critical for norm emergence. They bring attention to issues or even ‘create’ 
issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatises them (1998, p. 896). Checkel 
states that norm entrepreneurs are individuals with skills to turn their individual beliefs into 
broader normative beliefs when opportunity arises (2001, p. 553).  
 
Origin of norms. Norms can be of domestic or international origin. Finnemore and 
Sikkink (2001, p. 893) argue that many international norms started as domestic norms and were 
subsequently internationalised by norm entrepreneurs. Domestic norms sometimes act as 
‘filters’, which affect compliance and interpretation of international norms. Such influences are 
stronger in early stages of norm promotion, and lessen when a norm becomes internationalised. 
Also, norm entrepreneurs can sometimes use international norms to justify their position on 
domestic norms (2001, p. 896). Domestic norms can have a strong influence on promotion of 
international norms in young democracies with ethnic cleavages and with political parties 
organised along ethnic lines (Kelley, 2004, p. 431). In those cases allegiances are likely to be 
stronger with domestic rather than international norms. Johnston (2005, p. 1043) also refers to 
the strength of domestic allegiances in the face of promotion EU norms.  He suggests looking 
into other criteria such as national symbols, ‘intensity effects’ of socialisation at local and 
international level, ‘boundary policing’ of in-group identity, and ‘localisation’ of international 




Character of norms. Character of norms can be discussed in terms of its legitimation, 
prominence, and issues at stake. Finnemore and Sikkink (2001, p. 906) define legitimation as a 
main motivation for normative shifts. States and elites which are insecure about their 
international status or reputation might adapt to international norms more easily. In terms of 
their prominence, some norms may be more prone to internationalisation than others, which 
can be affected by the quality of the norm itself or by the quality of the states promoting the 
norm. Other relevant criteria which I account for in empirical Chapters are norm clarity, 
specificity and content (Johnston, 2005, p. 1028). 
 
Mechanisms of Norm Diffusion 
 
Constructivists identify a range of mechanisms of norm diffusion. Given my focus on 
the concept of EU normative power, I first take into account diffusion mechanisms proposed 
by Ian Manners (2002, pp. 245–6):  
 
a. Contagion - diffusion of norms results from the unintentional diffusion of ideas from 
the EU to other political actors 
b. Informational diffusion is the result of the range of strategic communications, such as 
new policy initiatives by the EU, and declaratory communications, such as initiatives 
from the presidency of the EU or the president of the Commission. 
c. Procedural diffusion involves the institutionalisation of a relationship between the EU 
and a third party, such as an inter-regional co-operation agreement, membership of an 
international organisation or enlargement of the EU itself. 
d. Transference - diffusion takes place when the EU exchanges goods, trade, aid or 
technical assistance with third parties through largely substantive or financial means. 
e. Overt diffusion occurs as a result of the physical presence of the EU in third states and 
international organisations. 
f. Cultural filter which affects the impact of international norms and political learning in 
third states and organisations leading to learning, adaptation or rejection of norms. 
 
However, in order to be able to assess the transformative impact of the EU norms, 
Manners’ (2002) mechanisms of norm diffusion need to be complemented by social 
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constructivist mechanisms, such as norm internalisation mechanisms proposed by Checkel 
(2005): 
 
a. Norm compliance – Compliance focuses on processes leading to internalisation, such as 
coercion and sanctions, cost/benefit calculations, persuasion, etc. Checkel (2005, p. 549) 
looks at motives and attitudes which change according to a set of norms, and gives 
speech and language a central role in his analysis.  
b. Social learning - Agent compliance comes not so much through political pressure, but 
through learning. When exposed to the prescriptions embodied in norms, agents adopt 
new interests. Rationalists and constructivists explain learning differently. 
Constructivists seek to capture the shaping of actors’ interest and identities ‘through and 
during interaction’.  
c. Role playing / mimicking - When role-playing occurs, the shift from logic of 
consequences toward logic of appropriateness has begun, as it involves non-calculative 
behavioural adaptation (Checkel, 2005, p. 810). ‘Mimicking’ happens when an actor 
copies behavioural norms or discursive practices of a group (Johnston, 2005, p. 1021).   
d. Persuasion - Argumentative persuasion implies interaction, while manipulative 
persuasion is asocial and devoid of genuine interaction (Checkel, 1999, p. 12). 
Persuasion is prone to social learning and may lead to interest redefinition and identity 
change, depending on the intensity, duration, and quality of exposure to norms as 
explanations of the success of persuasion (Johnston, 2005, p. 1030).  
e. Socialisation is the “process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given 
community” (Zurn & Checkel, 2005, p. 804). Socialisation is the process through which 
an actor moves from the logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness (2005, p. 
1048). Zurn and Checkel (2005, p. 1050) propose two routes of socialisation (thorough 
structures and through actors) using three principal socialisation mechanisms: strategic 
calculation, role playing, and normative suasion.   
 
The key to triggering any of those mechanisms are favourable scope conditions. They 
may include properties of the international institutions, properties of the political systems and 
agents that become socialised, properties of the issues or norms regarding which socialisation 
takes place, properties of the interaction between socialising and socialised agents (Checkel, 
2005, p. 1055). Schimmelfennig (2000) suggests that when populations are weakly mobilised 
‘because of underdeveloped party systems’, political elites are under less bottom-up pressure 
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to conform to demands for normative changes from other states or international institutions. In 
a similar fashion, Mansfield and Snyder (2002) argue that population can actually be 
‘overmobilised’ in new democracies with underdeveloped party systems, particularly through 
appeals to nationalism. 
 
Analytical Strategy for the Empirical Chapters  
 
The two empirical Chapters, each of which assesses one dimension of democratic 
substance, are based on two case studies. I have decided to use a case study approach because 
it is seen as the best research strategy when ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are being asked, when 
the investigator has little control over events, and when dealing with contemporary events (Yin, 
2002, p. 1). Particularly important is the view that case study is a useful empirical inquiry when 
the “boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (2002, p. 13). Case 
study method is used to uncover contextual conditions which are germane to the phenomena I 
want to explore. My analytical strategy for the assessment of each case study is based on Yin’s 
approach to case study analysis, which includes three general strategies: relying on theoretical 



















Assessment of democratic quality
List of indicators/norms
List of subversions of democracy
List of scope conditions
Mechanisms of norm diffusion Norm compliance
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The conclusions drawn in each empirical Chapter refer to specific hypotheses I have 
proposed. The conclusions have been reached by triangulating information from the three 
sections of each Chapter. Yin (2002, p. 98) lists four different types of triangulation. The most 
relevant for my study is the methodological triangulation. It is used when data is collected 
through several sources and analysed using different methods. Validity of findings is 
established if similar conclusions have been reached using different methods. In my case studies 
triangulation is conducted in the following way: 
 
 
Figure 4 - Methodological triangulation 
 
Yin proposes that each analytical strategy underlies a specific analytic technique, which 
are used to develop internal validity and external validity in doing case studies. He proposes 
five techniques that lay ground for case studies. However, instead of adopting any of those 
techniques, I have developed a tailor-made framework of analysis using the constructivist 
approach to studying EU normative power described above. In the next section I explain the 















Assessing Democratic Quality  
 
 There is no single framework for measuring the quality of democracy, which 
would be “right and true for all societies” (L. Diamond & Morlino, 2005, p. xii). Democracies 
differ in the normative weights they place on different dimensions of democratic quality, so a 
research approach needs to explain variations based on indicators that are specific to a country. 
Diamond and Morlino’s list of dimensions of democratic quality links the procedural 
dimensions to democratic substance by measuring eight dimensions (five procedural, two 
substantive, and one result dimension). The procedural dimensions are: the rule of law, 
participation, competition, vertical accountability, and horizontal accountability. Substantive 
dimensions are freedom and equality, and the result dimension is responsiveness in the sense 
of a democratic process through which the government designs and implements policies which 
citizens demand and want (2005, pp. xxv–xxxi). 
  
Potter (2005, p. 527) points out that all these are necessary but insufficient conditions 
for a democratic polity to survive and they are not easy to obtain in democracies where legacies 
of hate, mistrust and conflict remain. This is why my framework of analysis needs to include 
dimensions that capture democratic ‘substance’ more closely, and which can reflect the difficult 
circumstances the EU faces in a ‘‘defective’’ democracy such as BiH. 
  
I have made an argument in Chapter III that consolidation can for my purposes be 
understood as an outcome rather than as a process of democratisation. In order to assess and 
measure democratic consolidation as an outcome of democratisation, I borrow Diamond’s 
definition (1999) of consolidation: “a behavioural and attitudinal embrace of democratic 
principles and methods by both elites and mass” (p. 20). The task of democratic consolidation 
in a ‘‘defective’ democracy’ such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, is “to balance cleavage and 
conflict with the need for consensus” (1999, p. 166). The two key substantive dimensions of 
democratic quality which can ensure fulfilment of this task are trust and equality/participation. 
 
Trust. Almond and Verba (1965) argue that political trust is crucial for a consolidated 
democracy. Political trust focuses on the sentiments of the citizens towards the key institutions 
of their society and gives a sense of the legitimacy of the governance arrangements in the eyes 
of the population. Social trust is also regarded as a precondition for the smooth functioning of 
the society and its institutions and it is one of the core elements of Putnam’s theory of social 
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capital which he introduced in “Making Democracy Work“ (1994). Putnam sees declining trust 
as a major challenge for societies, particularly those with a history of conflict. Uslaner and 
Inglehart (2002) see democratic societies as trusting societies. In their view, more trust leads to 
“better” government and happier public. Democracy does not make people become more 
trusting, but rather “trust leads to better institutions” (2002, p. 172). Other authors link trust to 
the second dimension I will assess, participation/equality, and suggest that trust is able to 
motivate political participation, and to improve the quality of this participation (Lenard, 2005).  
 
Equality/participation. Diamond and Morlino (2005) include participation in 
procedural rather than substantive dimensions of democratic quality. However, I argue that 
decays in participation subvert democratic substance, particularly in respect of social and 
political equality and political culture. Subversions of participation can be due to several factors 
such as the apathy of citizens, doubt in the efficacy of democratic mechanisms, alienation from 
the democratic process, systemic flaws, etc. (L. Diamond & Morlino, 2005, p. xvii). In that 
respect, participation is related to political equality, because political inequalities result in lesser 
consumption of democratic right of participation by under-privileged groups (2005, p. xvi). 
Another supporting condition of participation is the political culture, which should value 
participation and equality of all citizens (2005, p. xvii).  
 
Beetham (2003) points out that developing, or more challenging, democracies can alert 
us to features that are taken for granted in ‘consolidated’ democracies. Those features he calls 
‘subversions’. However, he sees this term as too restrictive because it may imply intentionality, 
whereas democracy can also be undermined by unintended inadequacies in institutions, 
procedures or elites. As I mentioned in the introduction, Beetham (2003) deliberately excludes 
the cases of countries which have been ‘debilitated by a civil war’ from his research. 
Unfortunately, Bosnia and Herzegovina fits this description, so the use of the term ‘subversion’ 
is seen as appropriate and even desirable. In this case it encompasses intentional as well as 
unintentional undermining of democratic consolidation. My framework of analysis stems from 
Beetham’s focus on such substantive flaws.  
 
Framework of Analysis 
 
Based on the two dimensions of democratic substance identified above, I have designed 
a specific framework of analysis that captures ‘subversions’ of trust and equality/participation 
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in order to assess the quality of democracy in BiH. Based on that framework of analysis, the 
next stage of my research will identify specific assessment criteria of what can subvert 
democracy. Using a modification of Beetham’s four-step model my research follows this route:  
 
I. Using the two dimensions of democratic quality given above as a starting point, 
identify specific indicators for each which would represent EU democratic ‘norms’. 
As pointed out earlier, the EU normative basis is defined in a range of documents, 
which will be analysed in search of indicators. Attention is also paid to informal 
democratic norms, which have not been enshrined in EU documents, but which 
have acquired a taken for granted quality in democratic societies.  
 
 
II. For each indicator of EU ‘norms’, identify procedural and substantive ‘defects’ or 
‘subversions’ of democracy in BiH through research. In line with the constructivist 
thinking about the mutual interaction between structures and actors, and the 
importance of scope conditions, I will identify a procedural and substantive aspect 
for each dimension of democratic quality. My research will seek to identify both 
procedural and substantive ‘subversions’ for each indicator representing an EU 
norm.  
 
III. Identify scope conditions, instruments and processes of norm diffusion, and 
obstacles to norm diffusion for each indicator, and analyse them. My intention is to 
reveal the effectiveness, or otherwise, of the EU’s procedural approach by looking 
at the nature and character of obstacles to its diffusion mechanisms and the way they 
are (or are not) tackled. While assessing and analysing each of the indicators and 
their ‘subversions’ I will identify which of the five mechanisms the EU deploys to 
diffuse that particular norm: informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, 
transference, overt diffusion, and cultural filter. Those six mechanisms may not 
necessarily reveal actors’ motives for complying. That is why the next stage of 
assessment encompasses the following elements: contagion, human agency/norm 





IV. Based on an analysis of the relationship between EU norms and identified 
democratic ‘subversions’, determine the level of norm transformation. The final step 
is to assess EU normative influences and impact according to a range of instruments 
and outputs identified in previous steps. In line with Michael Smith’s (2004, p. 181) 
assertion, I will seek to extend that assessment beyond mere ‘impact’ or ‘influence’ 
to more extensive measures of ‘effectiveness’ or ‘success’. Based on the discussion 
about norm compliance in the second Chapter, I propose the following set of 
measures of assessment of the level of compliance with EU norms: overt 
subversions, low compliance, procedural compliance, institutionalisation, 
internalisation, and transformation. 
 
The four steps of assessment are illustrated in the following figure. As Beetham points 
out, these stages are not necessarily separate in practice, but form part of an iterative or reflexive 














Access to Information 
 
I was based in Bosnia and Herzegovina throughout the process of conducting research. 
This enabled me to have first-hand access to individuals, organisations and information that 
were relevant to my research. But even more so, by being present in the country throughout that 
period, I was directly exposed to events, media coverage, public and informal debates and 
processes surrounding those cases. Access to information was therefore not an issue, and I 
EU norms 
Procedural and substantive ‘subversions’ 
of democracy 
Level of normative transformation  
 
Scope conditions, diffusion mechanisms 
and obstacles  
Figure 5 - Procedure for assessment of democratic quality 
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needed to focus on methodologies of collecting, organising and managing data. My framework 
of analysis was a central place around which I organised the data.  
 
Throughout this period, I performed various professional roles, which enabled me to 
have very easy access to information and I hardly experienced any obstacles to collecting 
information. I have been professionally engaged by the Council of Ministers of BiH (originally 
as an advisor and eventually appointed as Deputy Minister of Civil Affairs), I worked as an 
advisor and project manager for various international organisations and projects in BiH (OSCE, 
Office of the High representative, EU, USAID, NDI, etc.), and I was also very active as a 
member of the NGO sector (I set up and ran a think tank for the Foreign Policy Initiative BH). 
I have published articles in newspapers, weeklies, policy papers, books and other publications. 
My network of contacts is rich and wideranging from journalists, government officials and civil 
servants, politicians and members of parliament across all political parties, analysts, academics, 
foreign diplomats, etc. My personal contacts and network obtained me direct access to 
individuals who have been directly engaged in the process which I observed. I used attendance 
at conferences at home and abroad to widen access to individuals outside BiH. I used trips to 
Brussels and many European capitals to interview as many stakeholders as possible.  
 
I collected the majority of material for my thesis before I became a government minister 
in February 2012. This ensured that I approached the topic from an unbiased and non-political 
perspective. Given the timeframe of my case study, the majority of empirical material was 
collected in the three years before 2012. The EU and government’s joint effort on finding a 
solution to the implementation of the Sejdić/Finci ruling continued throughout this period and 
intensified in 2013 and 2014, which is the timeframe I have looked at.  
 
Sources of Information 
 
Participant observation. Several projects in which I was professionally engaged were 
related to the EU integration of BiH. For several years I ran the project entitled ‘Monitoring the 
European Integration Processes of BiH’ implemented by the Foreign Policy Initiative BH (FPI). 
Through that project I had direct access to information that FPI researchers were gathering. I 
attended numerous focus group meetings and conducted surveys that were also relevant to my 
research topic. As a part of that project, I organised and attended many international 
conferences, round table discussions and workshops on EU integration. Those events 
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continually exposed me to a variety of views of domestic and international political players, 
analysts and experts.  
 
Documents and legislation. I have used various EU documents, which have elaborated 
on and added to the original Copenhagen criteria set out in 1993. Those documents include the 
EU Treaties, Zagreb Declaration of 2000, the Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans of 
2003, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, the European Partnership, EU annual 
Progress Reports for BiH, EU Parliament Resolutions on BiH, Council of Europe and Venice 
Commission documents, etc. However, I have also included in my research criteria that which 
is not so explicitly declared in EU documents, but rather representative of democratic norms 
which have acquired a taken for granted quality in democratic societies, and which come 
through the public statements of EU officials. I also studied various relevant constitutional 
documents and legal frameworks in BiH.  
 
Interviews. My knowledge of the context is wide and deep, so the purpose of interviews 
was not to obtain basic information about the country, different players and processes. I was 
able instead to focus interviews on more substantive in-depth issues and seek a wide variety of 
viewpoints. The official lines of interviewees were publicly available and known to me, so my 
questions rather referred to substantive accounts, informed opinions and a variety of 
interpretations. Given my various roles in BiH society, when conducting interviews I had to 
emphasise that their purpose was my PhD research. Although most interviewees agreed to 
answer my questions, they often asked not to use direct quotations. Many of them were senior 
officials who agreed to provide informed opinions, rather than positions representative of their 
organisation. This is why many of them opted for strict identity confidentiality. 
 
Although in effect I conducted tens of interviews, the most relevant ones are the 
following, even though in the end I do not refer to all of them in my thesis: five interviews with 
senior and mid-ranking EU officials from Brussels, five interviews with EU officials based in 
Sarajevo, three interviews with officials from EU member states, twenty five interviews with 
BiH politicians, seven interviews with direct stakeholders, five interviews with political 
analysts from BiH, and several with analysts from the region and EU countries, and three 




Media monitoring. For the purpose of monitoring the rhetoric during the campaign for 
2010 General Elections in BiH, I used two sets of resources. Media Intelligence Agency 
morning briefs, which are compiled on the basis of daily monitoring of 3 news agencies, 11 
radio and TV news broadcasts, 11 newspapers, over 20 international outlets, as well as 9 
weekly/biweekly print magazines and 10 weekly current affairs TV programs (produced in 
English language).26 MIA briefs include situation analyses on media scenes, politics, education, 
judiciary, social issues, etc. Secondly, news reports published on six major web-based news 
portals (in languages of BiH).27 Information for Chapter VI was collected during the month of 
formal election campaign, from September 3rd – October 4th 2010. Evidence for Chapter VII 
was collected in the period since the ECHR Decision in April 2009 until the introduction of the 
EU’s new approach to BiH in 2014 and 2015.  
 
Other sources. Evidence on citizens’ perceptions was collected using three methods: 
the public opinion survey conducted by UNDP (2009b) and Foreign Policy Initiative BH;28 a 
questionnaire I designed on motives and perceptions of citizens that collected data from three 
groups of 10-15 interviewees, each belonging to one of three constituent peoples in BiH; 
through focus groups (three focus group meetings were conducted, each within one of the three 
ethnic groups).29 Other sources of information included academic journals, official documents 
and reports from different organisations, media and press accounts, policy analyses, think-tank 
reports, government papers and documents, etc. 
 
Content analysis.  
 
Methodology - Chapter VI (trust). Research in Chapter VI was based mainly on 
information from documents and media reports. After collecting empirical data from the media 
I managed it through content analysis software. In the first step, I ran a word frequency search 
in order to identify one thousand terms most prominent in the media during the election 
campaign. After removing terms of grammatical purpose only (pronouns, conjunctions, 
numbers, prepositions, and articles), I produced a table of 150 terms, which appeared most in 
                                                 
26 Media Intelligence Agency, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
27 Web-portals were monitored using the Google reader tool, which receives RSS feeds from the following web sites: 
www.sarajevo-x.com, www.vijesti.ba, www.6uka.com, www.frontal.rs, www.vecernji.ba  
28 Because I participated in the design of this survey, I included in it several questions that were required for my research. Prior 
consent was granted by the Assembly of FPI BH. 
29 Focus groups were also conducted as part of a larger research project by FPI BH. However, consent was granted to include 
a number of questions for the purpose of my research, and participants were informed about the purpose of those questions. 
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the media during the elections campaign. The first fifteen words were indicative enough of the 
issues and actors which dominated the campaign.  
 
What this research revealed is that the current President of Republika Srpska, Milorad 
Dodik, and his party SNSD (Party of Independent Social Democrats) were the most prominent 
political actors during the campaign. Dodik’s name was the fourth most mentioned word in all 
media,30 and SNSD was the most mentioned political party. Other major political parties were 
also among the first thirty words, but were about half times less mentioned than SNSD (e.g. 
SDA was mentioned 196 times, SDP 194). Significantly enough, the word ‘war’ also came 
within the first fifteen words, which revealed a strong connection between the election rhetoric 
and the past. 
 
Because of such dominance of one leader and his party, I decided to focus my research 
on the campaign of Milorad Dodik and SNSD in order to explore the connection between their 
campaign and issues which also emerged as prominent (relationship with the State, international 
obligations i.e. EU accession, treatment of political opponents, relationship with the past 
through references to the war, etc.).  
 
In the next step, I used nVivo software in order to produce ‘word trees’ for the terms 
that dominated Dodik and SNSD’s campaign. I used the word trees as illustrations of the context 
in which those terms were used, and thus isolated a number of narratives that shaped SNSD’s 
campaign.  
 
I then collected evidence of rhetoric used to substantiate those narratives through the 
search of media outlets which reported on election rallies, speeches, election messages, press 
releases, press conferences, etc. The information collected through this process was then 
entered into a table of evidence, using the adapted framework of analyses proposed by Beetham. 
In the final stage, this information was interpreted using the concept of narratives. Clandinin 
and Connelly (1991) argue that narrative ‘captures and investigates experiences’ of human 
beings based on the perspective of their lives placed in time, space, person, and relationship. In 
the Acts of Meaning, Bruner (1993) states that narrative provides interpretive meaning in a 
given context. He states that meaning is not “out there” but is constructed in the human sphere 
                                                 
30 Primarily on the list of one thousand most mentioned words in media, even before it was reduced. 
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of culture. According to social psychologist Kenneth J. Gergen (2009), human beings retain the 
capacity to review the past in the light of the present, and so change the future. These insights 
apply across cultures, and people act to change their social context and even revise the meaning 
of their own history. Such revisions, according to Bruner, come through narrative. People tell 
stories about themselves and others in an effort to provide coherence to the past, an explanation 
for the present, and goals for the future.  
 
Analysing a narrative, or narrative inquiry, needs to encompass a "three-dimensional 
inquiry space" — the temporal, the spatial, and the personal-social. Although usually applied 
to individual behaviour, particularly in the study of education systems, Clandinin and Connelly 
(1991, p. 2) do allow for narrative inquiry to be sociologically concerned with groups and the 
formulation of community. In addition to the three-part structure of time, Carr (1991) relates 
the narrative structure to three dimensions of human experience – significance, value, intention. 
Past conveys significance, the present conveys value, and the future conveys intention. 
Narrative meaning thus consists of significance, value and intention. This structure helps 
convey a sense of purpose as temporal data are fit into the past, present and future oriented parts 
of the narrative. Clandinin and Connelly’s (1991) three-dimensional inquiry can be applied to 
distil themes or purposeful narratives in the sense that I apply the term here, to explain the social 
interaction, the temporal dimension, and the context.  
 
Methodology - Chapter VII (equality/participation). This Chapter relied more on 
information from interviews, documents and participant observation, but also to a lesser extent 
on media reports. This is why in this Chapter, I opted to analyse information through 
interpretative content analysis, rather than using content analysis software as in the previous 
Chapter. Aaron Ahuvia (2001, p. 147) notes that coding rules are far more straightforward in 
traditional content analysis. However, such a method cannot ensure a popular or widespread 
interpretation of the text.  In Chapter VII my objective is rather to underlie motivations for 
accepting or rejecting EU norms, for which I needed an interpretive account. When a researcher 
seeks to interpret social reality in a subjective, yet scientific manner, then qualitative content 
analysis is seen as an appropriate analytical route. It does not merely count words or extract 
content from texts. It rather examines meanings, themes and patterns that may be manifest or 




In Chapter VII, I bring together my interpretive account and the social constructivist 
approach in line with Thomas Diez’ (1999) view that there is an evident neglect of the role of 
language in studies of European integration. This is also in line with my view that meaning and 
language are central to the research of constitution of identity and interests. My objective is to 
illustrate how identity, discourse and narratives are mutually shaped with and by the declared 
EU democratic norms. Discourse and language analysis also shed light on specifying scope 
conditions regarding the effects of norms on identity change and actor behaviour, by asking 
‘when, how and why such identity formation occurs’ (Checkel, 2001, p. 556). Diez claims that 
language does more than describe; that all our accounts of the world are embedded in certain 
discourses; that the meaning of words is dependent on their discursive context; that this context 
is not rigid but in constant flux; and that recent transformations of the discursive context enable 
the construction of Europe as a ‘network’. I will use Diez’ (2005, p. 99) concept of discourse 
in order to explain interaction between structure and agency by seeing political articulation as 








In this Chapter I address the EU's shortcomings in addressing the rising nationalism in 
BiH during the process of democratisation. In Chapters II and III, I laid out the basic premises 
of the system in which nationalism has been institutionalised through a power-sharing 
arrangement, and a series of fault-lines in democracy. In Chapter IV, I introduced some of the 
weaknesses of the EU as an external democratiser in BiH, including the EU confused 
international identity, the perplexity surrounding the riddle as to whether the accession process 
is technical or political in nature, the indecisiveness among EU actors on key problems in BiH 
and how to tackle them, the divergent views of EU actors in the role of the EU as a state-builder, 
and a discrepancy between being a normative power and acting as one. In this Chapter I return 
to the argument made in Chapter IV that the weak legitimacy of the EU results in ‘fake, partial, 
or imposed’ compliance (Noutcheva, 2009). This I attribute to the EU’s reliance on a ‘cookie-
cutter approach’ to conditionality in BiH, in which it relies on the use of procedural instruments. 
In this Chapter, I show how the EU applies the ‘cookie-cutter approach’ in practice, and 
attribute the pitfalls in its procedural approach to three factors identified in Chapter IV: the 
tenaciousness of ‘gatekeepers’ to democracy (Tolstrup, 2014), the volatile domestic context, 
and the EU’s reluctance to use sanctions. These first two factors are attributed to the dominance 
of nationalism in BiH, whereas the third factor stems from the EU’s ‘confused international 
identity’.  
 
The international community invested immense efforts, time, and money in 
strengthening the institutions and state of BiH between 1995 and 2005, which was only possible 
by supressing the interference of nationalism in the processes of state-building and 
democratisation. However, as argued in Chapter II, as soon as the international community’s 
influence decreased, nationalism rose again, and not only has it stalled the EU integration 
processes, but it has reversed some of the previous international successes in state-building. I 
have already made a point that the resurgence of nationalism coincided with the EU’s 
appointments as the chief external state-builder and democratiser in BiH. Under those 
circumstances, it would be simple to assume that the compliance with EU norms is affected by 
the strength of identity and nationality based issues (Freyburg & Richter, 2010). However, as I 
already argued in Chapter IV, the nationalist elites in BiH have learned that they can create 
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obstacles to the EU’s norm diffusion on just about any issue, as long as it is fashioned into an 
issue of importance for the identity or nationality of their respective ethnic groups. In this 
Chapter, I show the process of politicising and ‘ethnicising’ issues in order to create ‘counter-
norms’ as obstacles to the promotion of EU norms. In the first part of this Chapter, I describe 
the kinds of obstacles which nationalism has posed to the EU, which illustrate the restrictive 
context in which the EU-sponsored democratisation is taking place.  
 
In the second part of this Chapter I look into the EU’s own approach in dealing with 
such a context, and its inability to adequately approach and face the resistance to EU norms by 
domestic elites. As this Chapter relies on empirical evidence collected through a case-study 
approach, I analyse and describe specific instruments to which the EU resorts. The EU has at 
its disposal a much wider range of instruments, which it refrains from using in BiH, thus 
restricting its own choices of actions. The main arguments to which I return in this Chapter are: 
BiH as an ‘eclectically unconsolidated democracy’ poses unprecedented challenges to EU 
norms; the EU fails to see the exceptional role of destructive nationalism in the process of 
democratisation in BiH; the EU undermines substantive democracy by its focus on procedural 
democracy and through the extensive use of procedural instruments; and it excessively relies 
on a misplaced ‘cookie-cutter approach’ in norm promotion.  
 
In the preceding Chapter, I described my tailor-made framework of analysis, which is 
based on the assessment of two substantive dimensions of democratic quality, trust and 
equality/participation. In this Chapter, I look at a distinct relationship between trust and 
democracy. There is a general consensus that trust and democracy are interdependent, but 
authors disagree about the nature of that relationship. One body of literature argues that too 
much trust, in the sense of deference to the ruling powers, can inhibit democracy. Citizens are 
often motivated to participate in politics precisely because they distrust politicians and wish to 
hold them accountable. On the other hand, some scholars agree that a minimum level of trust is 
essential for decision-making to be delegated and democracy to function. This approach sees 
trust as an important aspect of a democratic political culture, although there is extensive debate 
in literature about whether trust is necessarily a product of democracies (Uslaner, 2002), or the 
other way round (Inglehart, 1997a). Also relevant is Ingelhart’s (1997b, p. 142) argument that 
trust can be destroyed by authoritarian states for the purpose of maintaining control. As I stated 
in Chapters II and III, BiH is not an authoritarian state, but some of the practices introduced in 
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Republika Srpska by Dodik since 2006 can be described as authoritarian, which further 
underlines a need for rebuilding trust, and re-instating democratic practices.  
 
With that in mind, this Chapter seeks to shed more light on the relationship between 
trust as a substantive dimension of democracy, and democratic consolidation, by looking at 
ways in which Dodik’s undemocratic practises destroy trust, and how, if at all, the EU attempts 
to counter such undermining of democracy. As I have argued in Chapter II, the underlying 
structural fault-lines in trust do not fully explain the recent growth of distrust in BiH, neither 
can it be attributed to the alleged reappearance of eternal hatreds. I have already made an 
argument about the prevalent role of human agency in that endeavour, and elite 
entrepreneurship in destroying trust. I substantiate that point further in this Chapter by providing 
more evidence, which includes populism, negative, divisive rhetoric, ‘hate-language’, 
radicalism, extremism, and nationalism.  
 
My intention is not to look into the initial post-1995 international or domestic efforts to 
build trust, to which I referred partly in Chapter II. I rather look at how trust is being destroyed 
in BiH two decades after peace was signed, and how that contributes to a ‘defective’ democracy. 
I claim that trust as a component part of democratic culture promoted by the EU is challenged 
by competing concepts of nationalism and secessionism. The EU in that regard faces the 
challenge of a ‘clashing’ normative basis that is incompatible with the norms of the EU, and it 
fails to address it adequately. In this Chapter I apply the analytical strategy described in the 
previous Chapter, and I proceed by providing a brief description of the case study, followed by 
theoretical propositions on trust, and then I analyse the empirical evidence by looking at the 
rise of nationalism since 2006, and the EU’s failed management of those counter-influences. 
 
Description of the Case-Study – the SNSD 2010 Election Campaign  
 
The case study analysed in this Chapter is the rhetoric deployed during the 2010 election 
campaign by the Party of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) and their leader Milorad 
Dodik. In the previous Chapter I explained the technique which I used to select the specific 
party and leader whom I would analyse in this Chapter. But even more importantly, the reason 
why I analyse the rhetoric of only one leader and this specific political party is because they 
provide the most illustrative examples of how nationalism re-entered the mainstream of politics 
in BiH in 2006, and it also vividly shows the EU’s ineffectiveness in counteracting those 
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influences. In Chapter III, I provided some evidence in support of my claim that BiH has many 
features of different types of unconsolidated democracies. In this Chapter I provide evidence 
that shows how deep those ‘defects’ are. 
 
As discussed in Chapter II, the nationalist parties which were formed in 1990, and their 
many spin-offs, still dominate the political scene in BiH. Although some left-wing parties did 
manage to secure a significant number of votes in the 2010 and 2014 elections, none of them 
was able to form the government at any level without the support of nationalist parties. SNSD 
alone cannot be blamed for the resurgence and rise of nationalist rhetoric between 2006 and 
2015, especially having in mind that different ethnic nationalisms have a spill over effect, one 
cannot exist without the other. They create a vicious circle in which one ethnic nationalism 
feeds another, which then ignites the nationalism of a third group, and so on. This system works 
on the principle of connected vessels, whereas raised levels of nationalism in one ethnic group 
raises the level of nationalism in another. As I briefly referred to in Chapter II, Dodik’s re-
energised nationalism appeared around the same time when Haris Silajdžić, a leader of a 
Bosniac political party, was seeking opportunities to return to power. Both leaders employed 
violent language, they presented maximalist, radicalised positions on all issues, and played a 
tit-for-tat populist game, throwing nationalist slogans back and forth each time one of them 
would make a statement about an issue. Dodik presented his rhetoric as a defence of Republika 
Srpska against Silajdžić who called for its abolition, whereas Silajdžić positioned himself as 
the defender of the state of BiH, which was under threat from Dodik’s dis-integrationist politics, 
and his calls for the autonomy of Republika Srpska. It will be recalled from Chapter II that 
Silajdžić’s efforts could not be sustained over time, and he lost power in the following elections, 
whereas Dodik won majorities in all succeeding elections before 2015.  
 
One of the explanations as to why Dodik’s nationalism resonates more strongly in the 
RS, than Silajdžić’s did in FBiH, is partly to do with the RS being more centralised as an entity. 
By being in power at state, entity and municipal level, Dodik was better positioned to shape the 
public opinion and to crowd out any opposition. Also, by 2008, he had gained full control of 
the publicly owned media in the RS, and had successfully curtailed any opposition, whether 
from the non-governmental sector, or the media. In Chapter III, I provided some examples of 
undemocratic practices deployed by Dodik in order to curb the freedom of speech and free 
organisation. That has allowed him to spread the nationalist rhetoric without fear of it being 
strongly opposed within the RS. The opposition parties had already been weakened, initially by 
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the international community on the grounds of the obstruction to peace implementation while 
they were in power for most of the period between 1995 and 2006, and subsequently by the 
new government on the grounds of alleged corruption.  Dodik has also used nationalist rhetoric 
to undermine Serb opposition parties, by portraying them as unpatriotic and accusing them of 
betraying Republika Srpska because of their support to state-level reforms which brought the 
country closer to the EU and NATO. Dodik has played that card very successfully, as I will 
show in some of the examples in this Chapter.  
 
When it comes specifically to the undermining of trust in BiH, this case study illustrates 
the purposeful use of events, symbols, situations and manipulation of group interests by SNSD 
in order to construct issues that appeal to voters’ deepest emotions at the expense of a more 
rational choice of European integration. The focus of SNSD’s election campaign on 
emotionally-powered issues diverted attention away from the requirements of Bosnia’s EU 
integration, and in some cases it even managed to dismiss the importance of EU norms in favour 
of ethnic issues. That campaign tenaciously exploited the existing fault-lines in democracy in 
BiH in order to deepen the emotional appeal of their rhetoric. The nationalist rhetoric resonated 
better in cases where those fault-lines were deeper, for example in the case of weak institutions, 
the myths of eternal hatreds, the indecisiveness of the international community in implementing 
peace, in undermining the democratic legitimacy, etc. By over-utilising and sustaining the 
nationalist rhetoric, the nationalist parties polarise different communities along the existing 
ethnic cleavages, and revive strong feelings of past injustices and wartime memories in order 
to manipulate the public support for nationalism and secessionism.  
 
As already mentioned, in the second part of this Chapter I return to the analysis of EU  
instruments in promoting trust as a norm engrained in the EU treaties, having first 
contextualised it in the negative background of nationalist rhetoric. Before I do so, I first look 
at the ways in which language and rhetoric are used during election campaigns to construct 
‘competing’ norms, which is central to one of my main hypotheses. I have claimed that the EU 
norms in BiH are challenged by ‘counter-norms’, which downplay the appeal of EU norms. My 
research example shows how ‘counter-norms’ to democracy thus constructed, as well as the 
political culture of division are powerful enough to cause a great deal of instability in 
democracy, and even more importantly, how the EU ignores and underestimates those 
influences while promoting democracy in BiH. The final election results in 2010, and in 2014 
eventually, proved this effort was successful for the Party of Independent Social Democrats 
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(SNSD). Milorad Dodik won the post of the President of Republika Srpska twice, while his 
party won enough seats in the National Assembly of Republika Srpska to be able to form 
government with only minor support from a couple of coalition parties.  
 
Theoretical Propositions on Trust 
 
Definitions of trust. Political scientists offer various definitions of ‘trust’. Warren 
(1999) defines trust as “a judgement, however tacit or habitual, to accept vulnerability to the 
potential ill will of others by granting them discretionary power over some good” (p. 311). 
Particularly relevant for examples in this Chapter, which shows how trust can be purposefully 
destroyed, is the notion of ‘distrust’ proposed by Offe (2001). He claims distrust is not the 
opposite of trust, but the “attitude in which the cognitive assumptions are continuously tested 
and scrutinised which regulate the allocation of trust” (2001, p. 77). The choice of where to 
allocate trust, at which level, community, ethnic group, individual, is in my view crucial for 
understanding the polarisation within communities, as I will explain further.  
 
It is also important to distinguish between social and political trust, as I have already 
mentioned in Chapter V. Societies which experience a decline in social trust face numerous 
challenges, including failure to identify with the community. Political trust is defined “as the 
ratio of people's evaluation of government performance relative to their normative expectations 
of how government ought to perform” (Hetherington & Husser, 2012, p. 313). Many authors, 
such as Levi (2000, p. 493) and Putnam (2001), contend that social and political trust are related, 
but they ask whether social trust inspires political trust or the other way around. However, even 
more relevant for this case study is a distinction between generalised and particularised trust. 
 
Uslaner (2002) describes generalised trust as directed towards people who are strangers, 
and particularised trust as limited to one’s family or group. Democracy is more related to 
generalised trust, which is a precondition for building large-scale, complex, interdependent 
social networks and institutions, and consequently the social capital (Uslaner in Warren ed., 
1999, p. 9). Uslaner (In Warren ed., 1999, p. 123) also links generalised trust to democratic 
culture thorough tolerance for pluralism and criticism, while conversely particularised trust is 
characterised by intolerance and is more typical of authoritarian and totalitarian societies. 
Moreover, he argues that “particularised trust works to counter the effects of generalised trust” 
(Uslaner, in Warren ed., 1999, p. 129). In line with that, I do not look specifically at a decline 
119 
 
of political trust in terms of lower confidence in institutions or elites, which I accounted for in 
Chapter II, nor at dimensions of declining social or interpersonal trust. These are the subject of 
numerous existing quantitative studies, discussed below. Following Uslaner’s line of thought, 
this Chapter instead examines ways in which political elites ‘particularise’ trust within their 
own ethnic groups at the expense of generalised trust in the society as a whole. 
 
In order to do that, I also rely on the notion of ‘top-down’ trust. Offe (In Warren ed., 
1999, p. 44) combines the mass/elite and horizontal/vertical dichotomies in order to observe 
four realms in which trust relations can unfold: citizens to citizens, citizens to elites, among 
elites, and ‘top-down’ from elites to citizens. This Chapter is concerned with the fourth realm, 
the ‘top-down’ dimension of trust. The ‘top-down’ approach requires building trust among 
citizens who are at the same time strangers to each other. The gap can be bridged by attaching 
some abstract and indirect bonds of trust to the citizenry as a whole, claiming some shared 
commitment of all members of the political community to the ‘identity’ of a nation, its history, 
territory, culture, or institutions. This process is described as ‘bridging anonymity’ and in this 
Chapter I demonstrate how it is used to create particularised trust at the level of an ethnic 
community. 
 
I argue that the ‘top-down’ approach can be used to build both generalised and 
particularised trust, subject to where elites draw a boundary around the community to which 
they appeal. My view is that if ‘anonymity’ is being bridged at the level of multi-ethnic society 
as a whole, across ethnic communities, then this effort can be seen as contributing to the 
building of generalised trust and, hence, strengthening democracy. However, if the ‘top-down’ 
approach is limited to bridging anonymity at the level of individual ethnic communities, then it 
is strengthening particularised trust and weakening democracy. In the latter case, nationality 
and national identity perform a “trust-conferring function bridging political divisions, 
anonymity of cultural diversity and the strangeness of fellow-nationals” (Offe in Warren ed., 
1999, p. 60). In this case, the thin and abstract generalised trust across ethnic communities is 
weakened by fragmentations that occur along the thick religious and ethnic divisions. The next 
section looks at different ways in which generalised trust is weakened. 
 
Destroying generalised trust. Generalised trust can be weakened or destroyed by 
several factors, and in this section I list only those that are related to the fault-lines in democracy 
which I discussed in Chapter II. The first factor constituting a major fault-line in BiH democracy 
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is the weakness of institutions and structures, discussed in Chapters II and III, which led me to 
argue that BiH could be described as a ‘procedural’ democracy. Offe (In Warren ed., 1999, pp. 
76–9) argues that institutions can have the generalisation effect working in either direction – if 
performing reasonably, horizontal and vertical trust flourishes. Malfunctioning institutions can 
undermine the very cohesion of modern political communities and can trigger regressive 
phenomena such as the ethnic and religious forms of mediation of trust. In particular, this can 
be related to young institutions which have not had sufficient time to earn trust, as would be the 
case with the fairly young post-Dayton constitution. Offe (In Warren ed., 1999) finds this 
development particularly relevant for cases in which institutional regimes consist of a 
patchwork of old and new rules, which is also the case in BiH. Unconvincing institutional 
capacities incapable of projecting generalised trust create space for invoking particularised trust 
using ‘communal and quasi-communal ties and symbols’, which are another major fault-line in 
BiH democracy. 
 
Offe (In Warren ed., 1999) argues that the scope of generalised trust is limited by the 
use of signals of particularised trust, based on “strong loyalty to tribal, ethnic, or familial group, 
matched with xenophobia” (p. 65). The more particularised trust is based on group identity, the 
more it is likely to be withheld from anyone outside the group, which leads to discrimination. 
The anonymity within such groups is bridged by another substitute for personal experience, 
which Offe (1999, pp. 63–4) describes as categorical trust. It can be understood in terms of 
three properties: not possible to acquire at will, not easily given up, and associated with visual 
and linguistic markers that are easily detected from outside and inside the group. Belonging to 
a group is invoked by a non-experiential rule of trustworthiness based on a presumably 
distinctive history, identity, or spirit. The way in which this phenomenon affects democracy in 
BiH was briefly explained in Chapter II, when discussing the role of myths of ethnic hatreds 
and the implication that today’s inter-ethnic resentments stretch as far back as ancient history. 
In this Chapter I show how those myths continue to be utilised today, and how new myths are 
created in order to give an ethnic group ‘personal’ qualities, which invite trust within a single 
ethnic group through populism. 
 
Populism is also related to the fault-lines created by nationalistic political culture to 
which I alluded in Chapter II. Populism is used to ‘re-personalise’ trust relations, so that the 
trust in political leaders is based on their personal style, appearance, charisma and other 
personality features, rather than their track record (Offe, in Warren ed., 1999, p. 77). It relies 
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on loyalty and support to a ‘quasi-familiar’ person by a community which is otherwise diverse 
and amorphous. Put simply, it is a ‘shortcut’ to political trust. Deployed in ‘vertical’ or ‘top-
down’ cases, populism helps elites observe their targeted objects, and enables them to shape 
citizens’ attitudes through sending “trust-inviting and trust-confirming signals” (Cited in 
Warren, 1999, p. 61). Signals used by populist elites are often personal values or characteristics 
of identity, used as a unifying bond that bridges the distance between citizens, and between 
elites and citizens. 
 
In Chapter III, I made a case that BiH is an ‘elite-packed’ democracy (L. Diamond, 
1999), and that elites use a variety of techniques to invite trust among the population. In this 
Chapter I show how elites amplify the effect of signals inviting particularised trust by appealing 
to emotions. Marcus (2000) argues that emotions have a dual effect: they cause people to 
“deviate from their characteristic dispositions”, and also “enable people to steadfastly remain 
true to their most deeply held values and attitudes” (pp. 223–4). Based on various factors that 
weaken generalised trust, Warren (1999) argues that political campaigns can particularise trust 
by evoking the distrust of other communities of interest. Offe (In Warren ed., 1999, p. 61) also 
sees particularisation of trust as a means used for the purpose of electoral campaigning. In the 
view of Offe and Warren, and in my own view, a political candidate can win an office having 
cultivated particularised trust of a significant number of constituents, and in Dodik’s case at the 
level of the ethnic community.  
 
A number of studies that have examined trust in BiH since the war have noted a strong 
link between politics expressed through elite-agency and the level of trust among ethnic groups, 
taking into account different fault-lines in democracy such as inter-ethnic barriers, weak 
institutions, experiences of conflict, and the influence of nationalism. A decline in the 
nationalist party vote since the end of the war was noted in early research conducted before 
2004, but it still concluded that moderate liberal parties fail to maintain political support, 
showing that society remains divided if not polarised along ethnic lines (Steil & Woodward, 
1999; Chandler, 2000; Caspersen, 2004). A study dated years later found that there is a general 
problem of trusting others beyond close kinship and friendship circles after violence, but this 
distrust is not related to ethnicity (Whitt, 2010, p. 289). It noted that “co-ethnics are not 
universally trusted nor are out-groups categorically distrusted as an ‘ethnic hatred’ explanation 
might propose” (Whitt, 2010, p. 289). This study also examined the credibility of institutions 
as a factor of trust across ethnicity, and concluded that institutions appear to help alleviate 
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barriers to trust after violence, but that the institutional collapse is often the starting point for 
many conflicts (Whitt, 2010, p. 278). Research on social trust conducted in BiH in 2005, found 
that “respondents who do not express strong ethnic pride and with friends from a variety of 
ethnic backgrounds are more likely to trust members of other national groups”. Although 
assuming that “personal experiences with ethnic violence would have a negative impact on 
inter-ethnic trust”, they find the opposite: respondents with personal experiences of ethnic 
violence trust more the members of other ethnic groups (Ward cited in M. Pickering, 2006, p. 
82). Particularly relevant for my study is the research conducted by Levi and Stoker, who 
conclude that it is evident that “whether citizens express trust or distrust is primarily a reflection 
of their political lives, not their personalities nor even their social characteristics” (2000, p. 
481). This argument is supported by a view that citizens may not share equal levels of political 
trust. The differences in their attitudes stem from their “varying political perceptions and values 
and the influence of their local social and political contexts” (2000, p. 483). The case study I 
have chosen for this Chapter looks specifically at the way in which Dodik and SNSD have used 
all the factors described here during the election campaign in order to particularise trust at the 
level of their ethnic community, and at the expense of generalised trust in BiH. 
 
Undermining of Trust as a Norm 
 
Procedural and substantive subversions of trust. In Chapter V, I reviewed literature 
which treats trust as a substantive dimension of democracy, and I have also explained the use 
of the term ‘subversion’ to encompass intentional undermining of democratic consolidation. 
Referring back to my earlier arguments about three main impediments to compliance, in this 
section I focus on two in particular: the role of the ‘gatekeepers’ to democratisation (Tolstrup, 
2014), and the volatile domestic context. Having identified trust as an important component of 
substantive democracy, it may seem strange to refer to it as being subverted in a procedural 
sense. By procedural in this section I mean the use of institutions, laws and procedures in order 
to undermine trust. This is done, most notably, by undermining the overarching authority of the 
State of BiH and its various institutions, whether executive, legislative, or judicial. Substantive 
subversions refer to more profound ways of constructing various themes and narratives which 
destroy trust. However, although I separated them analytically in my research strategy, I report 
on both the substantive and procedural subversions of trust together through four narratives 
employed by Dodik and SNSD, including: undermining the State of BiH, secession of 
Republika Srpska, denial of Srebrenica genocide, and victimisation and idealisation of Serbs 
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and the RS. They each consisted of a series of sub-narratives that were deliberately deployed to 
undermine trust. 
 
Undermining the State of BiH. As will be clear from examples which follow, emotions, 
signals, events and symbols were used in order to create substantive and procedural subversions 
of trust. In an interview given to a Serbian weekly, Danas, Dodik asserted that the State of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina is “a mistake made in the process of disintegration of the former 
Yugoslavia” (“Bosnian Serb election winner says Bosnia ‘mistake’, urges ‘loose union,’” 
2010). He elaborated on this by saying that “Bosnia-Herzegovina is impossible as a state - it 
never has been and it never will be a state and this is a reality”. Also, upon his return from 
reform negotiations held in Washington, Dodik said “for me, Republika Srpska is a Holy Grail, 
BiH can be or not be” (“Dodik: Za mene je RS svetinja, a BiH može i biti i ne biti,” 2007). 
Some more examples of messages sent during the election rallies throughout the RS are 
summarised as follows, such as: “We won’t let go of Republika Srpska, it is a permanent 
category. … Our message is clear – RS forever and BiH only until it is a must. We live in BiH 
even though we do not love it, and in the next period we will try to return everything that had 
been taken away from us.” (Milorad Dodik, Mrkonjić grad, 10/9/10); and “seek a veto in 
Sarajevo whenever they try to do something against the RS, because RS is our only state, which 
we will protect and defend. Either the RS will be equal or BiH won’t be” (Nebojša Radmanović, 
Petrovo, Bijeljina, and Banja Luka, September 2010). This section shows how issues of state 
competencies have been deliberately fashioned into issues of importance for identity and 
ethnicity. 
 
Looking at the macro approach of destroying trust, this could be seen as the broadest 
level at which the State is being portrayed as untrustworthy. By making it look like an unstable, 
novel and temporary entity, this narrative creates the negative stereotypes of untrustworthiness. 
This is done by attaching negative trust values to the State – that it is a mistake, a failure, and 
‘impossible’ as a state. By giving it a temporary character, this narrative serves the purpose of 
creating an impression that its future is subject to debate, so all options are open, including 
secession of Republika Srpska. Dodik’s construal of BiH as a ‘mistake’ was further reinforced 
by a dimension of narrative construction, the creation of a personal/social interaction. Being a 
‘mistake’ implies an accidental creation of a political reality, and also a reality which by virtue 
of being a ‘mistake’ needs to be ‘straightened’ or ‘corrected’. By recognising, on behalf of his 
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electorate, BiH as a ‘mistake’ and calling it so out loud, Dodik imposes himself as a person or 
leader who has a solution and the capacity to correct this mistake.  
 
Following Offe’s (2001) argument about ways in which personal qualities of a leader 
are ‘transcribed’ onto collective self-perceptions, it can be said that Dodik extends his charisma 
of a ‘trustworthy’ ethnic leader onto his electorate in order to ‘correct’ mistakes made since 
Dayton. He thus calls for a loose union, the looser the better, and the restoration of all powers 
belonging to the Serb Republic in keeping with what is actually written down in the Dayton 
Agreement. In terms of the construction of this narrative, Dodik imposes himself as a ‘story-
teller’ who uses his public appearances to build upon the Serb voters’ public distrust of BiH, 
which had been gradually constructed over the preceding years (Connelly & Clandinin, 1991, 
pp. 2–14). He does so in order to utilise the existing negative emotions towards the state to tell 
his own story of how he sees the past, present and future of BiH. According to Offe (2001), 
populism ‘re-personalises’ trust relations and the low trust in institutions is compensated for by 
a ‘leader’s charismatic personality’. By establishing the interaction between himself as a ‘story-
teller’ and the RS public as his audience, Dodik seeks to ‘quasi-familiarise’ himself with the 
public, so that the public accepts him as trustworthy.  
 
Furthermore, this narrative serves not only to deny BiH as a state today, but also to deny 
the way it used to be before the 1990s, i.e. a trusting and trustworthy multi-ethnic society. In 
order to ‘un-bridge’ the legacy of trust and the state as it is today, this narrative creates a clear 
distinction between the past and present. In both cases it seeks to destroy trust in several ways. 
First, by denying the legacy of social trust prior to Dayton. Secondly, by detaching any links 
between such legacy and post-Dayton society. This is an effort to re-produce and re-engineer 
the symbolic representation of BiH as a multi-ethnic society. By denying the legacy of a multi-
ethnic society, this narrative tries to re-tell in an untruthful way the trust relations among ethnic 
communities. And thirdly, it projects a temporary character to the State. It incorrectly interprets 
the Dayton legal arrangements, by claiming BiH statehood as stemming from the Dayton 
Agreement, rather than being the successor of the Republic of BiH. This serves to give BiH a 
provisional status created only to settle peace; i.e. a compromise made after the conflict. This 
compromise is portrayed as too costly for the Serbs and their interests. Being such a painful 
compromise, the State is again attributed a negative value in order to evoke distrust of Serbs. 
Following Carr's (1991) interpretation of the temporal dimension in the way that past conveys 
significance, it can be said that denying the State of BiH its past is used here to deny its political 
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significance prior to Dayton, which makes it an open book, a blank canvas which will be subject 
to debate and a different design in future (Carr, 1991). The future is used here to convey 
‘intention’, in a way described by Carr - to reinforce the ‘temporary’ character of BiH on one 
hand, and, on the other hand, to convey the message that for the purpose of future intentions, 
the RS is the only permanent category, and thus the only political entity worthy of investing 
any trust into. Populist symbols and ‘signals’ were used to imply and suggest the kind of 
feelings which all Serbs should have towards the State.  
 
Tannen ((1998) cited in Connelly & Clandinin, 1991, p. 8) suggested that a reader of a 
story connects with it by recognising particulars, by imagining the scenes in which particulars 
could occur, and by reconstructing them from remembered associations with similar particulars. 
It is the particular and not general that triggers emotion and moves people and gives rise to 
authenticity. The two key symbols constantly used as ‘particulars’ that trigger negative 
emotions among the RS electorate are the BiH flag and the capital city, Sarajevo. In one incident 
in July 2008, Dodik was caught on camera removing the BiH flag from the table during a visit 
to the town of Trebinje.  
 
This illustrated the way in which RS political elites associate the BiH flag only with the 
Bosniac community. This is not so much due to any symbolic meaning of the flag itself, but 
due to a perception that the state is worthy only of the trust of Bosniacs, because, in their view, 
it only works in favour of Bosniacs. The BiH flag is thus being undermined simply because it 
represents the State as seen through Dodik’s eyes. The flag was imposed by the High 
Representative of the International Community in 1998, and was only confirmed by the BiH 
Parliament (including Serbs and RS representatives) in 2001. It was thus created to represent 
the post-Dayton BiH and was not initially disputed by any side. Moreover, because it does not 
carry any state, national, or ethnic symbols, most people for a long time could hardly relate to 
it and most still struggle to describe it accurately. It was designed to represent the colours of 
the EU, the shape of BiH, and stars, again symbols of the EU. However, for the purpose of 
Dodik’s campaign, the flag was used to symbolise and visualise the state of BiH, and 
undermining the flag was illustrative of undermining the trust in the State. 
 
Even in simply referring to Sarajevo, Dodik makes a distinction between ‘us and them’ 
and tries to create a sense that ‘they’ in Sarajevo ‘envy’ and hate Serbs in the RS (“Banja Luka 
SNSD party rally,” 2010). During the 2010 election campaign, denial of Sarajevo as the capital 
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city was often repeated and utilised. In giving a statement to Nova TV evening news Dodik 
repeated “I do not accept Sarajevo as my capital city, even though it is a political centre of BiH” 
(Bago, 2010). He stated that “what I said about Sarajevo looking like Teheran I still believe, 
because I still think there are more mosques in Sarajevo than in Teheran” (“Dodik: Sarajevo 
ima više džamija od Teherana,” 2010). Messages which were spread out during the election 
rallies served the same purpose: “the capital city for all Serb people is Belgrade, and so it will 
be” (Milorad Dodik, Sokolac, September 2014); and “SNSD is a brave team ready to go into 
fight with Sarajevo and international community in order to protect our interests” (Nebojša 
Radmanović, Petrovo, 6/9/2014). 
 
Given the fact that functioning of the power-sharing arrangements at the State level 
depends so much on trust and political will, the best way to undermine it is to destroy that trust. 
This narrative served a function which otherwise I did not find in other literature on trust. In 
order to destroy generalised trust at the level of the State, this narrative identified the State with 
a particular ethnic community (Bosniacs) and implied that only Bosniacs should trust the State 
to act in their interests.  This narrative first ascribed to the State the particulars and stereotypes 
that are otherwise associated with the Bosniac community. It then portrayed the survival and 
functioning of the State as purely Bosniac interest and as a threat to Serbs. They were then 
finally linked together through the use of symbols, populism and emotional discourse. The 
result is that trust in the State was ‘particularised against’, or seen as being the opposite of the 
particularised trust among the Serb people. The symbolic level at which the particularised trust 
among the Bosniac community is hence located is the level of the State, rather than the level of 
that ethnic community. This example supports my disagreement expressed in Chapter IV with 
authors who claim that the transfer of competencies to state level is of high relevance to the 
ethnic identity (Džihić & Wieser, 2011). Rather than actually being of high relevance for ethnic 
groups, those issues are instead constructed to be issues of identity by Dodik in ways described 
in this section.  In Chapter IV I argued that nationalist elites create ethnic constructs out of the 
EU state-building requirements for two purposes: to resist the EU leverage, and to use it as a 
‘political shelter’ (Noutcheva, 2009).  
 
Secession of Republika Srpska. The secession of Republika Srpska emerged as a 
narrative in its own right in early 2006, and has since then gained political momentum and was 
positioned as another deliberate mechanism for sowing distrust during the campaign in the run 
up to the 2010 elections. The construct of the state of BiH as an enemy and a threat has been 
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used as a foundation on which the narrative was built of a need to separate from the state as an 
untrustworthy category. The narrative on trust in the RS and a need for its secession has been 
built in contrast to the perceived ‘instability’ and ‘dis-functionality’ of the State, as a 
mechanism for protection from it, and even as blackmail in case any serious threat to the RS is 
extended from ‘Sarajevo’. This is what gave this narrative a sense of legitimation. In terms of 
other aspects of the character of this counter-narrative, the means to hold a referendum, and a 
timeframe for such action, all remain vague and indefinite categories, although in 2015 Dodik 
finally announced that the referendum would be scheduled for 2018. Nonetheless, the emotional 
strength of this narrative made it legitimate from the perspective proposed by SNSD during the 
election campaign in 2010. Using the construction of populist messages in ‘trust-inviting’ 
signals as described by Offe (1999) and as already discussed, the socially constructed qualities 
of the Serb people were again invoked to glorify and personify their ethnic community. Several 
messages were sent in that way, including that a stronger Srpska is a need felt by all, which 
imposes an almost universal necessity which requires power and bravery on behalf of the 
people. The use of battleground vocabulary reinforces the sense of legitimation through 
existence of a looming threat, while offering the referendum on secession as a means to 
counteract that threat. Also, the right to a referendum is given a taken for granted quality as a 
moral rather than a legal right. It thus serves a ‘trust-conferring’ function, bridging other 
differences inside the ethnic community and constructing shared and cross-appealing interests.  
 
The terminology describing the RS is used in contrast to the terms applied to BiH – so 
the RS is presented as stable, strong and catering for the needs of its citizens. Its distinctiveness 
from the State in that sense creates more cohesion among its members, and it is more 
trustworthy. Invoking secession as a moral right gives a sense of obligation that deserves and 
demands trust, and thus legitimises it. The strong group loyalty reinforces stereotypes of unity, 
bravery and other symbolic representations of categorical trust. 
 
Denial of Srebrenica genocide. In its judgement passed on 26 February 2007, 
concerning Serbia's involvement in the massacre of Bosnian Muslims (Bosniacs) at Srebrenica 
in 1995, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that there was “conclusive evidence that 
killings and acts causing serious bodily or mental harm targeting the Bosnian Muslims took 
place in Srebrenica in July 1995.  These acts were directed by the Main Staff of the VRS (the 
army of the Republika Srpska) who possessed the specific intent required for genocide” 
(International Court of Justice, 2009, para. 8). The key element of this mass murder which 
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enabled the Court to establish it as genocide was “the specific intent to destroy in part the group 
of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina as such” (International Court of Justice, 2009, para. 
8). According to the Research and Documentation Center, 7,711 persons went missing or were 
killed in that period (“Research and Documentation Center,” n.d.). The International Criminal 
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) convicted the former Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) 
officers Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić for crimes against humanity and violations of laws 
and customs of war committed against Bosnian Muslims in the area of Srebrenica in July 1995 
(“Appeals Chamber acquits Vidoje Blagojević of aiding Srebrenica genocide, affirms other 
convictions against him and Dragan Jokić,” 2009). In 2001, the ICTY convicted General 
Radislav Krstić as the first person to be convicted of genocide since World War II. The Trial 
Chamber stated that it was “convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that a crime of genocide 
was committed in Srebrenica” (“Radislav Krstic becomes the first person to be convicted of 
genocide at the ICTY and is sentenced to 46 years imprisonment,” 2001). 
 
By 2006 the right-wing parties from Republika Srpska had begun to cooperate with the 
international community on a number of issues, and finding truth about the events in Srebrenica 
was one of them. In 2004, the international community and then High Representative Lord 
Paddy Ashdown put pressure on the RS Government led by SDS to form a Commission for 
investigation of events in Srebrenica in July 1995. Later that year, the Commission published a 
Final Report which confirmed that 8,373 persons went missing or were killed, of which 7,793 
were killed between 10th and 19th July 1995 (“Izvjestaj - Vlada Republike Srspke, - SMG-bh-
doc-izvjestaj-vlada-republike-srpske-2004.pdf”, 2004.).31  While announcing the Report, the 
RS and SDS President at the time, Dragan Čavić, said that “the massacre of thousands of 
Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica is a black page in the history of the Serb people” (“Serb leader’s 
Srebrenica regret,” 2004). In a special TV broadcast he said he understood the pain of the 
relatives of those who died in the incident. Čavić's statement split public opinion in the RS in 
an unprecedented way. The international community at the time described the work of the 
Commission and their report as ‘historical and revolutionary’ as it was the first time that the RS 
Government had officially reviewed those events and publicly recognised what had happened 
in Srebrenica. However, this event was one of the causes of Čavić and SDS' immediate political 
demise, and he voluntarily handed over the Government to Milorad Dodik in early 2006.  
 
                                                 
31 The final report was published by the RS Government on 15 October 2004. 
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The narrative created to deny the Srebrenica genocide is multi-layered in terms of its 
intentions, targets and means of delivery. If we take the recognition of genocide as a norm 
clearly promoted by the EU for the purpose of building trust and sustaining peace, then denial 
of that norm can be discussed in terms of numerical, discursive, and geographical aspects of 
norm subversion.  Srebrenica featured prominently from the very start of Dodik’s election 
campaign when on September 1, speaking at a rally in Srebrenica, he stated “more Bosniacs 
left Srebrenica and went to Tuzla and Sarajevo in those months, than were killed here. That 
then is not genocide” (SNSD Rally Srebrenica, 2010). He thus unfolds the numerical layer of 
the narrative on denial of Srebrenica genocide. Deprecating the number of victims serves the 
purpose of defying the normative definitions of what constitutes genocide. Dodik thus implies 
that proportionality and outnumbering of the victims by those who managed to survive, was a 
sufficient proof that it did not constitute genocide. Through the numerical argument he tries to 
deny the key aspect which decided in favour of pronouncing this crime a genocide - the intent 
to destroy one particular group of the population.  
 
Dodik also seeks reciprocity by amplifying the number of Serb victims and proposing 
that it is proportionate to Bosniac victims. Dodik insists on the reciprocity argument throughout 
his campaign and demands in several rallies that “it is recognised that during the war there were 
also mass killings of Serbs" (SNSD Rally Srebrenica, 2010). For that purpose, Dodik augments 
the number of Serb victims in the hope that a larger figure would alarm his audiences while 
disguising the truth behind that claim. “They say, Serbs are to blame for Srebrenica. Not true. 
Serbs were also killed during war. 30,000 Serbs were killed here. Someone killed them too. A 
victim is a victim, and if they do not respect our victims, why would we respect theirs?” asked 
Dodik in an election rally in Milići near Srebrenica (SNSD Rally Milići, 2010). The message he 
thus sends is that respect is a matter of reciprocity and not a value in its own right. This narrative 
is constructed by saying that the respect for victims is an ethnic betrayal. If we go back to the 
definition of categorical trust as being built by appealing to a ‘distinctive history, identity or 
spirit’ of an ethnic community, then invoking a sense of pride and loyalty is a clear case of an 
appeal to a distinctiveness. Building and sustaining categorical trust is a thread that runs 
throughout the narrative on denial of war crimes. Respect for victims is thus portrayed as a 
potential national betrayal rather than a virtue.  
 
Dodik also minimises the effect of the Srebrenica genocide by treating it as a single 
event rather than the murder of thousands. Dodik stated this in an interview given to a Croatian 
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daily, Vecernji list: “telling a story of Srebrenica puts us in a situation that all atrocities in our 
unfortunate war years boil down to a single event, which minimises all other victims, of whom 
there are many” (“Srbi nisu Srebrenica,” 2010). In an interview to the Austrian daily, Der 
Standard, Dodik openly stated that “insisting on numbers is a wrong policy” (“Geben uns für 
die EU nicht her,” 2010). Instead of using numbers, Dodik said he preferred describing 
Srebrenica as a single event and declared that “it is unacceptable to us to single out Srebrenica 
and to give it historical significance” (“Dodik odbija rezoluciju o Srebrenici,” 2010). He 
portrays the case of Srebrenica as a conspiracy that shifts the attention away from crimes against 
Serbs, and the ICJ ruling is used as proof of that conspiracy. For that purpose, Dodik promised 
voters that the list of victims prepared by the SDS-led Government would be reviewed because 
he did not think it reflected the facts.  
 
The revisionism behind Srebrenica served the purpose of portraying the political 
opponents as traitors and showing an internal threat that needed to be resisted. This was clearly 
the thinking behind Dodik’s campaign to invalidate the previous RS Government’s decision to 
address the issues of genocide in Srebrenica. The very act of undermining that effort was a 
demonstration of Dodik’s open rejection of interethnic dialogue, dealing with the past, 
tolerance, reconciliation and interethnic trust. Weighed against a regained categorical trust, 
interethnic trust was clearly on the losing side, as it could never mobilise as much political 
participation among the deliberately radicalised electorate as the policy of demonstrating 
distrust. This example also illustrated that the only relationship of trust Dodik politically invests 
in is the one between himself and his electorate. Invocation of categorical trust to destroy 
interethnic trust amplified his trustworthiness as a leader who does not betray his own people.  
 
The discursive layer of this narrative is constructed through application of several new 
terms, which are used metaphorically and are specific to the context of the Srebrenica genocide. 
The first of those terms is ‘genocidal people’, which was originally launched by right-wing 
Bosniac politicians following the ICJ ruling. However, Dodik repeatedly exploited the term 
‘genocidal people’ during the election campaign in order to reinforce the impression of 
victimisation of Serbs as subjects of a hate campaign. Speaking at an election rally in Banja 
Luka Dodik said that Srebrenica “cannot be a motif for generalising the blame and 
condemnation of Serbs as a genocidal people” (SNSD final central rally Banja Luka, 2010). 
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Addressing audiences in Srebrenica Dodik deployed a term launched earlier by Dobrica Čosić32 
- ‘srebrenisation’ of the Serb people, which became the hallmark of deliberate victimisation of 
Serbs (“Hrle: Dodika na srebrenizaciju rata uputio ideolog Dobrica Čosić ” 2010). 
‘Srebrenisation’ is used to epitomise intentional demonisation of Serbs by ‘Sarajevo’ and 
internationals. Dodik breathes air into alleged conspiracies about ‘srebrenisation’ of Republika 
Srpska by saying that “the global srebrenisation of Republika Srpska is being carried out by 
politicians from Sarajevo and international community” and repeating that “we will not accept 
that it was genocide” (SNSD Rally Srebrenica, 2010).  
 
Dodik victimises Serbs by inverting the very paradigm of atrocities committed by the 
RS Army. Srebrenica in this manner becomes an instrument of demonisation of Serbs and a 
symbol of degradation of all other crimes. Dodik is quite explicit about this, in saying that “I 
am not prepared to accept the politicisation and srebrenisation of this war because crimes were 
not only committed in Srebrenica – it was only concentrated in that time and space” (“Geben 
uns für die EU nicht her,” 2010). Two core legal aspects of genocide are thus devalued, the 
intent of genocide and the fact that it was targeted against a single ethnic group. Instead, Dodik 
insists that its significance is only in temporal and spatial ‘concentration’ of the crime. It can 
thus be said that this narrative too is constructed not within its own context and temporal 
dimensions, but based on the denial of those elements on the existing narrative in genocide. 
That is what makes this narrative unique and for the reasons of the manner in which it is 
constructed I claim to be a deliberately constructed ‘counter-narrative’. 
 
The term genocide was also belittled by being described as a ‘localised’ or ‘municipal’ 
genocide. This term was also launched in early 2010 during the debate in Serbia about a 
proposal before the Serbian Parliament to adopt a Declaration condemning the crime in 
Srebrenica.  Dodik opposed such a move by the Serbian parliament in an interview to Vecernji 
list responding that “the International court of Justice in an appeal by BiH against Serbia 
declared that it was a local genocide” (“Dodik: u Srebrenici se dogodio lokalni genocid,” 2010). 
He sustained this rhetoric throughout 2010, repeating in March in an interview to Radio Bobar 
that the crimes were “characterised in the Hague as some kind of a local genocide, but it cannot 
be the only place of atrocities and killings during the war” (2010). As in the previous case, this 
                                                 
32 President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the war in BiH, one of the most influential members of the Serbian 




discourse, bounding the scope of genocide rhetorically to a limited geographical area, 
minimises the vastness of its civilizational connotations.   
 
Victimisation and idealisation of Serbs and the RS. Unlike the example of state-
building, which was constructed into an ethnically-sensitive issue, the victimisation and 
idealisation of Serbs are subversions of democracy that are very much relevant to the issues of 
identity. As such, those issues do present a greater challenge to the EU leverage as argued by 
some authors (Džihić & Wieser, 2011; Vachudova, 2014; Noutcheva, 2009).  
 
Dodik paints a picture in which the threat to the RS is most immediate, coming right 
after the elections – “threats to curtail the RS are waiting immediately after elections, although 
we want to strengthen it. Constitutional reforms will be on the table. But we know how to 
respond to them, we have a team which knows how to defend the RS in Sarajevo” (SNSD rally 
Obilićevo, 2010). Sarajevo as the administrative capital is thus once again portrayed as the 
‘battlefield’ in which foreigners and Bosniacs threaten to curb the power of the RS, and where 
Serbs from the RS need to have tighter bonds and be even more unified against any attempts to 
reform the Constitution. The main mechanism through which this would be done is said to be 
the constitutional reform, through which the RS would be ‘further deprived of its rights’. The 
main messages sent during election rallies include: “For the difficult time in front of us. There 
will be pressures to reform the Constitution. There are those in BiH who wish the RS was gone, 
and some in international community wish so too.” (Milorad Dodik, Šipovo, 11/9/10); and 
“Only those who stood up the test of their own identity made it to Europe. It is not true that 
future is bright for us if we lose the RS and go to Europe” (Milorad Dodik, Petrovo, 6/9/10). 
 
The RS was also said to be victimised at an emotional level, which sought to provoke 
feelings of being slandered because of the RS being “falsely accused and blackened as a 
‘genocidal entity created through ethnic cleansing” (“Dodik’s letter to voters,” 2010). Some of 
the electoral messages used for that purpose include: “political concepts coming from the 
Bosniac people, seeking to majorise Serbs and keep them at the level of the people which need 
to be punished” (Milorad Dodik, Milići, 10/9/10); “RS is exposed to numerous attacks by many, 
and it needs to be said to those from Sarajevo that if we have to leave BiH, we are taking 
Republika Srpska with us … the time will come when it will just part, like a ripe pear from a 
tree” (Milorad Dodik, Vlasenica, 9/9/10); and “Serbs are victims, who have to be treated with 
respect. Our people have been unjustly demonised.” (Milorad Dodik, Višegrad, 17/9/10). The 
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feeling of being victimised is counterbalanced again by categorical trust, for which it is 
necessary to idealise the RS. Mobilising the sense of pride was already discussed in the previous 
section, but here it is presented as a ballast against victimisation of the RS, and also for the 
purpose of provoking a feeling of revolt against threats to the RS.  
 
Dodik also employed a narrative on idealisation of the RS, which was built on the 
grounds of real, but temporary economic progress made in the previous four years of 
government. After coming into power in 2006, the SNSD-led Government engaged in hasty 
privatisation of the largest public companies, which generated large direct investments that 
suddenly boosted the RS budget. Most of that income was then used as public expenditure 
which for a short while boosted incomes of all those receiving some benefits or salaries from 
the Government. The economic situation in the RS temporarily but visibly improved, and for 
the first time since Dayton, it was better than the economic situation in the other entity. This 
success did not last for long, and by 2010 the RS Government was heavily dependent on 
borrowing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but it nonetheless sustained the 
narrative of a ‘better entity’ as long as it could. To that end Dodik said that “we promised four 
years ago to stop denigrating Republika Srpska and make it a better and more developed part 
of BiH. We kept that promise” (SNSD rally Petrovo, 2010). This discourse was extensively 
used during the election campaign, even though at that stage the government had already 
resorted to the IMF for financial support and it had to undertake severe austerity measures to 
cut public spending, SNSD kept promising prosperity of the entity.  
 
The narrative on idealisation of Republika Srpska is another example of construction of 
a ‘counter-narrative’ which enables a contrast between a ‘dysfunctional’ State and a ‘better and 
more functional’ Republika Srpska. This dimension of idealisation of the RS is thus being 
constructed as a contrast to the State which continues to ‘unjustly appropriate’ its competencies. 
The RS is being presented as a ‘politically and economically’ strong entity, which has prevented 
the ‘humiliation’ (SNSD rally Petrovo, 2010) of the transfer of competencies and has “reinstated 
its dignity” (SNSD rally Doboj, 2010). Republika Srpska is being compared to a united family, 
which has to be defended with ‘pride and unity’ which is why “today we can proudly say that 
there will not be any abolishment of the RS even if it means not entering Europe” (SNSD rally 
Šamac, 2010). Another metaphor used to describe the RS is a “community of happy people” 
(SNSD rally Trebinje, 2010). Radmanović praises the RS as “our pride, which we love” (SNSD 




As pointed out by Ingelhart and Uslaner (2002) when discussing factors that increase 
trust, optimism about economic security, and optimism more generally are closely related to 
higher trust levels. This narrative thus mobilises optimism and positive messages to strengthen 
the idealisation of the RS. As argued at the beginning of this section, the RS is portrayed as a 
trustworthy goal and as an object of particularised trust. This example shows an important 
distinction that has not been emphasised by academic literature on trust. I would designate this 
distinction as that between particularised trust through positive campaigning and particularised 
trust through negative campaigning. While most of the previous narratives illustrated the latter, 
the above example illustrates the former. 
 
Construction of counter-norms. I use examples presented in the four narratives that 
were used during the 2010 election campaign in order to show how elites engage in the process 
of construction of counter-norms. For that purpose I take a macro-level analysis described by 
Offe (2001), which enables me to look at alternative routes and instruments, such as elite-based 
entrepreneurial use of symbols, narratives, populism and emotions. It will be recalled that my 
hypotheses claim that domestic elites in BiH engage in the process of constructing counter-
norms, i.e. norms which are in their substance opposite to EU norms, and as such position 
themselves as barriers to the diffusion of democratic norms, or at best neutralise them. It is 
particularly important to emphasise the engagement of elites as counter-norm-entrepreneurs, 
who engage in construction and promotion of counter-norms. The process of constructing and 
promoting a counter-norm is a deliberate effort which can be analysed by looking at the same 
three aspects of properties of counter-norms as I am using later to analyse the properties of EU 
norms: norm appropriateness, norm origin and norm character.  
 
Based on the subversions of trust discussed above, I analyse evidence in support of my 
argument that in order to inhibit the promotion of EU norms, Dodik and his party act as 
entrepreneurs of counter-norms. I use the example of the narrative on the denial of genocide in 
Srebrenica, and monopolisation of truth about war in order to describe mechanisms through 
which the notion of appropriateness of counter-norms is constructed.  
 
The ICJ decision which confirmed genocide was committed in Srebrenica was used by 
Dodik as a trigger to deny genocide and downplay the number of victims and significance of 
that crime. By targeting so precisely the EU condemnation of genocide in Srebrenica, Dodik 
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has positioned himself as a counter-norm entrepreneur. He built a sense of the appropriateness 
of this counter-norm by invoking categorical trust, which he achieved by appealing to a 
‘distinctive history, identity and spirit‘ of the Serb people, ascribing the entire ethnic group the 
qualities of pride and loyalty. Dodik anticipates that the interest formation among the Serb 
population would be inspired by such ideational motivations, which would inform a belief in 
the appropriateness of his narrative by the electorate. By presenting a risk of ‘ethnic betrayal’ 
if compassion for the victims were expressed, Dodik engages in a process redefinition of 
interests and preferences, using persuasion to convince his electorate that ‘betrayal’ is not 
tolerable in an ethnic community which “prides itself on loyalty to their collectivity” (Checkel, 
2005, p. 812).  
 
As mentioned earlier, Dodik thus attempted to construct and invoke the categorical trust 
among the Serb electorate. Secondly, he invoked a sense of “oughtness”, which is according to 
some authors embodied in norms by definition (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 892). Because 
this is a counter-norm that is under construction, and does not have that taken for granted quality 
of “oughtness”, Dodik appealed to the community’s shared moral assessment, i.e. he declared 
this counter-norm to be a matter of categorical trust, a matter of the community’s ‘pride’ and 
‘justice’ in order to artificially ascribe it a sense of “oughtness” or appropriateness. Dodik as a 
counter-norm entrepreneur invokes the appropriateness of this counter-norm by repeating it 
consistently, and by endowing it with the taken-for-granted qualities of pride, loyalty, identity, 
spirit, etc., so that audiences are eventually simply unaware of consenting to the group 
conformity (Johnston, 2005). In that way, ideational motivations are invoked by the symbolic 
representation of the ethnic community, which results in norm appropriateness (Offe, 2001). 
Belonging to a community is invoked by Dodik as a non-experiential trustworthiness that 
appeals to a presumably distinctive history, identity, or spirit, which had previously been 
constructed through a range of myths that have been sustained for decades.  
 
The character of a (counter)norm can be discussed in terms of its legitimation, 
prominence, and issues at stake, as well as its clarity, specificity and content. The context of 
perceived threats (the Kosovo declaration of independence, the invocation of a right to self-
determination against the State of BiH, international condemnation, etc.) provided opportunities 
to legitimise counter-narratives. In the example of the invocation of the moral and political 
motives for secession, a narrative construction provides history with ‘moral, emotional, and 
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aesthetic’ legitimacy (Connelly & Clandinin, 1991). Linking in such a way ‘knowledge, 
context, and identity’ creates what Clandinin and Connelly call ‘stories to live-by’.  
 
The narrative on the RS secession is socially situated between SNSD and Dodik as 
‘story-tellers’ and their audiences with whom they familiarise and thus become more intimate 
by sharing a common past and joint visions of the future. The search for categorical trust in the 
‘right to secede’ additionally strengthens the legitimation of that proposed act. In order to gain 
legitimacy, the right to secede is rested within the concept of a shared community through the 
technique of ‘broadening’. This is, for example, used by Nebojša Radmanović when addressing 
the party supporters in Petrovo. He puts the responsibility for the RS existence and future on 
voters by saying that “BiH cannot be without the RS, because the RS is an expression of your 
will” (SNSD rally Petrovo, 2010). In order to ‘broaden’ his views on the RS secession he creates 
a sense that it is ‘a matter of popular will’, the ‘will of the people’. SNSD officials thus construct 
an idea of widespread legitimacy of such an act, and prepare the ground for it becoming a matter 
of popular demand rather than the unilateral political act of the RS leadership. By fabricating 
legitimacy of a counter-norm the elites shift the debate away from legal arguments about how 
realistic or implementable the RS secession would be. In that way, they use the rhetorical 
legitimation in order to compensate for the lack of legal means to execute the intention to 
secede, which was sufficient for the purpose of generating support during elections. Even 
though this counter-norm only had a temporary character, used for the purpose of consolidating 
electoral support, it nonetheless served its primary purpose and was not subsequently 
questioned in any way. 
 
The prominence of counter-norms was provided through repetition and persistence of 
messages in speeches throughout election rallies. In most of the narratives discussed, references 
to the future are only used to declare intention, rather than providing a realistic and fully 
endorsed timeframe. Making a reference to any future point in time, however vague, still works 
to provide specificity of information that conveys rhetorical intention rather than being an 
execution plan in its own right. Prominence of the counter-norm provided by consistent 
repetitions of similar messages during the election campaign was thus used to compensate for 
the vagueness of the timeframe and lack of specificity of mechanisms for secession.  
 
The example of the narrative on RS secession is also most illustrative of the process of 
constructing the specificity of a counter-norm. The RS secession was for a very long time a 
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looming but tacit threat, which the parties that were in power before SNSD abandoned in their 
public rhetoric, mainly due to the fact that the High Representative had powers to remove them 
from office for such breaches of the Dayton Peace Agreement, but also because it is unrealistic. 
Dodik is the first leader in Republika Srpska who has been able to provide this intention with 
specificity without a fear of being removed from office. With this narrative Dodik is implying 
not only that the State itself is unstable, but that it can actually destabilise the RS too (SNSD 
final central rally Banja Luka, 2010).  
 
The specificity of this counter-norm is provided through several messages. In an 
interview to the Reuters News Agency Dodik said that his priority is to achieve greater 
autonomy for the RS within the Dayton Agreement, and if that is not possible then he will 
“advocate for an RS independence of BiH” (Tanner, 2011). Speaking at an election rally in 
Banja Luka, Dodik said that without the RS ”the Serb people would be exiles” and the important 
thing is to “keep a stable Republika Srpska” (SNSD final central rally Banja Luka, 2010). Those 
messages attempt to make the RS secession a matter of rational choice as it implies that the RS 
would be better off and more stable on its own. Being more rational implies seeking higher 
goals which invite more respect and more trust. However, more motivations are being brought 
into the equation because rationality alone, although potentially convincing, may not 
necessarily be powerful enough to mobilise popular emotions. The indecisiveness and a lack of 
consensus within the international community on whether such rhetoric should any longer be 
sanctioned, provided Dodik with an opportunity to be very specific and to declare his intentions 
openly and publicly. 
 
The content of this counter-norm is based on a constructed moral ideal of the Serb 
people to have a ‘right’ to secession. Conferring such a right on Serbs alone offers it 
unprecedented moral distinctiveness that demands categorical trust. For example, Radmanović 
said in Petrovo that “Republika Srpska has a right to call a referendum and it will use that right 
when you say so” (2010). As in some previous examples, what is at play here again is the use 
of the past to give authenticity to this argument. Namely, the right to self-determination existed 
in the Constitution of the former Yugoslavia, which was used as a legal basis for calling a 
referendum on independence of the former Socialist Republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. However, according to the BiH Constitutional Court decision “the 
Constitution of BiH does not give room for any sovereignty of the Entities or a right to self-
organisation based on the idea of territorial separation” (“Constitutional Court of BiH,” 2000). 
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So the invocation of a ‘right’ to secede relies more on historical experiences and emotional 
validation, rather than the actuality of the constitutional provisions or any legal means to 
execute it.  
 
Aware of this fact, Dodik resorts to the technique of ‘borrowing’ and for that purpose 
makes reference to the independence of Kosovo. He thus states that “the decision of the 
International Court of Justice on Kosovo represents a legal precedent for RS secession” 
(“Milorad Dodik : Odluka Međunarodnog suda pravde je razočaravajuća,” 2010). Also invoked 
is a moral argument that “if Kosovo Albanians have a right to secede on the grounds of ethnic 
hatred and lack of unity with Serbia, why would not we have the same right in BiH” (“Milorad 
Dodik : Odluka Međunarodnog suda pravde je razočaravajuća,” 2010). What is ‘borrowed’ 
from the Kosovo experience is the categorical interpretation that the ‘political right’ to secede 
is a matter of moral standards, a matter of perception of injustices, and is granted by virtue of 
being an acquired right, rather than by any law. By paralleling this situation with that of a tight 
and strongly bound community of Kosovars, this narrative seeks to create mirror images of 
categorical trust that draws its legitimacy from the sense of righteousness and trustworthiness. 
Nikola Špirić substantiates this right also by involving logic, and appealing that “it is illogical 
that Serbs would be the only people in Europe and world without a democratic right to self-
determination” (SNSD rally Bijeljina, 2010). On the same occasion Špirić acclaimed that it is 
also a “right to have a dream”, again appealing to higher community ideals. 
 
The character of counter-norms that appear in Dodik’s narratives are such that they have 
many features which make them powerfully resistant to any influence of EU norms. Counter-
norms are constructed as legitimate, clear and specific. The consistent and frequent use during 
the election campaign provided them with prominence, while the construction of categorical 
trust was used to provide them with content, legitimacy and specificity. A sense of intention 
and means of conveying that intention, the particularity of information that anchored the 
narratives to the level of an ethnic community, all created a taken for granted quality to the 







The EU Approach to Promoting Trust in BiH 
 
In the following sections I assess the EU’s approach to promoting trust in BiH, in the 
face of the difficulties presented in the previous sections. I have argued earlier that the EU faces 
unprecedented challenges to the promotion of its norms in BiH, but that it lacks an 
understanding and recognition of the tenacity and potency of the counter-norms which are 
constructed purposefully to resists the efforts to strengthen democracy in BiH. Because its 
unwillingness to admit that BiH is a case with exceptional resistance to EU norms, the EU acts 
as if the promotion of EU norms is simply a matter of the will of domestic political elites. The 
EU thus treats their declarative support for BiH’s integration in the EU as sufficient proof of 
that political will, and does not deem it necessary to make any extra efforts to reverse the 
negative effects of the influences created by domestic elites.  
 
This informs the EU’s ‘cookie-cutter approach’ to BiH used previously in other aspiring 
countries in the past. The EU tries to apply the same rhetoric and mechanisms of norm diffusion 
as it did in countries in which the will to join the EU was far more explicit and evident in the 
actions of the government. In the case of BiH, the EU ignores or underestimates the obstinacy 
of domestic elites in deliberate creation of obstacles to the promotion of EU norms and 
strengthening of democracy. As I stated at the beginning of this Chapter, its first part reviewed 
the actions of domestic elites in resisting the EU norms on trust, and in the second part of this 
Chapter I review the EU’s approach to promotion of trust in BiH by looking into the EU 
normative basis, the properties of EU norms on trust, and the mechanisms it uses to diffuse 
those norms. 
 
The EU normative basis on trust. In Chapter V, I suggested that in assessing how 
successfully trust has been diffused in BiH it is necessary to identify specific indicators for trust 
which would represent EU democratic ‘norms’. As explained in Chapter IV, Manners (2002) 
identifies five ‘core’ norms: peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. Although not a core norm in itself, trust can be considered a 
value inherent to the EU’s core norms, and also underlying both the core and the ‘minor’ EU 
norms (solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance). Trust 
is also strongly linked to peace as a norm central to the EU normative basis, whereas, 
conversely, conflict destroys trust. This is why the building of trust, particularly inter-ethnic 
trust, is crucial to sustaining peace in post-conflict societies and consolidating new democracies. 
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Understood as such, the importance of trust can be traced back to the early documents 
establishing the EU, but it has also been implicitly built into a number of EU documents that 
subsequently define the EU path of the Western Balkans and BiH specifically. The EU 
normative basis on trust exists at three levels, going from a wider basis of the EU treaties, over 
a narrower level of regional documents, to the level of country-specific documents. 
 
EU documents. The Rome Treaty (1957, Preamble) defines the normative basis based 
on Europe’s core values, i.e. “the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law” as well the ‘ideals’ of Europe such as ‘peace 
and liberty’. Sharing those ideals is a criterion for joining Europe, and its intention was to end 
‘the division of the European continent’. Implicitly, sharing ideals involves sharing trust, and 
trust can be considered as the antidote to divisions that ransacked Europe during and after World 
War II, and the basis for establishing new European structures aimed at sustaining peace. The 
preamble to the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) also includes ‘solidarity between peoples’ and 
respect for their history, culture and traditions. It contains a strong link between respect and 
tolerance on one hand, but it does not mention trust explicitly.  
 
The Lisbon Treaty (2007) amendment to the Preamble of the Treaty of the European 
Union confirms those values and emphasises the “cultural, religious and humanist inheritance 
of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable 
rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law”. It also confirms 
“the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas countries” as belonging to the EU’s 
normative basis. Because the Council of Europe documents are not explicit in mentioning trust, 
I asked, in one of the interviews a CoE official, about how the CoE values trust. The response 
was that “the value of trust as in confidence of citizens in the system, which protects them and 
building confidence between ethnic, religious, linguistic or other communities within a society 
is a key element for genuine enjoyment of rights guaranteed under CoE instruments and the 
other norms and standards which member states subscribe to or aspire to” (2012). 
 
Regional declarations. The Thessaloniki Summit Declaration (2003), which BiH 
signed, supports the ‘core norms’ of the EU by stating that: “We all share the values of 
democracy, the rule of law, respect for human and minority rights, solidarity and a market 
economy, fully aware that they constitute the very foundations of the European Union” (2003, 
para. 1). The Thessaloniki Declaration expands the EU’s normative basis to address issues of 
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recent past in the region, and although it does not explicitly quote trust as a value to which those 
countries should aspire, it is nonetheless implied in the call to “vigorously condemn extremism, 
terrorism and violence, be it ethnically, politically or criminally motivated” (2003, para. 1). 
Fragmentation and divisions along ethnic lines are thus considered as “incompatible with the 
European perspective” (2003, para. 5). The emphasis of this level thus shifts towards tolerance 
and ethnic and religious coexistence as integral parts of the EU’s normative basis. 
 
Country specific documents. Trust is somewhat more explicitly evoked in the EU 
documents which  refer to BiH specifically, which is in itself a recognition of the importance 
of this norm for the future of BiH. Trust is explicitly included in a normative focus of the 
country-specific documents, which recognise normative incompatibilities between the EU and 
BiH, and call for narrowing down of that gap. The EU Enlargement Strategy and Main 
Challenges 2010-2011 states: “the integration of ethnic communities remains limited and 
greater dialogue is needed to foster trust especially in the areas of culture and language” (2010, 
p. 38).  
 
The EU Parliament Resolution on BiH from 2009 refers to tolerance, common vision 
on the country’s future, peace and stability: “any questioning of the territorial integrity of BiH… 
would also run counter to the principles of tolerance and peaceful cohabitation between ethnic 
communities on which the stability of the whole Western Balkans is founded” (2009, para. E.). 
It also “regrets, therefore, the inability of BiH politicians to agree on a common political vision 
for their country, compromising for reasons of short-sighted nationalism the objective of joining 
the EU, an objective which would bring peace, stability and prosperity to BiH citizens” (2009, 
para. 1.). Finally, it “reminds political leaders in BiH that joining the EU means accepting the 
values and rules on which the EU is based, namely respect for human rights, …solidarity 
between peoples and communities, tolerance, including tolerance of different traditions and 
cultures… and urges political leaders to abstain from hatred politics, nationalist agendas and 
secessionism” (2009, para. 2.). The Resolution also links reconciliation to the country's progress 
towards European integration, since it is “based essentially on the same values as those on 
which the EU rests” (2009, para. C.).  
 
The EU 2010 Progress Report emphasises other areas which are problematic due to a 
lack of social and political trust. It particularly states that the October 2010 elections “reinforced 
the tendency of political parties and government officials on all sides to engage in nationalistic 
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rhetoric” (European Commission, 2011, p. 10). The EU’s norms that apply to the example of 
the Srebrenica genocide were pronounced very clearly through a European Parliament 
resolution on Srebrenica adopted on 15 January 2009. In the Resolution, the European 
Parliament calls on “the Council and the Commission to commemorate appropriately the 
anniversary of the Srebrenica-Potočari act of genocide by supporting Parliament's recognition 
of 11 July as the day of commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide all over the EU, and to call 
on all the countries of the western Balkans to do the same” (2009, para. 2.). Furthermore, the 
Resolution “stresses the importance of reconciliation as part of the European integration 
process” and emphasises the role of domestic actors so that “all ethnicities may overcome the 
tensions of the past and begin a peaceful and sincere coexistence in the interests of enduring 
peace, stability and economic growth” (2009, para. 4.).  
 
As can be seen from those documents, trust is rarely mentioned directly, but, judging by 
the EU documentation, the main indicators for trust are tolerance and inter-ethnic cooperation. 
These are the norms directly specified in EU documents, norms which must be based on trust 
if they are to be successfully internalised by the population of BiH and its political elites. As 
outlined in Chapter V, trust could be viewed as an ‘informal’ norm, but this might seem to 
belittle the concept since the theoretical discussion at the beginning of this Chapter has 
illustrated its fundamental importance for democracy, and especially for democratic 
consolidation. Having such a normative basis, it could be assumed that the EU could be 
‘predisposed’ to act normatively as argued by Manners (2002). However, as argued in Chapter 
IV, having a clear normative basis does not make the EU a normative power, neither does it 
predispose it to act normatively. As becomes clear from the examples on mechanisms of norm 
diffusion, the EU does not act as a normative power although many of those representing it do 
understand the importance of EU norms, and some claim to use it in ‘everything the EU does’. 
As the following examples show, this view of EU officials cannot be corroborated by evidence 
of the EU using norms in practice. Using the same route of assessment as in the previous section 
on counter-norms constructed by Dodik, in the next section I look at the properties of EU norms 
which are outlined here, including norm appropriateness, norm character, and norm origin.  
 
Properties of norms. In order to illustrate the appropriateness of EU norms, I again 
look at the example of the genocide in Srebrenica. This example is interesting because it clearly 
does not fall into the EU’s technical criteria, and yet is related to norms which are very 
important to the EU, such as peace, justice, tolerance, etc. Being a political, rather than a 
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technical issue, this example reveals difficulties in finding the right instruments to diffuse a 
norm beyond the technical criteria. In Chapter IV, I referred to this as a riddle between the EU’s 
technical and political roles, and I have argued that different EU actors take a more or less 
prominent role depending on the nature of the issue. Given that this issue is clearly more 
political, it was evidently a matter in which the European Parliament would be most 
prominently involved, using one of its most used instruments, i.e. a parliamentary resolution. 
As I pointed out in the section on EU normative basis, the EU Parliament very clearly 
condemned the act of genocide, and for that purpose used the language of appropriateness or 
‘oughtness’, recommending that all countries commemorate 11 July, and that recognition of 
that crime is necessary for further peace, reconciliation and economic growth.  
 
Due to the overwhelming position in the EU and the region that genocide ought to be 
condemned, Dodik’s denial of the genocide in Srebrenica provoked a series of strong reactions 
by the EU officials. Their clear and unequivocal positions on Srebrenica genocide gave a sense 
of appropriateness to the EU position. Doris Pack, member of the European Parliament and 
rapporteur for BiH saw Dodik’s statements as “harmful to the interests of the people of the 
Republika Srpska” and as endangering the process of regional stability (“Srebrenica: Dodik 
statements harm Republika Srpska. Doris Pack MEP - EPP Group,” 2010). At the end of March 
2010, the Parliament of Republic of Serbia passed a declaration condemning “the crime 
committed against the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica in July 1995 as determined by 
the International Court of Justice ruling” (“Serbian Lawmakers Condemn Srebrenica 
Massacre,” 2010). The European Union welcomed the adoption of this declaration as a step in 
facing the country’s past (“Joint statement by EU HR Ashton and EU Commissioner Füle on 
Serbian Declaration on Srebrenica,” 2010). The Head of the EEAS Department for Western 
Balkans, Jonas Jonsson, on behalf of Catherine Ashton stated that “EU is paying great efforts 
in order to overcome the tensions from the past among all countries in Western Balkans” and 
that “the European Union is fully behind the Resolution on Srebrenica, and it was encouraging 
the Western Balkan countries to accept what Serbia did in March 2010” (“Zaštitite Rezoluciju 
o Srebrenici od Dodika,” 2011). To that end, the EU High Representative Lady Ashton issued 
statements every year on the July 11 Srebrenica commemoration “underlining that the EU 
condemns this genocide unequivocally” (“Personal interview with a senior EU official in 




This case was a rare example in which the EU used such explicit language in standing 
up for one of its norms, and a policy for which there is a clear consensus across the EU member 
states. It was also a good example of different EU actors working in concert. However, even 
though there is strong consensus on condemning the genocide in Srebrenica, there is no 
consensus on how far the EU needs to go in defending those values against their denial by 
Dodik and SNSD.  In my interviews I asked EU officials about such situations in which elites 
try to play down or undermine an EU norm. One of the respondents said: “There is some 
confusion in the EU about how to deal with a would-be member-state where the political elites 
don't seem to want EU integration. In most other countries, including Croatia and Serbia, 
political elites desire quick EU membership, and take difficult domestic decisions in order to 
gain legitimacy and progress towards membership. This may not be the case for all elites across 
BiH, and this poses fundamental challenges for the EU enlargement model” (“Personal 
interview with an EU official in Sarajevo,” 2012). This perception is quite widespread and it 
came up in many interviews with EU officials. Even though there is an explicit recognition that 
this poses a ‘fundamental challenge for the EU enlargement’, the EU nonetheless willingly 
delegates the responsibility for the country’s progress entirely to domestic political elites, which 
clearly do not have an interest in integrating. It appears somewhat paradoxical that the EU 
would rely entirely on the political will of domestic elites, recognising at the same time that 
such political will does not exist. That paradox supports one of my main arguments in this thesis 
– that the EU fails to see the destructive role nationalism plays in democratisation of the country. 
As will also be clear in the next example, EU norms may be consistent, explicit, have a sense 
of appropriateness, so low compliance is clearly not a question of the properties of EU norms, 
but a question of properties of the EU as norm promoter, including its self-perception. 
 
In order to illustrate the character of EU norms, I again return to the example of the 
undermining of the State of BiH, which I discussed in Chapter III, and also earlier in this 
Chapter. It will be recalled that I argued in Chapter IV that EU actors have divergent views on 
the role of the EU as a state-builder, which cripples the EU’s effectiveness as the main state-
builder in the country. Instead of standing firmly against any undermining of the state by 
nationalist elites, the EU sometimes even accepts the views of nationalist elites and takes them 
for granted. This example is interesting because state-building would be thought of as a 
technical matter, when in fact, protecting the integrity of the state of BiH is a matter of high 
political importance for the EU. This is again confirmed by the involvement of the EU 
Parliament, which issued rather explicit statements about a need to protect the integrity of BiH: 
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“any questioning of the territorial integrity of BiH would not only constitute a violation of the 
DPA, under which no entity has the right to secede from BiH, but would also run counter to the 
principles of tolerance and peaceful cohabitation between ethnic communities on which the 
stability of the whole Western Balkans is founded; therefore, the international community and 
the EU will under no circumstances accept or tolerate any partition of BiH” (“European 
Parliament resolution on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009,” 2009, para. E.).  
 
Furthermore, the same April 2009 Resolution of the EU Parliament recalls “that the 
prospect of EU membership has been offered to BiH as a single country, not to its constituent 
parts, and that, consequently, threats of secession or other attempts to undermine the 
sovereignty of the State are completely unacceptable” (2009, para. 3.). The EU thus “urges all 
relevant authorities and political leaders, in this regard, to focus much more on reconciliation, 
mutual understanding and peace-building measures, in order to support the stability of the 
country and inter-ethnic peace” (2009, para. 4.).  
 
The same can be said about the EU position on the Srebrenica genocide, and the 
functionality of the state institutions. Every single EU Progress Report on BiH since the SAA 
was signed, clearly states a need to create a functional state, and makes a point about 
strengthening its institutions. A senior EU official in Brussels pointed out that their norms are 
clear and legitimate, but that the problem lies elsewhere. He said that “political elites and parties 
need to show responsibility in accordance with democratic processes. They need to put the 
interests of BiH before the interests of the party” (“Personal interview with a senior EU official 
in Brussels,” 2012). In subsequent sections I look in more detail the EU mechanisms of norm 
promotion, but it can already be noted that the EU persists in the use of the procedural 
mechanisms, such as statements, declarations, progress reports, but in the examples used here, 
the EU did nothing more to show dedication and commitment to their norms, or preparedness 
to defend them.   
 
I have made an argument throughout this thesis that the EU’s focus on procedural 
democracy undermines substantive democracy, and this point is further substantiated by the 
examples used here. The EU’s procedural approach in facing Dodik’s destructive and tenacious 
statements on Srebrenica and integrity of the State, undermined the substance of democracy, 
which in this case would be the promotion of trust. By tolerating Dodik’s language and rhetoric 
on those two subjects, i.e. by not taking action beyond verbal condemnation of his rhetoric, and 
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by putting the responsibility for progress solely on the shoulders of domestic elites, the EU 
denounces its own responsibility for protecting the  norms of tolerance and peace upon which 
the EU itself rests. By renouncing ownership of those norms through inaction, the EU 
delegitimises those norms, and gives signals to domestic elites that their undermining of EU 
norms can go unpunished. 
 
The EU’s ignorance of the construction of counter-norms is further evidence to this 
point. It will be recalled from Chapter IV that international norms have to work through the 
‘filter of domestic structures and domestic norms’, which results in variations in compliance 
and interpretation of norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 893). Looking at examples of 
procedural and substantive subversions, it can be seen that the election campaign was used as 
a platform for building and sustaining a series of counter-norms. The counter-norms were 
created in order to act not just as a filter, but even as a barrier to the promotion of EU norms. 
The reason why the election campaign proved to be a clever choice to lay out the counter-norms 
is because of a widespread perception, among domestic as well as international actors, that 
commenting on election speeches might look like taking sides in the campaign. The EU officials 
thus refrained from taking any steps that might look like favouritism. This was confirmed by a 
number of the EU interviewees, one of whom stated: “In the election campaign we try very 
hard to avoid any hint of favouritism or any 'endorsement' or not of parties/candidates. That 
does not mean we are silent though - we will continue to talk publicly about the generic policy 
issues of concern to us and citizens and hope that some of that feeds through to voter choices” 
(“Personal interview with a senior EU official in Sarajevo,” 2013).  
 
Another EU official also made a statement to that end: “There is a strong sense that open 
criticism of political parties and leaders during the campaign would over-step our mandate and 
be counter-productive” (“Personal interview with an EU official in Sarajevo,” 2013). The 
international norms receive less prominence during that time because of the EU’s position on 
impartiality, while counter-norms are at their highest. Further to my earlier point about the EU 
disowning its own norms, those examples also show that the EU relegates its substantive norms 
to a lower priority for the sake of perceived impartialness during the election campaign. This 
again is an example in which the procedural aspects are given priority before the substantive 
aspects of democratisation. In my view, for the sake of the EU’s credibility and integrity, it 
should be prepared to risk looking politically partial, if that partiality serves the purpose of 
protecting EU norms. If the EU would be decisively partial to its norms that would send a 
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message to the electorate that the counter-norms are not acceptable to the EU, which would 
somewhat weaken the support for the domestic elites which position themselves against the EU 
norms. However, the EU is clearly not prepared to take that risk, even if it has to pay the price 
of undermining its own norms and looking inconsistent.  
 
On their part, the EU officials provided little understanding of the nature of challenges 
they face in norm diffusion. To many EU interviewees the lack of trust in BiH was a given, 
seen as primordial and engrained in local mentalities, based on myths of eternal hatreds, which 
is why they should not be contested, even by EU norms. This position also relates to the power-
sharing mechanisms, which are seen primarily as means of upholding peace and ensuring ethnic 
representation, even if in breach of some basic EU norms. The EU officials admitted to adhering 
to this distinction between domestic and international norms: “When there is an apparent 
attempt to impede implementation, first we ask ‘is this an issue for us - or is it internal politics 
that needs to play out?’. If we jump in with both feet do we undermine the very thing we are 
trying to promote, i.e. domestic democratic dialogue” (“Personal interview with a senior EU 
official in Sarajevo,” 2013). The EU thus juxtaposes the promotion of ‘trust’ against ‘domestic 
democratic dialogue’, clearly deciding that the procedural norm of ‘democratic dialogue’ is 
more important than ‘trust’ as the substantive norm.  
 
Another interesting aspect related to the origin of norms was pointed out in the same 
interview: “I think it is also fair to say that we know that some 'EU norms' are new to BiH 
society and even socially/politically sensitive, so we try to avoid situations that would lead to 
people saying we are ramming foreign doctrines down their throats. We are looking to facilitate 
a consensus on values that is sustainable and this will take a long time in BiH because it is in 
my view an essentially inward looking country. We need BiH to take on the values as its own 
for the integration project to be truly successful” (“Personal interview with a senior EU official 
in Sarajevo,” 2013). What can be concluded from this is that not only are domestic norms 
successful in counteracting EU norms, but that the EU officials do not see it as their job to 
challenge such views.  
 
Furthermore, some of them even change their own perceptions under the influence of 
domestic context. This was evidenced by many responses which indicated that EU officials 
often play by the local rules of the game and even adopted some of the local rhetoric that is 
contradictory to that which would be an EU norm. This was evidenced in a phrase which was 
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originally coined by Dodik, but which was stated to me by an EU official: “Relations in BiH 
are regulated by the Dayton Peace Agreement, every change needs to be agreed upon by all 
three constituent peoples” (“Personal interview with a senior EU official in Brussels,” 2012). 
As discussed in Chapter II, the Dayton Peace Agreement includes many mechanisms for the 
protection of ethnic interests and power-sharing, but it does not in any of its aspects maintain 
an agreement among the ‘three constituent peoples’, which would now also be against the very 
substance of the ECHR ruling on representation of all citizens of BiH. As such, the use of this 
language by the EU is a proof of their adoption of the rhetoric of domestic elites, a reverse 
effect of the process of socialisation. 
 
When it comes specifically to the promotion of trust, one final important distinction was 
raised by an EU official, who said: “I would hope that all of our actions promote trust - trust in 
the EU and in working together across the country. However I think it is fair to say that the EU 
is not about post-conflict peacebuilding - we are no longer funding peace camps and things that 
help people to meet each other as the main objective, although that may be a side effect. We 
work on the assumption that BiH is a country that has decided to join the EU and we deal with 
it from that point” (“Personal interview with a senior EU official in Sarajevo,” 2013). The EU 
thus recognises the exceptionalism of BiH only insofar as it was treated as a post-conflict 
country. However, the EU fails to recognise the exceptionalism of democracy in BiH, created 
by numerous, deep fault-lines, which it did not face in other aspiring members in the past. The 
EU clearly does not consider it to be its own responsibility to endorse wider aspects of 
democratisation in BiH, which would encompass the more substantive elements of democracy, 
including trust-building.  
 
Nonetheless, there is a strong perception among EU officials that the promotion of EU 
norms is at the core of all activities of the EU in BiH, to the degree that international institutions 
are themselves the values they represent: “The EU promotes its values basically 'in everything 
we do'. EU integration is about BiH eventually taking on the values of the EU so all of our 
work/activity is based on this. To try and cut it down: we do this both rhetorically and in our 
activities. Like any other organisation, we try to be our values” (“Personal interview with a 
senior EU official in Sarajevo,” 2013). This view also relates to the personnel representing EU 
institutions: “I think all EU officials and staff recognise and understand their role in espousing 
EU values. We urge 'what the EU would do' on politicians, officials and interlocutors on all 
sorts of issues. We are always giving our advice to our BiH counterparts and that advice 
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emerges from our values, which are in a more mundane way the Copenhagen criteria and the 
Acquis” (“Personal interview with a senior EU official in Sarajevo,” 2013).  
 
EU mechanisms of norm diffusion. According to Manners (2002), diffusion 
mechanisms need to be looked at because ‘accepting the normative basis of the EU does not 
make it a normative power’ (pp. 245–6). In my framework of analysis, and on the basis of the 
theory Chapters, I have divided mechanisms of norm diffusion into ‘procedural’ and 
‘substantive’. Procedural mechanisms include informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, 
transference, overt diffusion, and cultural filter. Substantive (constructivist) mechanisms 
include contagion, compliance, social learning, socialisation, role playing/mimicking, and 
persuasion.33 Given the fact that the EU does not deploy all of the proposed mechanisms of 
norm diffusion in BiH, I report only on those that were recorded through my research. Evidence 
presented in previous sections showed that the EU has underestimated the importance of the 
immaterial and ideational aspects of equality in norm promotion. As argued in one of my 
hypotheses, if those aspects of norm promotion are undermined, the EU efforts are bound to 
remain limited to procedural aspects.  
 
In this section I show how the EU limits itself to the use of procedural mechanisms of 
norm promotion, which in most cases results in diffusion of procedural rather than substantive 
norms. This in turn hampers the constitutive and transformative aspects of internalisation of 
norms. This was also a view expressed by a CoE official who stated: “The EU engages with 
values through a process-oriented approach, particularly in candidate and potential candidate 
states where convergence with standards is expected rather than meeting them.  CoE is dealing 
with member states through a peer monitoring approach to meeting or surpassing adopted 
norms.  The EU engages heavily through its financial instruments to promote and assist, while 
its political instruments may be more timid due to the nature of the organisation.  CoE, not 
having ability to engage in a financially significant manner, engages through expertise, 
multilateral support and best practice, peer pressure” (“Personal interview with CoE Official,” 
2012). The over-reliance on procedural mechanisms of norm diffusion that are discussed in this 
section provide evidence in support of that argument, as well as my argument that the EU 
undermines substantive democracy through the extensive use of procedural instruments. 
 
                                                 
33 See the discussion in Chapter IV and V on the origins of these terms and the distinctions between them. 
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When it comes to the size of the EU Delegation to BiH, the interviewees confirmed the 
fact which is often mentioned, that the size of their mission reflects the EU’s political 
commitment to BiH: “BiH is a relatively large mission. However, the size of mission reflects 
the fact that the Head of Delegation also doubles as EU Special Representative. The bulk of EU 
delegation staff work in traditional project management roles, as is typical for other missions 
in potential candidate countries, overseeing the spending of EU project funds. The EUSR 
mandate is linked to peace-building, stabilisation and, in order to achieve the latter, furthering 
BiH's EU membership prospects” (“Personal interview with an EU official in Sarajevo,” 2012). 
One of the interviewees also felt a strong need to address one of the local prejudices about the 
EU institutions and how they are integrated. Namely, there is widespread thinking in BiH that 
EU institutions on the ground and in Brussels are in discord. There are often attempts by some 
politicians and media representatives to play one side of the mission against the other, or to 
seek or provide information to Brussels by bypassing the Delegation to Sarajevo. However, 
such allegations were strongly dismissed: “The EU as an organisation is far more integrated 
than assumed. The staff in the field are in daily contact with our counterparts in Brussels. Of 
course what happens is Brussels asks our advice on the answers, and vice versa, and we come 
up with a harmonised answer! But this links to the first point about being overly concerned with 
geography - it is not one group of people on the ground and a wholly different set of people in 




Informational diffusion. EU missions run a range of information campaigns, which, 
initially, did not necessarily target specific issues, but were rather broad based and promoting 
EU integrations in general. Since the EU Delegation to BiH has been transferred responsibilities 
from the OHR to also support the EU Special representative to BiH, their informational 
campaigns have been targeting some specific issues. In doing so, over the last few years they 
developed a wide range of instruments, which was confirmed by one of my interviewees: “We 
use everything! Financial assistance of course but also our daily working contacts, outreach 
events and projects, media engagement. You name it, I think we do it. The Ambassador gives 
press statements, writes op-eds, holds public and private meetings with BiH officials and 
leaders. There are projects that bring EU member state experts to BiH to share experience (and 
values along with that) - such as TAIEX. High level visitors come from Brussels and repeat the 
messages” (“Personal interview with a senior EU official in Sarajevo,” 2013). The Office of 
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the EU Special Representative (EUSR) has been running an ‘EU Outreach Programme’ for 
several years, which is designed to “facilitate a broader debate on EU integration in BiH. It 
focuses on the security, stability and prosperity that deeper integration will bring” (“European 
Union (EU) - Delegation of the European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovina,” n.d.). It originally 
targeted citizens, while later phases included some members of parliament, civil society, trade 
unions, and the media. However, many of those campaigns were promoting the EU itself, rather 
than any of its specific values or norms. They were aimed to convince target groups that the 
‘EU road’ is the right way forward for Bosnia and did not go into the substance of what the EU 
itself is about or which values it is based on. The campaign messages were broad, general and 
designed to campaign for the sake of campaigning rather than for the sake of sending out a 
message.  
 
As discussed in the section on subversions of trust, various EU documents clearly 
recognise that nationalist rhetoric is deployed purposefully to entrench divisions and undermine 
social and inter-ethnic trust. Based on the those documents, it comes as obvious that the EU 
institutions had a strong awareness that the 2010 election campaign would again be dominated 
by nationalist rhetoric, and the 2010 EU Progress Report admits that was eventually the case. 
However, the EUSR did not run any specific campaign that would have targeted the nationalist 
rhetoric during the 2010 elections. Instead, in April 2010 the EU Special Representative, 
Valentin Inzko embarked on a mission that included participation in ten public debates 
throughout BiH which run just short of the start of the formal election campaign, ending in July 
2010. The issues promoted through this campaign were more practical and pragmatic, such as 
economy, unemployment, local development, regional cooperation, tourism, youth, education, 
access to EU funds, environmental issues, investments, fight against corruption and rule of law, 
social issues and agriculture, market competitiveness, movement of goods, capital and people 
and free travel. Issues of stability and democratic values were mentioned only vaguely and 
rarely (“www.reci.ba,” 2010).  
 
Based on the issues discussed, it can be said that the aim of the campaign was to engage 
citizens in issues that are not emotionally charged and instead affect their daily lives. However, 
the title of public debates was somewhat misleading: “There is only one direction for BiH - to 
build a prosperous and democratic society in the heart of Europe” (“www.reci.ba,” 2010). 
Discussions touched upon a range of issues that would affect the prosperity of BiH, but they 
barely addressed the building of democratic society. Not in a single public debate were any of 
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the EU ‘core democratic values’ mentioned, implied or illustrated through any examples. 
Instead, a series of conventional and clichéd phrases were repeated such as ‘joining the 
European family’, ‘BiH could remain a black hole in European continent’, ‘there is only one 
way forward’, ‘BiH has no other alternative than Europe’,  ‘we remain committed to BiH 
integration into the EU’, ‘EU is knocking on the door of BiH’, ‘EU is the strategic destination 
of BiH, but the EU does not have a magic wand’, ‘EU is determined to accept you into our 
club’, ‘the road to EU is thorny and difficult’ (“www.reci.ba,” 2010).  
 
Procedural diffusion. The main instrument of procedural diffusion is the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement (SAA), which BiH signed with the EU on June 16, 2008. During 
the process of ratification of the SAA by the EU member states, an Interim Agreement on Trade 
and Trade-related Matters (IA) was brought into force (2008). However, the Interim Agreement 
had to remain in force long after the SAA was ratified because there was breach of Article 1 of 
IA (Article 2 of the SAA) – the failure to implement the ECHR decision in Sejdić/Finci case, 
discussed in the next Chapter. Even though Article 1 refers to a much broader framework of 
democratic principles and human rights, it is clearly not related to undemocratic practices and 
rhetoric that were evident during the election campaign. In interviews with diplomats from EU 
member states, it became clear that they consider rhetoric to be of purely performative nature, 
and as such cannot be taken as a breach of democratic principles. The Interim Agreement 
according to that logic does not apply to examples presented in this Chapter, which makes 
procedural diffusion of norms impotent in responding to counter-norms such as distrust.  
 
Transference. The EU financial support to BiH is consolidated in an instrument for pre-
accession assistance (IPA), which aims at providing targeted assistance to countries which are 
candidates and potential candidates for membership to the EU. One EU official underlined the 
importance of IPA funds for the promotion of values: “IPA is directed not just at sectors but at 
promoting our values in those sectors, e.g. efficient, impartial justice and rule of law, fair public 
administration serving citizens, decent sewage systems, anti-corruption work, projects to 
promote civil society activism and engagement of civil society with institutions. All of these 
are expressions of our values as much as concrete work/reform programmes” (“Personal 
interview with a senior EU official in Sarajevo,” 2013). According to the EU Delegation, “IPA 
will help strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law...” (“europa.ba - IPA,” n.d.). 
The Commission recognises that significant political risks are associated with the core reform 
areas, including resistance of key political stakeholders, which may impede the success of the 
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reforms. Those problems are considered by the Commission in relation to the programming of 
its assistance (“europa.ba - IPA,” n.d.). However, election rhetoric which clearly undermined 
some of the reforms and EU norms was not considered a viable or sufficient risk that would 
affect the programming of EU funds. 
 
One example of misplaced sanctions in the case of IPA allocation is a decision of the 
European Commission to withhold IPA funds in support of the processing of war crimes at the 
Court of BiH. The Court of BiH has been one of Dodik’s main targets, and since 2008 he has 
extensively engaged to undermine it. In 2008 Dodik stated that the RS will not be “judged by 
Muslim judges”, referring to the Court of BiH, which had previously rejected a complaint by 
the RS Government in a court case (“Za Dodika neprihvatljivo da u Republici Srpskoj ‘sude 
suci muslimani,’” 2008). This statement was strongly condemned by the EU and US officials. 
The EU Special representative at the time Miroslav Lačak found this statement chauvinistic and 
stated: “Dodik's statement about the BiH Court would mean an end to a political career in a 
democratic country”. The US Embassy issued a statement which was equally strong, saying 
that “Such intolerance is unacceptable. There is no room for ethnic or religious politics in the 
judiciary”. However, no sanctions were ever deployed against Dodik following this occasion, 
even though everyone clearly considered his statement as ‘crossing the line’.  
 
In 2015, however, the EC decided to withhold 2.9 million Euros from IPA funds that 
were intended to fund the salaries of seven judges, twenty prosecutors, and one hundred and 
fifteen legal staff engaged at various courts in BiH on prosecution of war crimes (“Pod 
pritiskom EU dogovorena strategija reforme pravosuđa u BiH,” 2015). That decision was made 
because the authorities from Republika Srpska refused to agree on a new Strategy for the 
Reform of the Judiciary. By withholding funds necessary for war crimes prosecution, the EU 
not only missed the target with sanctions, but in fact rewarded those whose goal it was to 
obstruct the Court of BiH, and the processing of war crimes through political blockages. The 
EU only helped them in that pursuit. In Chapter IV I referred to an argument put forward by 
Vachudova (2014), who stated that the EU conditionality is seen as more credible because the 
EU is capable and willing to stop the process when the government is not making progress. 
However, as this example shows, by stopping the process the EU sometimes undermines its 
own credibility, and rewards the lack of support of domestic elites to EU-sponsored projects. 
This is a consequence of two factors outlined in Chapter IV: the EU as poorly embedded in the 
local political context, and the misplaced ‘cookie-cutter approach’ which wrongly assumes that 
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progress is a reward in itself, miscalculating the real interests of domestic elites that often 
benefit more from the status quo. 
 
Conclusion - procedural mechanisms. As can be seen from those examples, the EU does 
not deploy all six procedural mechanisms of diffusion of norms, and it deploys them to various 
degrees. I have not identified specific resistance to the actual diffusion of EU norms through 
procedural mechanisms during the election campaign. Moreover, the role of the EU and 
international community was marginalised, both by international actors themselves, as well as 
by domestic actors. Procedural mechanisms alone do not indicate the extent of the effectiveness 
of the EU’s procedural approach as they do not reveal whether internalisation of norms occurs 
and at which stage. Procedural mechanisms provide avenues for diffusion of norms, but these 
are mainly one-way streets, and go only as far as introducing a norm.  
 
One general observation that can be made following an inventory of EU procedural 
mechanisms is that none of them in any way relates to the underlying context in which 
nationalist rhetoric is constructing resilient opposition to the internalisation of EU norms. There 
is an evident and wide gap between the underlying context and the objectives of the EU 
procedural mechanisms. If the EU procedural mechanisms were seen in isolation from the scope 
conditions and context outlined earlier in this Chapter, one would wonder if they both refer to 
the same country. Referring back to Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998, p. 888) patterned ‘life 
cycle’, I argue that the procedural mechanisms only go as far as the first stage – norm 
emergence. The characteristic mechanism of the first stage, norm emergence, is persuasion by 




Contagion. The research of election narratives showed that political actors are aware of 
EU norms in spite of the fact that they openly reject some. However, the very fact that counter-
narratives and counter-norms are constructed in contrast to EU norms is evidence to the fact 
that unintentional diffusion of European ideas has had some influence in BiH. Given the sheer 
size, density and physical international presence in BiH since the Dayton Agreement, 
unintentional diffusion through contagion should not come as a surprise. Apart from bilateral 
presence and projects by EU member states in BiH, at present the EU itself has several sizable 
missions including the EU Delegation (including the Office of the EU Special Representative), 
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EU Police Mission, and Operation Althea (EUFOR). Apart from their regular activities and 
projects, each mission also runs an independent information campaign.  
 
Compliance. This case study revealed three aspects limiting the use of compliance 
instruments (coercion, sanctions, cost/benefit calculation, etc.). First, this case study is 
somewhat specific in the way that the very context of elections limited the use of instruments 
by the EU. Given the fact that SNSD in particular, but many other parties as well, put 
nationalism at the focus of their election campaign through different narratives, condemning 
such rhetoric in any aspect, or even pointing to norms or values that counter those proposed by 
nationalism would have been seen as giving preference to a different political option, and 
endangering the EU’s impartiality. Given this limited context, the EU actors refrained from 
more assertively deploying substantive instruments during the election campaign. 
 
Secondly, the EU officials believe that the use of sanctions against elites in BiH may 
not have desired effects: “We see this when sanctions are applied to BiH. In other countries, 
sanctions may have encouraged compliance from local decision-makers, but there was little 
reaction or concern expressed by political leaders in BiH, who seem to have calculated that the 
loss of EU financial assistance is not worth losing sleep over” (“Personal interview with an EU 
official in Sarajevo,” 2013). I have already argued in Chapter IV that literature which sees 
compliance simply in terms of cost-benefit calculations does not apply to the case of nationalist 
elites in BiH, because their interests lay elsewhere. In some cases, as is the case with state-
building, non-compliance is actually rewarded by stopping EU programmes and funding, which 
only prolongs the status-quo in which nationalist rhetoric thrives. Another EU official made a 
different point: “If it comes to it, however, there are tools at the EU's disposal to send a message 
- these range from public statements of unhappiness/concern delivered by the Delegation or 
from Brussels to more concrete ones like cutting the IPA budget because not enough progress 
was made towards EU integration. At the very far end there are restrictive measures, such as 
travel bans, assets freezes, etc., but they are for use only under very specific conditions as laid 
out in the mandate of the EUSR” (“Personal interview with a senior EU official in Sarajevo,” 
2013). However, none of those have ever been used by the EU to sanction non-compliance by 





Thirdly, in order to decide on the use of particular instruments, the EU needs specific 
examples at which it can target the use of sanctions. This became evident through interviews 
with EU actors. In the absence of a high level of specificity, the EU actors find it hard to identify 
a ‘red line’ marking unacceptable norms. They find this falls into a subjective category that no 
actor feels responsible to judge on. For example, a CoE representative stated: “freedom of 
speech includes the freedom of unpleasant speech.  When the line is crossed with hate speech 
then the CoE has a role to react, but generally does not interfere with political speech in election 
campaigns” (“Personal interview with CoE Official,” 2012). When asked to clarify when 
‘unpleasant speech’ becomes hate speech, this interviewee referred to the official CoE 
definition of hate speech: “Hate speech, as defined by the Council of Europe, covers all forms 
of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism 
or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive 
nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and 
people of immigrant origin" (“Personal interview with CoE Official,” 2012).  
 
However, even when it is blatantly clear that ‘the line has been crossed’ and hate speech 
used, there is a striking absence of the use of sanctions. In a similar vein, the examples of 
subversions of trust during the election campaign showed that Dodik’s election rhetoric 
included many elements which clearly constituted hate speech. However, even in those cases, 
and most likely due to the position on impartiality during election campaigns, I did not identify 
any instances when Dodik’s hate speech was condemned, never mind sanctioned by the EU. 
The CoE official justified this by saying that it is not all “that black and white” (2012). This 
revealed one of the main reasons explaining the EU preference for the use of procedural 
instruments of norm diffusion. Procedural instruments provide specificity of use, there are clear 
definitions of when and how such mechanisms are deployed. Substantive instruments are based 
on value judgements, and require a subjective assessment of when to be deployed, which would 
be difficult to reach among many EU actors.  
 
Finally, during the election campaign which was dominated by nationalist policies, the 
nationalists were very determined not to comply with EU norms. For them, cost/benefit 
calculation worked against EU norms. As the SNSD’s narratives showed, a need to create a 
sense of community among their potential voters required an outsider that would strengthen the 
sense of belonging to that community. One interviewee put this in the following way: “If there 
is a full frontal assault on the EU we will of course respond especially to anything that is false, 
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we will however try to depersonalise it as much as possible as in some quarters a fight with the 
EU will win people votes” (“Personal interview with a senior EU official in Sarajevo,” 2013). 
In the case study I analysed, it was the EU and international community which were portrayed 
as outsiders who sought to challenge the entrenched or constructed community values and 
norms. So not only were the EU actors limited in promotion of their own norms, but they were 
in fact targeted directly by the counter-narratives. Therefore, the calculation on the part of local 
actors has been that the benefit of rejecting EU norms outweighed any cost of sanctions. In 
other words, the benefit of winning elections outweighed the cost of rejecting any EU position. 
 
Social learning. The scope conditions and underlying context prevented interaction 
between EU norm entrepreneurs on one side, and counter-norm entrepreneurs on the other. As 
my section on the mechanisms of norm diffusion for procedural democracy showed, the EU 
norm entrepreneurs engaged in extensive and structured campaigns. However, these were not 
sufficiently interactive and did not provide opportunities for social learning. They were in some 
aspects one-directional without opportunities for feedback and the EU representatives were 
sometimes seen by political actors as completely detached from the issues and norms they 
promote. At the same time, Serb political elites engage in construction of counter-narratives 
which take the attention away from EU norms and narratives. They are emotionally charged 
and have more discursive power. My research thus did not identify real opportunities for 
interaction, or two-way communication that would result in social learning based on this case 
study.  
 
Also, the analysis of scope conditions showed that during the actual election campaign, 
the visibility of the EU actors on the ground was very low-profiled which resulted in an absence 
of more assertive rhetorical as well as practical insistence on EU norms. There was no scrutiny 
by a wider range of institutions with international normative roles. Moreover, the EU officials 
considered it politically incorrect to engage in rhetorical campaigns during the election 
campaign, even if for the sake of promotion of EU norms. This resulted in the lack of 
prominence of EU democratic norms as counterweights to undemocratic behaviour during the 
election campaign and the perceived tacit agreement with counter-norms actually cultivated 
scope conditions for subversions of democratic trust.  
 
Finally, this case study showed different levels of importance attached to the use of 
language and rhetoric by domestic and international actors. Interviews I conducted showed 
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greater awareness among domestic actors of the use of rhetoric and narratives in construction 
of narratives, than among EU actors. An expert on political parties, who worked for an 
international agency in Sarajevo told me that they treat Dodik’s rhetoric as purely performative, 
just an instrument for winning elections (“Interview with a representative of USAID in 
Sarajevo,” 2008). A similar view was expressed in a discussion with a representative of a 
German political foundation in Sarajevo, which is working with a number of political parties, 
who said: “We do not pay much attention to Dodik’s words, it will all change after elections” 
(“Personal communication with a representative of a German political foundation in Sarajevo,” 
2010). However, the view of domestic and regional actors is different. Speaking at a lecture on 
the integration of South-Eastern European countries into the EU, held at the World Policy 
Institute (WPI) in New York, the former President of Croatia, Stjepan Mesić warned the US 
and EU representatives of the dangers of Dodik’s rhetoric: “Just as the world failed to recognise 
Milošević's policy then, it does not recognise Dodik's policy today” (Somun, 2008).  
 
Socialisation. Following the same line of argument as with social learning, scope 
conditions are perceived to be the key obstacle to the process of socialisation too. This is in line 
with Checkel’s assertion that when strategic calculation operates alone, there can be no 
socialisation and internalisation. In this case the narratives deployed during the election 
campaign, particularly against the international institutions prevented the normative switch 
from the logic of consequences to the logic of appropriateness (Checkel, 2005, p. 809). Dodik 
was in this case instrumentally rational, calculating and maximising his election interests, 
instead of adapting his behaviour to the norms and rules favoured by the international 
community. In doing so, he understood very clearly that the position of the EU would be that 
he is a democratically elected leader, which is why they would continue to interact with him 
even though he speaks openly against the values they promote. This was also expressed by one 
EU official: “Visits by our top leadership and officials to towns around BiH, outreach events 
where we show our concern and desire for engagement with communities especially young 
people and political liaison. On this last one, while we know BiH politicians are not popular, 
they are duly elected and we are at the end of the day a diplomatic mission and have to deal 
with the representatives elected by the people” (“Personal interview with a senior EU official 
in Sarajevo,” 2013). 
 
This is another major obstacle to socialisation evident from the case study I analysed in 
this Chapter. As argued earlier, rational choice argument could not be applied to the 
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construction of narratives that shaped SNSD's election campaign. Aware of consequences of 
non-compliance, and also aware of the fact that rewards of compliance were not greater that 
localised rewards of non-compliance, political elites chose the latter. Political conditionality as 
an important element of the socialisation process was also not seen as persuasive enough. The 
policy costs of non-compliance with EU norms were not compelling enough, while rewards of 
compliance were distant, uncertain and incomparable to the rewards of winning elections.  
 
Persuasion. Although evidence collected through this research did not account for many 
cases of persuasion during the election campaign itself, interviews with EU officials confirmed 
that persuasion nonetheless does take place through their direct interaction with political elites. 
However, that persuasion is usually issue-based, focusing on specific reforms. Its objective is 
not a wider sense of ‘socialising’ political elites. Given the fact that democratic norms which 
strengthen social and political trust are not issue-focused, EU officials confirmed they are barely 
discussed as such. This case thus shows that persuasion can be effective if more narrowly 
focused, and not as a mechanism of wider appeal to norm internalisation.  Along those lines, 
Checkel (2001) and Johnston (2005) raise the question of the intensity, duration, and quality of 
exposure to norms as explanations of the success of persuasion. However, Johnston is rightly 
concerned whether “intensity or duration are independent of other elements of exposure, such 
as the autonomy of the agent, the authoritativeness of the persuader, the content of the message, 
and the cognitive characteristics of the persuader” (2005, p. 1023). Research of the SNSD 
narratives substantiate this argument, as they show that the autonomy of political elites, the lack 
of authoritativeness of EU officials, the opacity of EU informational campaigns, and the implied 
political correctness on the part of EU officials as regards the boundaries of persuasion, all work 
against the intensity or duration of exposure to EU norms. 
 
Conclusion - Level of Compliance with EU Norms on Trust  
 
In Chapter IV, I made several arguments about the EU as an actor, and as a normative 
power that seeks to instil democratic values and norms in BiH society. I have followed up on 
some of those arguments in this Chapter in order to substantiate the view of the EU as an 
ineffective democratiser that fails to recognise the obstacles imposed to it by an unfavourable 
context in BiH. Contending the view that compliance with EU norms can been seen simply in 
terms of linkage and leverage (Levitsky & Way, 2005), I have first made a case that neither 
linkage nor leverage can be effective in an environment in which domestic elites openly resist 
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EU efforts (Schimmelfennig, 2000). It is not in the interests of the nationalist elites to integrate 
and comply with EU norms, so the literature which assumes that compliance would be 
compelled by the prospect of faster EU membership does not apply to BiH (Vachudova, 2014). 
Examples presented in this Chapter show that the nationalist elites not only fail to comply, but 
they engage in deliberate and tenacious efforts to resist the influence of EU norms, and to create 
real obstacles to their diffusion. I have also referred earlier to the literature which shows that 
the EU is willing to adopt a more flexible approach on issues which are seen as nationally 
sensitive for a country (Anastasakis, 2008). In this Chapter I supplemented that argument with 
a view that nationalist elites in BiH have learned over time that the EU is prepared to lower the 
bar in case of ‘nationally-sensitive’ issues, so they have engaged extensively in fitting many 
technical issues into the mould of identity and ethnicity. Moreover, in cases when the nationalist 
elites require a ‘political cover’ for obstruction and non-compliance, they simply fabricate new 
national issues, which surface to the mainstream politics through carefully crafted techniques 
of construction of counter-norms that render irrelevant any issues which the EU tries to impress 
on the society. 
 
I looked at trust as a norm through the concepts of generalised and particularised trust, 
in order to demonstrate ways in which political elites ‘particularise’ trust within their own ethnic 
group at the expense of generalised trust. Opting for the top-down approach and a focus on 
elites’ utilisation of populism, negative and divisive rhetoric, hate language, radicalism, 
extremism and nationalism, I showed how entrepreneurs of counter-norms deploy rhetoric 
against fragile social relations in order to particularise trust at the level of a single ethnic 
community to which they appeal.   
 
When I introduced the notion of compliance in Chapter IV, I referred to appropriateness, 
universal validity and ideational commitment as important elements in internalisation of norms. 
The successes of Dodik’s rhetoric, manifested in his election win as well as high rates of popular 
support, suggested that many voters did not consider EU norms to be appropriate or universally 
valid. It showed that citizens are more committed to counter-norms imposed on them through 
a process of social construction, which has resulted in their lack of commitment to EU norms. 
Apart from a lack of external pressure and insistence on EU norms, the lack of popular 
acceptance of universality of EU norms and ideational commitment to domestic norms, are also 




This case study shows that the EU operates on a clear and well-structured normative 
basis, which gives it some credibility as a normative power, but does not ‘predispose’ it to act 
as a normative power (Manners, 2002). Although trust is not explicitly stated to be a core EU 
norm, the EU does preach a message of tolerance and inter-ethnic cooperation which can only 
be based on trust. Moreover, it clearly sees itself as a norm diffuser, even though EU officials 
can be reluctant to specify unacceptable norms very exactly. However, being a norm diffuser is 
still not sufficient to qualify the EU as a normative power, because it fails to act as a normative 
power. I have previously argued that this uncoupling of the EU’s identity as a normative power 
on one hand, and its behaviour as a rationalist power on the other hand, can be attributed to the 
weak self-perception of a normative power. As some evidence in this Chapter shows, and as I 
argued in Chapter IV, the EU’s normative role is more prominently expressed at higher levels 
of policy-making and within the EU’s political bodies, such as the European Parliament. 
However, that self-perception fades away at the technical level. Although most of the EU 
representatives are aware of the importance of EU norms and believe they are present in 
everything the EU does, they fail to see their explicit role as norm-entrepreneurs. 
 
The EU fails to see the exceptional nature of democratisation in BiH, which is 
characterised by an exceptional role of nationalism in a very restrictive political context, and 
the role of nationalist elites as ‘gatekeepers’ to the spread of democratic norms. This case study 
showed that the EU officials recognise in a very general way the obstacles to its norms in the 
form of counter-norms and counter-narratives. Moreover, as already stated, the EU has a very 
clear and concrete normative basis upon which to address them; it has resources and instruments 
available. On the other hand, it has also missed some obvious opportunities to promote 
democracy in meaningful ways, and fight back against the spread of counter-norms. The 
inadequacy of the EU response to counter-norms can be attributed to the officials’ perceptions 
of BiH as a society, and their lenience towards the theories of ancient hatreds and perpetuity of 
ethnic divisions. Interviews with EU representatives showed that they assumed nationalist 
rhetoric was deployed simply for the purpose of making gains in domestic politics, rather than 
being harmful to the EU norms or its presence in BiH. Since they saw the issue as being one of 
hostility among different nationalist leaders or political parties, they did not want to intervene 
in case they were seen to be favouring one group over another, and they did not see a need for 
the EU to become involved in the rhetorical warfare in defence of its own norms. This showed 
how poorly the EU is integrated in the local context, and how easily it can isolate itself from 
that context, thus failing to see its own role in strengthening democracy in such a negative and 
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divisive context. This attitude harms the EU legitimacy, which is seen as crucial for norm 
compliance and for the effectiveness of the EU conditionality (Noutcheva, 2009). 
 
Another key argument which I have made throughout this thesis is that the EU 
undermines substantive democracy by its focus on procedural democracy and through the 
extensive use of procedural instruments. I have referred back to this point on several occasions 
in this Chapter, using different examples of narratives employed by Dodik. I have thus argued 
that part of the reason why the EU is weak is also the nature of the instruments at its disposal 
for diffusion of EU norms. These provided more avenues for promoting procedural rather than 
substantive democracy. The EU efforts go only as far as engaging in encouraging norm 
emergence, without following through with compliance and internalisation. It can thus be said 
that the EU mechanisms of norm diffusion come short of substantive engagement. The absence 
of deliberate application of mechanisms that would trigger processes of social construction 
revealed that the EU does not strategically approach normative compliance in BiH. Given 
Dodik’s popularity one must conclude that his subversions of procedural and substantive 
democratisation have successfully placed obstacles in the way of substantive internalisation of 
norms.  
 
An argument also needs to be made that many of the above factors are due to a lack of 
perception among the EU officials that they play a role in substantive democratisation. Most of 
them see themselves as ‘acquis-entrepreneurs’ rather than as ‘norm-entrepreneurs’ in the sense 
used by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) or Checkel (2001, 2005) (as discussed in Chapter V). 
One senior EC official said to me in his interview: “Democratic values are intrinsic to the 
Acquis, and the Acquis remains the basis for promotion of EU values. EU values and the Acquis 
are inseparable” (“Personal interview with a senior EU official in Brussels,” 2012). This implies 
a very technical approach to monitoring the implementation of the technical criteria, while 
normative and substantive criteria are seen as too abstract and not within their remit.  
 
This brings me to the core of the understanding of the inadequacies of the EU response 
to the challenges to its normative power in BiH. In Chapter IV I referred to this phenomenon 
as the EU’s ‘confused international identity’. That confusion, I have argued, is a result of the 
way in which various EU actors see their own role in BiH, and how they see the role of the EU. 
Although examples used in this Chapter did not show as many discrepancies in the views of 
various EU actors as examples in Chapter IV did, it can be argued nonetheless that the 
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underlying thinking behind the approach of all EU actors to problems in BiH is essentially 
rationalist, while the challenges to the EU’s normative power are clearly social constructivist. 
The EU treats nationalist elites as rationalist actors who would be prepared to make rationalist 
choices based on a simple cost-benefit calculation. However, the nationalist elites actually 
engage in social-constructivist projects of constructing counter-norms and creating various 
obstacles to the diffusion of EU norms. Responding to a social-constructivist project with 
rationalist instruments is what confuses the EU’s international identity in this case, disabling 
the EU influences against the nationalist rhetoric. The ultimate evidence in support of this 
conclusion is the response of an overwhelming majority of EU officials that Dodik’s rhetoric is 
simply utility for winning elections, and it has no wider or more permanent structural 
consequences for the society as a whole, or for the internalisation of EU norms. They see this 
as a matter of concern for domestic politicians in BiH, and not as a challenge to the EU’s 
international identity and its self-perception as a normative power.  
 
Recalling some of the main arguments of different literature on conditionality outlined 
in Chapter IV, it can be said that the EU conditionality is dependent on its legitimacy 
(Noutcheva, 2009), and clarity and consistency of its conditions (Levitsky & Way, 2005). Based 
on the examples analysed in this Chapter it can be said that the EU weakens its own legitimacy, 
while willingly compromising the clarity and consistency of its conditions. To reiterate the point 
made at several places in this Chapter, the EU fails to see that the prospect of membership, 
especially given how distant a goal, is not necessarily in the interest of the nationalist elites in 
BiH. Moreover, the EU miscalculates and underestimates the real interests of nationalist elites, 
which enables them to manipulate EU requirements (Vachudova, 2014). The result, in the case 
of diffusion of trust as a norm, is low or no compliance. This EU norm is diffused and promoted, 
but no transformation or internalisation takes place because the obstacles to norm diffusions are 
insurmountable for the EU’s unprincipled conditionality, and unrealistic in the absence of any 
concerted and well-targeted sanctions. This leads me to return to one final argument made in 
Chapter IV that is pertinent to the case study analysed in this Chapter. One critical prerequisite 
for meaningful change, which the EU resolutely dismisses, but which worked in Slovakia, 
Croatia, and Serbia, is the removal of a stigmatised charismatic leader, which would open up 










My main three hypotheses are that the EU lacks perception that it is a normative power, 
which is why it is not predisposed to act normatively; that BiH is an ‘eclectically unsuccessful 
democracy’ which poses exceptional impediments to the EU-sponsored democratisation; and 
that the EU fails to recognise the exceptionalism of BiH, which is why it extensively relies on 
a ‘cookie-cutter approach’. In the previous Chapter I put more emphasis on the exceptional role 
of nationalism, and the EU’s shortcomings in counter-acting those influences, as well as the 
lack of perception among EU actors that the EU is a normative power. In this Chapter the 
emphasis is put on the EU’s ‘cookie-cutter approach’, and I provide further evidence to the 
argument that the EU’s over-reliance on a procedural approach undermines substantive 
democratisation in BiH. Nonetheless, I account for many examples of dominance of 
nationalism, and the exceptionalism of politics in BiH, which cannot be even partly divorced 
from the arguments about the EU as an actor.  
 
Whereas in Chapter IV I discussed the most recent failed attempts to find a solution for 
the problem of implementation of the Sejdić/Finci ruling, in this Chapter I return to this example 
in order to look at both the procedural and substantive aspects of earlier efforts to implement 
the ECHR ruling. I do so by looking at that example through the perspective of participation as 
a substantive dimension of the quality of democracy in BiH. To remind, Dervo Sejdić, a Roma, 
and Jakob Finci, a Jew, appealed before ECHR against provisions of the BiH Constitution that 
prevent them from running for Presidency. The Constitution allows only Serbs from Republika 
Srpska, and Croats and Bosniacs residing in Federation of BiH the right to stand for elections 
to the State Presidency and to be represented in the House of Peoples (the upper Chamber of 
the BiH Parliament). The ECHR ruled in 2009 that the provisions of Annex IV of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement, which is the Constitution of BiH, discriminates against all individuals who 
do not ethnically declare themselves as Serbs, Croats or Bosniacs. Although the main 
responsibility for the failure to implement the ruling rests with domestic elites in BiH, this 
example is nonetheless tribute to the EU’s failed ‘cookie-cutter approach’. While looking more 
closely at the EU, I return to arguments made in Chapter IV about the lack of legitimacy and 
inconsistency in applying EU conditionality, as well as the limited appeal of EU norms to the 
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nationalist elites which seek to preserve the status quo. Although the EU clearly stated that the 
progress of BiH on the road to the EU will be subject to the implementation of the ECHR ruling, 
the failure to find a solution in the next two election cycles is evidence that this could not be a 
matter of simple cost-benefit calculation.  
 
Within the broader notion of political participation, and while looking into this example, 
this Chapter focuses on the concept of political equality and the EU’s mechanisms of diffusion 
of this norm. This Chapter looks at ways in which the EU has engaged in promoting equality 
as a part of its normative basis, which mechanisms it has deployed to that end, and how the 
underlying scope conditions have enabled or disabled EU efforts in norm promotion. Using the 
research approach described earlier, I identified procedural and substantive subversions of the 
basic political equality in order to describe discriminatory political context and inequalities in 
access to political participation it creates. At the core of my argument about subversions of 
democracy in BiH is discrimination, defined in the basic sense of unequal access to political 
participation. In the following sections I will put special emphasis on two distinct aspects of 
equality – equality in the sense of instrumental participation, and equality as an element of 
substantive democracy. Following closely my research approach, I first present the case study 
then discuss theoretical propositions on equality, and finally I run my assessment of the EU’s 
approach to equality as a substantive dimension of democratic quality.  
 
Description of the Case Study - The ECHR Ruling in the Sejdić/Finci Case 
 
 Dervo Sejdić is of Roma and Jakob Finci of Jewish origin, both citizens of BiH. 
On February 10, 2006 and January 3, 2007, they received written confirmation from the Central 
Election Commission that they were ineligible to stand for election to the Presidency and the 
House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly because they do not fulfil the criteria of ethnic 
origin. Upon originally challenging this situation in the domestic courts, they appealed to the 
ECHR. Sejdić and Finci argued that despite possessing experience comparable to that of the 
highest elected officials, they were prevented by the Constitution of BiH and the Election Law 
from being candidates for the Presidency and the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary 
Assembly. They appealed against prohibition to participate in public life, which is in violation 
of Article 14 ECHR (non-discrimination) taken together with Article 3 of Protocol No.1 ECHR 
(right to free elections), as well as Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 ECHR (general prohibition of 
discrimination). By a vote of 14 votes to three, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
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Human Rights found that the applicants' continued ineligibility to stand for election to the 
House of Peoples of BiH lacked an objective and reasonable justification and was therefore 
discriminatory. The Court also held, by 16 votes to one, that there had been a violation of Article 
1 of Protocol 12 as regards the applicants' ineligibility to stand for election to the Presidency of 
BiH. This case is the first ruling by the Court under Protocol 12. 
  
This landmark ruling strikes at the heart of the power-sharing arrangements established 
under the Dayton Peace Agreement and assesses the compatibility of constitutional mechanisms 
with the fundamental principle of non-discrimination in the EU normative basis. Dervo Sejdić 
and Jakob Finci are not excluded explicitly because they are of Roma or Jewish origin, but 
implicitly because they do not belong to ‘constituent’ peoples. The system was reinforced by a 
decision of the BiH Constitutional Court which gave the three ethnic groups the status of 
‘constitutent’ peoples. Any individuals who thus do not declare themselves as belonging to 
‘constituent’ peoples are discriminated against through the design of the electoral system, or 
excluded simply by virtue of not declaring themselves as one of the ‘constitutent’ peoples. Such 
an electoral system excludes all individuals who fall within the following categories: Serbs 
living in Federation of BiH, Bosniacs and Croats living in the RS, individuals belonging to one 
of the 17 minorities (as described by the Constitutional Court) (2000), individuals whose 
parents belong to two different ethnic groups (unless they themselves decide to declare as 
belonging to either), any other individuals not declaring themselves as belonging to any of the 
three ethnic groups. 
 
 This is also the case with the status of Slaviša Šućur (2011) a member of the 
House of Representatives of FBiH, and a Serb living in Federation. He does not qualify to run 
for the Presidency or to be represented in the State House of Peoples as a Serb residing in the 
Federation. Even though he declares as one of the constituent peoples, he too is discriminated 
against because he does not fulfil the ‘territorial’ criteria to run for the Presidency. Šućur agrees 
that implementation of the ECHR judgement should help restore the protection of individual 
rights and make everyone equal regardless of ethnicity or territory (“Personal interview with 
Slaviša Šućur,” 2011).  
  
Meanwhile, a similar, parallel situation has been addressed through the Court again. On 
20 September 2006, Ilijaz Pilav filed an appeal with the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina against the Ruling of Court of BiH of 10 August 2006, and Decisions of Central 
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Election Commission of 1 August 2006 and of 24 July 2006, which rejected his application for 
candidature for the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, stating that he cannot be elected 
from the territory of Republika Srpska as he declares himself as Bosniac. The cases of Šućur 
and Pilav demonstrate that the problem does not lie only in discriminatory treatment of 
minorities, but in inequality of individual political rights, irrespective of ethnic belonging. 
 
Individual and minority rights in BiH. Ethnic affiliation in former Yugoslavia, 
according to the ECHR, was “decided solely by that person, through a system of self-
classification. Thus, no objective criteria, such as knowledge of a certain language or belonging 
to a specific religion were required” (“Case of Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 
2009, para. 11). The BiH Constitution does not contain criteria on one's ethnicity either, but 
leaves it to the traditional self-classification. In its Partial Decision on the Constituent Peoples 
in BiH, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina recognised that there is a “lack of 
a definition of the status of Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs as constituent peoples…” (2000, para. 
52). This is further affirmed by one section of the Venice Commission Opinion on the BiH 
Election Law (48th Plenary Meeting, 2001), which states that the use of terms Bosniac, Croat 
and Serb “may be more flexible than they appear, as there is no constitutional or legal definition 
of who is a Bosniac, Croat or Serb. Current electoral rules simply require electoral candidates 
to make a declaration as to their ethnicity” (“Opinion on the Electoral Law of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 48th Plenary Meeting,” 2001, para. 21). 
 
In an argument presented by Wheatley (2002), the “regime on minority rights, as part 
of a wider human rights regime, recognises that membership of a minority group is a matter of 
personal choice” (p. 3). The ECHR Judge Hajiyev also makes a point that “in the context of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, ethnic affiliation is not to be taken as a legal category, since it depends 
exclusively on one's self-classification… a subjective criterion” (“Partly concurring and partly 
dissenting opinion of judge Mijović, joined by judge Hajiyev,” 2009, para. 2). Everyone has a 
right to declare ethnicity, but it is not obligatory, neither is it objective. It only matters when a 
person decides to enter political life, whether to vote or to be elected. Ethnic affiliation is thus 
a subjective and political category.  
 
Anyone not declaring themselves as belonging to one of the three ‘constituent’ groups 
falls into the category of ‘others’. Although the category of ‘others’ is recognised in the 
Constitution, they receive what Jakob Finci designated as “treatment of the second class 
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citizens” (“Personal interview with Jakob Finci,” 2011). Dervo Sejdić, the other appellant 
before the ECHR, finds the term ‘others’ in itself offensive and discriminatory. He also believes 
it designates everyone other than constituent peoples as ‘second class citizens’ and states that 
even though “I was born here, my ancestors lived here, I now don’t belong here” (“Personal 
interview with Dervo Sejdić,” 2011). He says this was his motivation for recourse to the Court 
to seek ‘justice’. Finci insists that this question is not about representation of minority groups, 
but equality of individuals and reducing the salience of ethnicity in criteria of political 
participation. That was his motivation for filing an appeal before the ECHR, after he realised 
that political parties were not prepared to voluntarily change the system and there was no other 
visible pressure from the outside. He was not seeking a solution that would positively 
discriminate in favour of minorities, which is dealt with by the BiH Law on Rights of National 
Minorities (2003). His was primarily driven by a motivation to give all individuals equal status 
in terms of the constitution, which would in his view serve to preserve Bosnian plurality and 
diversity.  
 
I thus argue that the core of the issue of ethnic self-declaration is an individual right to 
equal treatment. Wheatley (2002) argues that political equality “demands the recognition of the 
equality of individuals, not groups” (p. 16). According to Jakob Finci (“Personal interview,” 
2011), the Jews are treated as a minority only in a few countries (Croatia being one example), 
while most countries with an ethnically homogenous population treat Jews as citizens of 
different religion, rather than an ethnic minority. He quotes the examples of Serbia where Jews 
are considered Serbian nationals. Finci states that active and passive political participation is a 
matter of individual rights, and it demands that all are treated equally and not as more or less 
equal. He argues that unlike the ‘others’, minorities are not recognised in the Constitution, and 
their rights have been dealt with only since adoption of the Law on Minorities in 2006. But 
Finci sees a problem with the Law on Minorities, which was again drafted by those declaring 
as constituent peoples. The Law in his view weakens the ‘others’ because in legal terms it 
‘breaks up’ a whole group of ‘others’ into smaller units of 17 minorities, which makes them 
politically even less influential.34 
 
                                                 
34 The Law on Minorities requires quite a high threshold for minority representation, so they need to constitute over 3% in 
order to claim minority rights. Finci claims that according to the 1991 census over 240.000 people declared as ‘others’ and 
as such presented a significant political ‘force’ within the population of under 4 million.  
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All the interviewees whose rights are clearly breached put emphasis more on political 
equality as an element which binds the community together and makes up the fabric of what 
they all saw as the ‘specificity’ of Bosnian pluralism. Related to that point is an argument by 
Ben Reilly (2002) that mitigating the ‘destructive patterns of divided societies’ cannot be done 
by ‘replicating existing ethnic divisions in the legislature’, but by ‘reducing the salience of 
ethnicity’ in the electoral system. 
 
The EU position on discrimination in the BiH Constitution. Although the problem 
of discrimination in the BiH Constitution had existed since the Peace Agreement was signed, 
the EU took a more assertive approach in addressing those normative incompatibilities only 
after the ECHR judgement. In this Chapter I argue that in doing so, the EU relied more on 
procedural rather than on substantive instruments of norm diffusion, including heavy reliance 
on conditionality. It will be recalled from Chapter IV that this condition was treated as a 
technical issue between 2009 and 2014, which yielded no compliance. While debating the riddle 
as to whether this is a technical or political issue for years, the EU made several attempts to 
deal with it through procedural instruments, which weakened the EU’s credibility and 
legitimacy. After a series of failed attempts by political leaders to address this and other issues 
of constitutional change, the Head of the EC Delegation threatened that the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement could be suspended if the Constitution was not harmonised in line with 
the ECHR ruling. For a threat like this to be credible, the EU should first have some legacies of 
executing similar threats in the past, which it did not, and also the sanction itself would need to 
be harmful to those against whom it is being applied, which it is not. 
 
Nonetheless, Lady Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the European Union (EU) 
Foreign Policy and Security and Vice President of the European Commission repeated the same 
message while visiting in February 2010. Ashton reminded the public and government that 
constitutional reform was necessary for the further integration process in the EU, and that the 
implementation of the ECHR decision in the Sejdić/Finci case was an opportunity for 
substantial changes of the Constitution (“EU High Representative Catherine Ashton visited 
BiH,” 2010). Meanwhile, because of a political deadlock that followed the October 2010 
elections, the EU member states tacitly agreed to delay the coming into force of the SAA until 
this basic condition was fulfilled, even though all member states had ratified the Agreement by 
the end of 2010. EU officials publicly declared that BiH’s application for membership would 
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not be considered ‘credible’ before they saw a ‘credible effort’ in finding a solution to 
implement the ECHR ruling.  
 
Since then, strong diplomatic efforts by the Council of Europe, EC, EU Presidencies, 
and member states have sought to sustain pressure in order to change this constitutional 
provision, as described in Chapter IV. I argue that although the EU has more leverage and 
instruments at its disposal, in this case it was the CoE that presented itself more robustly as a 
normative power than the EU did. The CoE proved to be more categorical in protection of its 
principles when it comes to discriminatory clauses of the BiH Constitution. The EU, on its part, 
only reinforced the image of an inconsistent player who undermines its own legitimacy. It first 
failed to recognise the real nature of a highly political problem and invested huge efforts in 
dealing with it technically and procedurally, only to reverse in a matter of weeks upon the 
initiative of the UK and German governments.  Although the new approach is better suited to 
address this clearly political problem, it is nonetheless another tribute to the EU’s inconsistency 
and indecisiveness. 
 
Theoretical Propositions on Equality 
 
Using the same route of assessment as in the previous Chapter, in this section I look into 
the theoretical propositions on equality as a dimension of democratic quality. In defining 
political equality Almond and Verba (1998) refer to “the extent to which citizens have an equal 
voice over governmental decisions” (p. 2). Lijphart (1991, p. 2) argues that voting is the most 
basic form of participation and it should be made as equal as possible, while other forms of 
participation are bound to remain unequal. Dahl (2000) looks at equality primarily in terms of 
the access to and utilisation of instruments of participation along the five criteria: voting 
equality, effective participation, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, and 
inclusion of all adult members in collective decisions. He defines political equality as a 
reflection of political participation - "all the members of the association are adequately qualified 
to participate on an equal footing with the others in the process of governing the association" 
(Dahl, 1991, pp. 2–3).  
 
The issue of unequal participation in BiH is not a matter of minority representation. The 
literature on political rights of minorities defines majorities in statistical terms, i.e. as 
constituting over 50% of the population (Hodzic & Stojadinovic, 2011). However, this 
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definition does not apply to BiH in which no ethnic group can be considered an absolute 
majority in the statistical meaning of the word, which is why I argue this perspective needs to 
be supplemented by alternative views of equality. Participation can be viewed from the 
perspective of belonging to the society and being “constitutive of membership in the polity” 
(Almond & Verba, 1989, p. 3). Under ideal circumstances, this understanding of participation 
would benefit BiH in the way in which “political equality builds community: societies are 
bound together by cooperative activity toward shared goals. This is how that precious 
commodity of social capital is formed” (1989, p. 3). Minorities can also exist in the sense of 
victims of open or implicit discrimination, or the status given through the political and 
constitutional system. Although legally and constitutionally the constituent peoples of BiH are 
in most cases guaranteed political rights, in areas and communities where they are statistically 
a minority, they are often subject to implicit or explicit discrimination, not only in political 
rights, but also in terms of social rights, e.g. employment, education, social care, healthcare, 
etc.  
 
Substantive participation would imply a broad normative and behavioural consensus 
that would cut across those cleavages and would result in support for the legitimacy of the 
system (L. Diamond, 1999, p. 65). As argued by Diamond (1999), legitimacy in this sense 
involves more than normative commitment – “it must also be evident and routinised in 
behaviour” (p. 65), which is often not the case in BiH.  
 
However, the definition of participation which is most relevant for this case study is the 
one proposed by Przeworski (2000), who emphasises a neglect of the importance of political 
institutions and state structures in creating opportunities for and influencing the nature of 
political participation. He argues that in places where people emphasise their cultural 
differences, inequality is more likely to be “a consequence of institutional failure rather than a 
cause of it” (Przeworski, 2000, p. 21). Beetham (2003) puts responsibility for protection of 
rights with states - “rights belong to individuals; the duties to protect them reside with states” 
(p. 72).  
  
Having in mind those three perspectives, some propositions can be made about the case-
study analysed in this Chapter. The political exclusion that occurs through the design of the 
electoral system in BiH does not purposefully disadvantage any particular groups, including 
formal minorities, by not protecting their cultural, ethnic, linguistic, or religious distinctiveness. 
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Instead, the problem of political inequality and unequal participation is far more basic – it is 
about an individual right to elect and be elected. The reason why I emphasise this particular 
understanding of equality is because it enables me to highlight discrimination against all 
individuals who are excluded from enjoying full political rights in BiH. The question I thus ask 
is not that of granting special political rights for the protection of minority groups which could 
be achieved through positive discrimination. I rather ask the question of the protection of basic, 
individual, human rights that are breached through the salience of ethnicity in the design of the 
electoral system. This enables me to highlight one of the main hypotheses I have presented so 
far, that the domestic system of norms is incompatible with the EU normative basis. I seek to 
show that restrictions on these rights, particularly on the suspect grounds of race and ethnicity, 
are not only discriminatory, but also undermine the overall compatibility between the normative 
systems of the EU and BiH.  
 
Undermining of Equality 
 
Procedural and substantive subversions of equality.  
 
Procedural subversions of equality. Most of the procedural subversions of equality are 
rooted in the constitutional system, which was made incongruent with the international human 
rights norms in its very design. The very process of reaching peace was compromised by 
dominance of ethnicity in designing the BiH Constitution. Šarčević (2009) argues that through 
the very fact that local negotiators were brought to the table to represent their ethnic groups, 
this gave ‘ethnic groups’ the status of ‘pre-constitutional categories’. In order to provide for the 
interests of three ethnic groups, the DPA was thus designed to give preference to the protection 
of rights of each ethnic collectivity, rather than protecting individual rights or providing a vision 
for the society as a whole. 
 
Due to the demographic consequences of the conflict in BiH, primarily caused by the 
concept of ‘ethnic cleansing’, the ethnic composition of territorial units in BiH has become 
highly homogenous. This has de facto created ethnically homogenous electoral constituencies, 
which create a mirror image of ethnic/territorial divisions at the level of political representation 
in the state, in Presidency, Parliament, as well as in all executive and judicial institutions. 
Šarčević (2009, p. 60) describes this outcome as ‘ethnicisation’ of the BiH constitutional 
system, which in his view was not a cause, but a consequence of the international peace-
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building strategy, as I myself argue. Because the very design of the system was in breach of 
human rights at the very beginning, it was nonetheless kept because the international negotiators 
considered it temporary, yet necessary in sustaining peace, at least until such time when its 
incompatibility with the human rights regime could be addressed. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights in its partial judgement in the Sejdić/Finci case 
confirms that ethnicity-based exclusion was introduced in Dayton in the pursuit of the 
restoration of peace. The Court states: “When the impugned constitutional provisions were put 
in place a very fragile ceasefire was in effect on the ground. The provisions were designed to 
end a brutal conflict marked by genocide and ‘ethnic cleansing’. The nature of the conflict was 
such that the approval of the ‘constituent peoples’ (namely, the Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs) 
was necessary to ensure peace. This could explain, without necessarily justifying, the absence 
of representatives of the other communities (such as local Roma and Jewish communities) at 
the peace negotiations and the participants' preoccupation with effective equality between the 
‘constituent peoples’ in the post-conflict society” (2009, para. 45). Further to the same 
argument, David Campbell maintains that peace negotiators may have desired the reintegration 
of Bosnia, but “their reliance on a powerful set of assumptions about identity, territoriality and 
politics - a particular political anthropology - has meant the ethnic partition of a complex and 
heterogeneous society is the common product of the international community's efforts” (1998, 
p. 395). In the following sections I describe three phenomena, which are the basis for a series 
of procedural subversions of democracy, including: the status of constituent peoples, 
ethnic/racial discrimination, and mechanisms for protection of collective rights. 
 
When it comes to diffusing norms related to equality and human rights, the first obstacle 
faced by the EU is the concept of ‘constituent’ peoples, to which I referred as one of the fault-
lines in Chapter II. The BiH Constitutional Court in its ruling on constituent peoples debates an 
argument proposed in the submission by the BiH government that the disputed constitutional 
provisions were a result of a search for peace and as such require the power-sharing mechanisms 
peculiar to Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, even though the Court recognises a need to have 
found a peace settlement at the time, it nonetheless points out a crucial fact that BiH has since 
then signed and ratified a number of European human rights instruments. The state has thus 
formally accepted European norms and has taken responsibility to implement them. The formal 
conditions for diffusion of norms are thus in place, which shows that powerful resistance to 
their full implementation comes from inside the system itself. The ECHR thus refers to the 
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Opinions of the Venice Commission which demonstrate that alternative mechanisms of power-
sharing could be designed which do not automatically lead to the total exclusion of 
representatives of the other communities (“Draft Opinion on the constitutional situation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the powers of the High Representative,” 2005). 
 
The specific language in the BiH Election Law (2001), which regulates this principle 
states the following: “the declaration of affiliation with a particular 'constituent people' or the 
group of 'others' … shall be used for purposes of the exercise of the right to hold an elected or 
appointed position for which such declaration is required in the election cycle”. Should a 
candidate choose not to declare affiliation to a 'constituent people' the Election Law states that 
“such failure to declare affiliation shall be considered as a waiver of the right to hold an elected 
or appointed position for which such declaration is required” (“BiH Election Law,” 2001, sec. 
4.19 & 5 –7). 
 
Incompatibility of this principle with EU norms is expressed by the ECHR which 
observed that “The applicants, who describe themselves to be of Roma and Jewish origin 
respectively and who do not wish to declare affiliation with a “constituent people”, are, as a 
result, excluded” (“Case of Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2009, para. 45). On 
this very point, the ECHR, based on applicants’ submissions to the Court that they are 
discriminated against based on their ethnic origin, establishes that the concepts of ethnicity and 
race are related: “Whereas the notion of race is rooted in the idea of biological classification of 
human beings into subspecies on the basis of morphological features such as skin colour or 
facial characteristics, ethnicity has its origin in the idea of societal groups marked in particular 
by common nationality, religious faith, shared language, or cultural and traditional origins and 
backgrounds. Discrimination on account of a person's ethnic origin is a form of racial 
discrimination” (“Case of Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2009, para. 43). The 
ECHR resorted to definitions of racial and ethnic discrimination provided by The International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which establishes that 
the term 'racial discrimination' means “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference 
based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field 
of public life” (“International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 




In Chapters II and III, I described the mechanisms of protection of ‘national interests’, 
which are designed to provide protection only to constituent ethnic groups against majority 
decisions by others, and include various and numerous veto points that often obscure the 
decision-making process. This procedural subversion of equality is emphasised by the Venice 
Commission Opinion on the BiH Election Law, which states that “in a multi-ethnic State such 
as Bosnia it appears also legitimate to ensure that a State organ reflects the multi-ethnic 
character of society. The problem is however the way in which the territorial and the ethnic 
principle are combined” (2001, para. 17). In its 2005 opinion on the constitutional situation in 
BiH, the Venice Commission found that “the combined effect of these provisions… makes 
effective government extremely difficult, if not impossible” (“Draft Opinion on the 
constitutional situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the powers of the High Representative,” 
2005, para. 29). Šarčević (2009, p. 68) affirms that the extension of the effects of veto powers 
on the House of Representatives, and the cumulative effect of the required approval by the 
House of Peoples, deprives the House of Representatives of its legitimacy as representatives of 
citizens.  
 
In reference to the actual incompatibilities with the European norms, the Venice 
Commission says that “granting precisely to those people who are already dominant such a veto 
and not to small groups requiring protection is a questionable practice” (“Opinion on the Draft 
Amendments to the BiH Constitution Bosnia and Herzegovina, CDL-AD (2006)019:,” 2006, 
para. 21). This mechanism is thus the opposite of what is meant by ‘treating unequal situation 
differently’, because it actually makes the system unequal in favour of majorities, rather than 
boosting the representation and protection of the rights of minorities or individuals.  In that 
sense, this example shows incompatibility with the European treatment of minorities at the very 
basic level of their exclusion from the electoral process and depriving them of basic protection 
mechanisms in the decision-making system, while using those same mechanisms to strengthen 
the already dominant position of ‘constituent’ peoples. 
 
Substantive subversions of equality. Substantive subversions of equality are described 
in terms of three phenomena: the lack of political commitment, construction of conspiracy 




Following the ECHR judgement delivered on 22 December 2009, the BiH Council of 
Ministers (CoM) passed a decision on 11 February 2010 and tasked three ministers (Human 
Rights, Civil Affairs and Justice) to prepare an action plan for implementation of the judgement 
within 20 days. Following that step, on 4 March 2010 the Council of Ministers set up a formal 
Working Group composed again of the three ministers plus representatives of the seven party 
caucuses represented in the BiH House of Representatives, who were instructed to draft relevant 
constitutional amendments by 29 March with a view to amending the Election Law by 15 April, 
so that the general elections scheduled for October 2010 could take place according to the new 
rules.  
 
The ECHR ruling received enormous media attention and the pressure by the 
international community intensified in its aftermath. According to representatives from the 
European Commission Delegation and those from the Council of Europe (Personal interviews 
with high ranking officials from both representations), the working group itself was created 
under some international pressure and under the spotlight of the media and civil society. 
However, the very composition of this working group went against the nature of the ECHR 
ruling. Namely, according to the current constitutional and legal provisions ministerial positions 
are allocated based on ethnic quotas among the constituent peoples,35 so the three Ministers that 
were appointed to the working group represented constituent peoples, and in this case they were 
each selected in order to ensure equal ethnic representation on behalf of the government - 
Human Rights (Bosniac), Civil Affairs (Serb) and Justice (Croat). None of the seven 
parliamentary party representatives came from a minority group. Neither did the Working 
Group include representatives of the Minorities Council, which formally has an advisory role 
to the Parliament of BiH. According to Finci (“Personal interview,” 2011), this in itself showed 
the lack of interest on the part of the ruling parties to involve so called ‘others’ in the process 
of finding a solution to the problem of their political participation and representation.  
 
In protest against such composition of the working group, a designated representative 
of the Social Democratic Party, Mirjana Malić (“Personal interview,” 2009) resigned at the very 
first meeting of the working group and did not take part in further meetings. She stated that the 
working group was an attempt by the Council of Ministers to shift responsibility for 
implementation of the ECHR ruling on to Parliament. Her interpretation of the decision is that 
                                                 
35 The only exception ever was the Foreign Minister, Mr. Sven Alkalaj, who is Jewish. 
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it is the ‘government’ which has been tasked with finding a solution for implementation of the 
decision, i.e. the Council of Ministers, as it was the government which was the subject of the 
appeal before the Court and ultimately the Court’s ruling. On top of this, she claims that the 
Council of Ministers had no legal authority to pass a decision which prescribed which parties 
represented in the Parliament would participate in the working group. This responsibility rests 
solely with Parliament which decides on formation of its own working bodies. In her view, the 
very set up of the working group showed that there was no genuine commitment to address this 
issue and the whole attempt was only intended to satisfy the form and silence criticisms. Jakob 
Finci believes there was no direct pressure from any international institution to set-up a working 
group, but there was a general understanding that setting the process into motion would please 
the international community and would be viewed as something positive. 
 
The lack of commitment to find a solution was further demonstrated through the 
functioning of the working group. Three meetings were held during March 2010 and before the 
deadline expired. In the first meeting the working group debated rules of procedure, the second 
time they met to request written proposals of constitutional amendments, and finally met on 
March 29, and concluded that no written proposals had been received. It took the Council of 
Ministers a further four weeks to acknowledge the conclusion of the working group and demand 
a new action plan. On April 29, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) 
held an urgent debate on ‘the urgent need for constitutional reform in BiH’ and adopted 
Resolution 1725 calling for the setting-up of a domestic, institutionalised constitutional reform 
process (“Urgent need for constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2010). The PACE 
Resolution recognised some of the flaws in the attempt to implement the ECHR judgement and 
thus recommended that an “institutionalised process, based on a clear political mandate, should 
seek to involve a broad range of domestic legal experts, in order to make a comprehensive 
analysis of all existing proposals and produce a package of concrete amendments which would 
generate consensus among the key political stakeholders” (2010, para. 6).  
 
Meanwhile, the working group was used as yet another platform for inter-party 
confrontations and creation of further political divisions. It thus became clear through the 
statements of members of the working group that two separate visions of the problem had 
crystallised through this process. Dušanka Majkić, a Serb from the party of Independent Social 
Democrats from RS, thus stated that “representatives of Croats and Bosniacs in the working 
group do not care about implementation of the judgement, but only care about opening a wide 
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range of constitutional issues, which is unacceptable to us Serb representatives” (“Radna 
skupina bez dogovora,” 2010). Even though she was herself appointed to represent a 
parliamentary party and not to represent ethnicities, Majkić showed that members of the group 
identified themselves primarily as representatives of ethnic groups and were there to protect 
their own ethnic interests. RS President Dodik also portrayed the issue in terms of ‘us and them’, 
and said “we agree to find a solution, if Sarajevo agrees” (“Milorad Dodik Press Statement,” 
2010).  
 
After a meeting in Banja Luka, Milorad Dodik and HDZ leader Dragan Čović stated 
that the ‘political atmosphere’ was not favourable to constitutional changes, and this question 
should not be addressed until after elections (“Nije realizovana odluka u slučaju Sejdić- Finci,” 
2010). This position meant that political leaders consciously delayed decision until after 
elections even though holding elections based on old rules was a clear breach of the ECHR 
ruling which had already come into force. According to Finci (“Personal interview,” 2011), this 
showed a degree of arrogance on the part of representatives of constituent peoples, who 
managed to find an ‘ethnic’ interest for each of the constituent peoples that were anyway in a 
majority, on an issue that was otherwise concerned with the rights of those whose representation 
was restricted to begin with. Debate has since then polarised between Serbs who want 
minimalist changes to the Constitution that would take off the discriminatory label, and 
Bosniacs and to some degree Croats who saw the ECHR judgement as an opportunity for an 
overhaul of the system that would remove wide-scale discrimination across the board. The lack 
of interest and commitment to find a solution was recognised by PACE, which called “the key 
political stakeholders to engage in meaningful and constructive dialogue about concrete 
proposals for constitutional amendments” (“PACE Resolution 1701 - Functioning of 
democratic institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2010, para. 9).  
 
Following the PACE Resolution, one more attempt was made and the group met for the 
fourth time on May 5, the actual deadline when the Election Commission announced General 
Elections. This meeting was held upon strong suggestions from the CoE representatives, and a 
Special Representative of the Secretary General of the CoE was present at the meeting in order 
to communicate conclusions of the PACE Resolution. The meeting, however, did not result in 
an agreement. In respect to this effort the CoE Sixteenth Report (June 2009–May 2010) 
monitoring the compliance with obligations and commitments and implementation of the post-
accession co-operation programme noted: “Despite the stated readiness of the authorities and 
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the apparent consensus among the key stakeholders in the country, that the Sejdić and Finci 
judgement must be implemented, no serious discussions took place within the working group. 
Each party tabled its own, sometimes opposing, proposals of constitutional reforms with no 
‘meaningful negotiations’ on the amendments” (Council of Europe, 2010, para. 31). 
 
The working group scheduled ten more meetings between May and October 2010, six 
of which could not be held due to a lack of quorum, three finished inconclusively, and in the 
final meeting Dušanka Majkić opposed adoption of the agenda, which included draft acts for 
establishment of a body for constitutional reform, arguing that the working group only had a 
mandate to propose amendments to the Constitution and electoral law to implement the Sejdić 
and Finci judgement and not to instigate formation of new bodies. She was supported by the 
other three Serb members of the working group, so the agenda could not be adopted. No further 
attempts to formally address this issue were made in the nine months following the October 
elections. The media in BiH generally take this working group as an example of insincere 
attempts to address a reform issue.  
 
The ECHR made it certain that the BiH Constitution would need to be changed sooner 
or later and the EU and CoE sent that message very clearly. Even though the ruling itself 
extensively elaborates that what needs to be changed is the treatment of equality and 
participation in the broadest sense, the negotiations on constitutional reform that ensued 
resulted in gradual narrowing down of the interpretation of the ECHR ruling. The EU itself 
contributed to this restrictive interpretation. When the EU Council conclusions were adopted, 
indicating that execution of the judgement would be a condition for entry into force of the SAA 
and further EU progress, the tone of the discussions shifted more and more towards the second 
priority - respecting the legal order and executing the judgement first and ending 
discrimination/violation second (and in an increasingly narrow sense related only to the 
confines of the judgement HoP and Presidency). One very senior EU official said to me in an 
off the record conversation that the EU was primarily interested in BiH fulfilling conditions for 
submitting its membership application, and that they were prepared to accept any solution, 
however minimalist. He also admitted that the CoE has a different position on this, but that 
interpretation of the EU conditionality was ultimately the EU’s own responsibility. With the 
EU taking the lead it had a tendency to cut off other institutional frameworks, both in BiH and 
internationally, from exerting pressure or contributing to the process. The CoE Committee of 
Ministers, Parliamentary Assembly and other human rights monitoring instruments slowed 
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down or averted their attention from the matter in order to "give space" to the EC led process, 
the Venice Commission avoided directly addressing the case and instead provided advisory 
services.  The CoE was not involved in any formal negotiations on the ruling that ensued. In 
order to understand what the implications are of either approach, narrow or wide, it is necessary 
to look at the content of the minimalist solution, as well as the broader interpretation of 
constitutional reform. 
 
Instead of the current system in which a Serb member of the Presidency is elected from 
Republika Srpska, and a Bosniac and Croat from Federation of BiH, Milorad Dodik proposed 
a solution in which one member of the Presidency would be elected from Republika Srpska and 
two from Federation, without prescribing the nationality of any of them (“Dodik - Slučaj 
Sejdić/Finci se može brzo riješiti,” n.d.). The Constitution in this case would, however, 
prescribe that no two members of the Presidency should be from the same constituent peoples 
or ‘others’. Because Republika Srpska is ethnically homogenous, this would in effect mean that 
although candidates from any other ethnic groups (all of which are in minority in RS) could 
formally run for the Presidency, the likelihood would be that the successful candidate would 
almost certainly be a Serb. This decision would be difficult to implement because it is based on 
an assumption that the final selection of candidates would not be ultimately decided by the 
actual number of votes, but through a process that would need to ensure that no two candidates 
come from the same peoples. In effect, this would mean that if a Serb residing in Federation 
was the most successful candidate in that part of the country, and there was another Serb elected 
from the territory of the RS, one of them would need to be eliminated.  
 
In contacts with European representatives, Milorad Dodik made it clear that his only 
concern was eliminating obstacles for further EU integration and not the respect for human 
rights per se.36 A number of statements he gave after meeting EU officials showed that he was 
only paying lip service to the demands to change constitution and shared little concern for the 
respect of human rights. Following a meeting with the German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 
Berlin, Dodik stated “our approach is clear and I have explained it, that we need to eliminate 
discrimination and ensure constitutional change takes place in line with the ruling” (“Dodik: 
                                                 
36 As the following sections will explain, although no formal decision was passed by any EU institution, the EU assumed an 
approach after the ECHR was not implemented before the October 2010 elections that the SAA which had since been ratified 
by all member states, would not come into force before the ruling was implemented. This position was based on the fact that 
Article 2. of the Interim Agreement between BiH and the EU demands respect of human rights, and the EU interpreted the 
lack of an agreement in this case as a breach of that Article. 
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Njemačka ima fer odnos prema BiH,” 2011). What this statement meant in the context of 
different constitutional proposals was that he would agree to amendments that would eliminate 
discrimination in the strictest sense, but was not prepared to agree to wider changes that would 
improve the treatment of human rights and rights of minorities in the Constitution. His main 
motivation was to fulfil EU conditionality and avoid sanctions, and not necessarily to improve 
the status of ‘others’ in a substantive sense.  
 
This was also evident from a statement he gave following a meeting with the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of Sweden Carl Bildt in Banja Luka, when Dodik stressed that by “resolving 
these issues BiH would gain additional credibility and possibility to apply for the candidate 
status in the EU by the end of the year” (“Press release, Office of the RS President,” 2011). In 
a meeting with the EU Enlargement Commissioner Štefan Füle, Dodik emphasised the fact that 
implementation of the ruling was a condition for submission of BiH’s application for EU 
membership (“Dodik: Evrointegracije uz ojačanu autonomiju RS,” 2011). He spoke in the same 
vein in a meeting with Renzo Daviddi, acting Head of the EU Delegation in BiH at the time 
(“Daviddi - Pitanje referenduma u RS vrlo iritantno u ovom trenutku,” 2011). Unlike Dodik, 
the leader of the Serb Democratic Party, Mladen Bosić emphasised that this issue was about 
'the respect of human rights’. However, even he limited the interpretation of the ECHR ruling 
by adding that “if anyone thinks that based on this judgement we would enter fundamental 
changes of the Dayton Agreement, they are heading for a situation which would block progress” 
(“Statement by Mladen Bosić,” 2010). As I will show in the following sections, and as became 
evident in subsequent attempts to negotiate a solution, the EU gradually subscribed to this view 
and made it clear that a minimalist solution would be sufficient for unblocking the SAA 
enforcement. In cases like this, proposed solutions are not really aimed at ‘internalising’ a norm, 
but rather at satisfying the form and silencing foreign pressures. In regard to the character of 
norm, this example shows that however prominent and salient a norm may be, its effects can 
still be moderated by localising the norm, i.e. by proposing solutions which accommodate the 
European norms to the domestic context, instead of the other way around. In a procedural sense 
it could then be claimed that the norm has been accepted, but in reality division and inequalities 
would still persist.  
 
Speaking in a conference held on 2 December 2010 entitled “How to implement the 
ECHR judgement in the Sejdić/Finci case?” and organised by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation 
in Sarajevo, President of the Party of Democratic Action Sulejman Tihić said that this issue is 
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only ‘the tip of the iceberg’. For him, the gist of the problem is in fact that discrimination is 
widespread and abundant. Two of the so called ‘Croat parties’, HDZ and HDZ1990, both 
argued that this is primarily about the respect of human rights, but each emphasised different 
aspects of it. HDZ president Dragan Čović said that “it needs to be said again: this is BiH, we 
have to protect the spirit of BiH“ (2010). He clarified this by saying that constitutional reforms 
need to respect the 'individual and collective identity of Bosnian citizens’. Božo Ljubić pledged 
for new definitions of collective and individual rights, and argued that abolishment of 
discrimination of the ‘others’ will not be sufficient, and that it is also necessary to improve the 
status of Croats, whom he sees as unequal to Serbs and Bosniacs in many respects (Kovačević, 
2010). In the view of SDP Vice-President, Lidija Korač, citizens bear the consequences of the 
lack of respect for international agreements and the issue of discrimination needs to be 
addressed, while the collective rights of constituent peoples need to be protected too (“Personal 
interview,” 2010). She believes such solutions exist and they need to be designed in a way to 
prevent any future discrimination on the same basis. Specifically, she referred to the case of 
Ilijaz Pilav, who had also filed an appeal before the ECHR because as a Bosniac residing in the 
RS, he cannot run for the Presidency of BiH. 
 
When I interviewed Jakob Finci he said that from his perspective it looked like the 
parties had said “yes, we want to do something about it, but we do not know how” (“Personal 
interview,” 2011). He believes there is a general political will to address the issue, but that all 
parties would prefer if someone would impose the decision on their behalf so that they would 
not need to take responsibility for changing the system. In an interview given to a radio station, 
Finci said that “everyone is trying to achieve their ulterior goals, and they do so by taking 
advantage of the ECHR ruling” (Karabeg, 2011). He built on this statement by explaining to 
me that the sudden outbursts of political will were only a result of the fact that the pressure had 
been taken off when the next elections were announced. This gave parties another four years to 
find a solution. In the absence of that pressure an agreement would not be a hard sell for the 
public, and parties would probably see it as less harmful to reach an agreement so far ahead of 
the next election campaign.  
 
Dervo Sejdić, on the other hand, was more sceptical of the will of the political parties 
to resolve this issue. He admits he has never heard any politician speak openly against the 
ECHR ruling, but thinks that there is ‘silent resistance’, particularly having in mind that “all 
proposals that came from minority groups have so far been rejected” (“Personal interview,” 
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2011). Budryte (2008, p. 160) points to a similar situation in Lithuania, where poor legislation 
was adopted due to the fact that legislation drafters did not have ‘effective consultation with the 
Roma community’.  
 
Construction of counter-norms. At this point in the previous Chapter I included a 
section which showed how domestic elites, based on subversions of democracy, were able to 
deliberately construct counter-norms. Counter norms were created in order to obstruct diffusion 
of EU norms. In this Chapter, however, rather that repeating the point about counter-norms, I 
used evidence from the sections on subversions of democracy to identify mechanisms which 
also serve the purpose of obstructing diffusion of EU norms. I believe this part of my research 
and analysis has revealed some influences that are distinct and novel: 
 
- Rationalisation of subversions - Appropriateness of the European norms as an element 
of persuasion and conviction was counteracted by rationalisation of norm subversions. 
- Norm contextualisation - This process was supported by localisation of norms, i.e. 
processes of adapting the international norm to the domestic context and ascribing it a 
new meaning. European norms were de-internationalised, and contextualised with the 
local frame of reference, i.e. domestic elites managed to impose their ‘world view’ on 
their international interlocutors. 
- ‘Demonising’ norms - In regards to the origin of norms, the construction of conspiracy 
theories in which promotion of EU norms was portrayed as a threat ascribed European 
norms a negative meaning. This enabled domestic elites to ‘demonise’ European norms 
and strengthen resistance against them. 
- Norm re-construction - Apart from the negative meaning, in some instances, European 
norms were ascribed alternative meanings, which I describe as ‘norm re-construction’. 
This was particularly clear from the evidence about different leaders’ positions on 
implementation of the ECHR ruling. Some interpreted it in a very narrow sense, which 
would possibly eliminate discrimination in the strictest sense, but would not improve 
the status of minorities. Others interpreted it in a very wide sense, which would not only 
implement the ruling itself, but would produce a domino effect in other related 
legislation. To be able to that, leaders resorted to the process of norm re-construction 
through which they ascribed to this norm a different meaning or interpretation. 
- Norm relativisation – Domestic actors presenting European efforts to diffuse a norm as 
over-exaggerated, and European norms as less important than local norms. Relativising 
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a norm can help relieve public pressure if portrayed as not affecting citizens lives 
significantly or directly. 
- Disowning norms – This was a part of the process of shifting the blame. In one instance 
there were attempts to shift the responsibility for norm implementation between 
Government and Parliament, whereas there were also attempts to shift the responsibility 
onto the international community. 
- Unspecifying norms – one of the important properties of the norm character is its 
specificity and clarity. The more specificity a norm has, the more chances it has to be 
internalised. As I already argued, in the case of equality, one of the key strengths of EU 
efforts was the clarity and specificity of the norm itself and its supporting legal 
framework. This fact was counteracted by attempts to un-specify the norm and to 
present it as vague, inconclusive, and unaccommodating to the local context in order to 
reduce the chances of its diffusion and internalisation. 
- Re-focusing norms – The focus on the norm content that is required if appealing to norm 
appropriateness or its clarity, specificity and other features of norm character, was 
replaced by the focus on the process of norm implementation. This was initially an effort 
by domestic elites, but it was soon followed by the CoE and EU, which then formalised 
the focus on the process through conditionality, rather than content. The ‘credible effort’ 
became a requirement for further accession, rather than implementation of the norm 
itself. This was done in order to avoid sanctions.  
- Out-voicing norm entrepreneurs – the timing of the norm promotion (election 
campaign) enabled domestic elites to out-voice European norm entrepreneurs by the 
powerfulness of their rhetoric and by diverting attention to more emotionally powered 
issues. This was done in a similar fashion to the case on trust. 
 
Conclusion – subversions of equality/participation. As became evident from the 
examples on subversion of democracy, compliance with the EU or European norms is hampered 
by dominance and excessive protection of ethnic interests of the three constituent peoples, 
discrimination against all who do not declare as such, as well as by the complex decision-
making process at the State level. The design of the decision-making system based on ethnic 
power-sharing creates imperatives of protection of ethnic interests. Because ethnic power-
sharing is replicated onto all mechanisms where decisions are required, participants in those 
structures assume the role of ethnic groups’ representatives and identify primarily in terms of 
their ethnic belonging. This blinds them to the ‘greater good’ and interests of the country as a 
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whole, particularly in the context of EU integrations. The identity of Members of Parliament 
and Government as representatives of ethnic groups thus prevails over their role of political 
appointees representing citizens and constituencies.  
 
Properties of domestic institutions influenced actor behaviour during the effort to 
implement the ECHR judgement by channelling political positions into a rhetorical divide, 
which in my hypotheses I identified as a ‘normative gap’ between domestic structures and the 
EU – on one side there is the EU normative basis that contains clear human rights standards, 
and on the other side is a discriminatory electoral system that gives preference to collective 
over individual rights. This normative gap is manifest through the salience of ethnicity in the 
power-sharing system, and through a paradox that changing the electoral system requires the 
support of the very parties whom the system currently favours. Both of these manifestations 
create resistance to diffusion of EU norms. The result is a complex, inefficient and often 
ineffective legislative process that at best produces legislation that contains lowest common 
denominators based on compromises between different ethnic interests. The ineffectiveness of 
the decision-making process is particularly relevant in regard to the adoption of EU legislation, 
which is often blocked by ethnic veto mechanisms in spite being previously accepted as a 
commitment through the accession process. An example of this is the fact that during 2010, the 
State Parliament passed 27 laws in total, only three of which were requirements for EU 
integration (Foreign Policy Initiative BH, 2010). 
 
The EU Approach to Promoting Equality/Participation in BiH 
 
As stated at the beginning of this Chapter, I have put stronger emphasis in this Chapter 
on the assessment of the EU's procedural and ‘cookie-cutter approach’ to the promotion of 
equality and participation as norms in a democratic society. This was a typical case of the EU’s 
conditionality, both in the way it was designed, but also in the way in which it failed to produce 
compliance. The Sejdić/Finci case is also useful as an example because it shows the extent of 
the international attention that could hardly be reciprocated in future. The number of 
international institutions engaging in the Sejdić/Finci case and intensity of their efforts rapidly 
increased following the ECHR ruling. Up until that point, the issue of unequal participation and 
representation was widely recognised by most international actors on the ground, but it was 
originally the Council of Europe that was most prominently engaged in raising the issue of 
compliance of the BiH Constitution with human rights conventions. However, it was only after 
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the ECHR ruling that this issue obtained a true 'European' label and prominence among other 
EU required reforms. Until then, constitutional reform was an issue that was strongly promoted 
primarily by the US. 
 
The issue was brought to the fore within the domestic public domain in 2006 through a 
US-led effort to change the Constitution, subsequently known as the April package, to which I 
have already referred in Chapter II. The project embarked upon a mission to engage as many 
local political leaders in a reform effort to change the Constitution. Through a consultative 
process involving many political actors, and also by organising public debates throughout the 
country, they came up with a comprehensive package that had the support of most political 
parties and got the full backing of the international community. One of the most important 
changes it proposed was to abolish discrimination and introduce mechanisms of election of the 
Presidency and the House of Peoples. The April package solutions relied heavily on previously 
issued opinions of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, and the Venice 
Commission also issued an opinion on the amendments proposed through the April package 
(“Opinion on the Draft Amendments to the BiH Constitution Bosnia and Herzegovina, CDL-
AD (2006)019:,” 2006). 
 
This was the most comprehensive constitutional reform package that sought to eliminate 
many flaws of the Dayton Agreement, e.g. elimination of discrimination and changing the 
system of electing Presidency and House of Peoples, reducing the powers of the Presidency and 
strengthening the role of the Parliament, a reform of the decision-making in the Council of 
Ministers, expanding the size of the House of Representatives and limiting the competence of 
the House of Peoples, transfer of competencies and setting up of new state-level ministries in 
line with EU integration, etc. The US Administration provided the highest level of political 
support, and following the occasion of the 10th anniversary of signing of the Dayton 
Agreement, BiH political leaders gathered in Washington in November 2005 and signed an 
agreement to change the Constitution in the presence of the US Secretary of State at the time, 
Condoleezza Rice who therein stated: “To advance the promise of peace and progress, we must 
now move beyond the framework constructed a decade ago. A weak, divided state was 
appropriate in 1995. But today in 2005, the country needs a stronger, energetic state, capable 
of advancing the public good and securing the national interest” (“Bosnian political leaders 




The April package had the support of all major political parties in FBiH and RS, except 
Stranka za BiH (Party for BiH) and HDZ 1990, and as such was the first and last effort since 
the Dayton Agreement that secured such a level of political agreement and on so many issues.37 
However, back in BiH the April package faced strong opposition primarily from SBiH leader, 
Haris Silajdžić, who was seeking an opportunity to return to political life after four years of 
absence, which I described in Chapter II. Silajdžić and a team of his advisors ran an intensive 
public campaign against the April Package on the grounds that it was ‘legalising’ Dayton 
arrangements and that it did not go far enough in reversing the effects of the war and ethnic 
divisions, and curbing the autonomy of the RS. The package thus ended up short of two votes 
in the House of Representatives in April 2006. As mentioned earlier, in the following four years, 
the political situation deteriorated dramatically with Silajdžić and Dodik taking a very 
confrontational stance and intensifying nationalist rhetoric to levels unprecedented since peace 
was signed. In the atmosphere of amplification of ethnic divisions, parties from Republika 
Srpska gradually withdrew their support for changes that had been proposed in the April 
package and announced they had no intention to return to that level of Dayton revisionism.  
 
The debate on constitutional reform thus came to a halt, and although elimination of 
discrimination remained a high priority on the agenda of international agencies, the credibility 
of the international agencies had been significantly shaken after the April package and they had 
little leverage to renew the discussion. The international community lacked mechanisms to 
bring it to the attention of leaders or the public. Jakob Finci, who was present at the signing of 
the party agreement in Washington in 2005, said it was the failure to adopt the April package 
which prompted him to file a case before the ECHR (“Personal interview,” 2011). He said that 
the fact that protocol 12 came into force in 2005 gave him safe legal grounds to challenge the 
discriminatory provisions of the Constitution. The failure to adopt the April package made him 
realise that change would not come voluntarily from the political parties, and given the fact that 
the international community's efforts lost power and credibility, he looked for a mechanism that 
would force political leaders to come to the table again. In October 2009, the issue was 
unsuccessfully tabled for discussion between party leaders at a last, also failed, attempt to 
negotiate a solution outside formal institutions before the 2010 elections. Negotiations came to 
be known as the Butmir process and were held under the leadership of the Swedish EU 
                                                 
37 HDZ1990 was formed after they split up from HDZ during the process of constitutional negotiations because of dissenting 
opinions from a group of party members. 
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Presidency, and Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt personally, as well as the US Assistant 
Secretary James Steinberg.38 
 
As discussed in Chapter IV, the implementation of the ECHR judgement has been made 
a condition for submission of BiH’s application for EU membership, and the coming into force 
of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement has been delayed until there was a ’credible 
effort’39 to implement the judgement, although this condition was dropped in 2015. The 
judgement of the European Court of Human Rights thus served the purpose of an anchor to 
which the EU was able to attach its further conditionality, and also to raise the public profile of 
the issue. Having set the background for the EU’s approach to the issue of 
equality/participation, I now turn to the EU’s approach in order to analyse the EU normative 
basis, the properties of EU norms, and its mechanisms of norm diffusion. 
 
The EU normative basis on equality/participation. The evolution of the issue from a 
human rights norm, to a requirement for further EU integration, is important to note because it 
once again emphasises the EU’s procedural approach to norm promotion. As it became clear 
from efforts to raise the issue of constitutional change, even though it was recognised ever since 
BiH joined the Council of Europe that its Constitution was in breach of human rights 
conventions, the EU did not make it an issue of concern for EU integration until the ECHR 
judgement. The important thing to note is that all along, and even after the ECHR judgement, 
the EU itself never tabled any specific proposals for change, only emphasised a mere need for 
change.40 The US, on the other hand, engaged legal teams which provided expert support and 
drafted proposals that were discussed in Washington and in Butmir, while the US 
Administration and diplomacy stood behind those proposals. The CoE also provided legal 
assistance and was directly involved in negotiating the content of reforms. This reminds of a 
similar situation in Hungary where the EU was not willing to engage in the drafting of legal 
recommendations for the protection of minorities in spite of its other efforts to that end (Vizi, 
2008). With that in mind, I argue that the EU engaged procedurally in promotion of this norm, 
while the US and CoE took more of a normative and substantive role. 
 
                                                 
38 Named after the Butmir EUFOR base in Sarajevo where negotiations were held. 
39 The phrase was coined by EU officials in Brussels. 
40 This excludes the Venice Commission opinions, which did offer many solutions for changes and commented on the existing 
proposals. However, the EU officials or institutions always emphasised that they had no preference for any solution. 
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Following the same method as in the previous Chapter, I reviewed different documents 
which refer to equality as a value inherent to the EU, its legacy and heritage. I have done so in 
order to outline a normative basis which established equality as a key component of normative 
power Europe, as described by Ian Manners (2002, p. 242), and in order to measure it against 
the procedural and substantive subversions of democracy in the area of equality. Even more 
explicitly than has been the case with the example of trust, equality has been integrated into the 
broad normative basis of the European Union during decades of its evolution and development 
through treaties, policies, criteria and conditions. Equality is implied in the fifth of Manners' 
five ‘core’ norms (2002, p. 243), the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
also resonates strongly in one of the four ‘minor’ norms, namely anti-discrimination.   
 
EU documents. Wheatley (2002) points out the difference arising from the status of the 
norm of ‘non-discrimination’ in the framework of a treaty and its language, so it can be an 
‘accessory right’, related to another substantive right, or an ‘independent right’ to equality 
demanding material justice. The 12th Additional Protocol to the European Convention adopted 
in 2000 introduces the right to non-discrimination as an independent right and also, related to 
the case study under review in this Chapter, establishes the responsibility of a state which may 
fail to prevent or remove discrimination (“Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,” 2000, para. 1 & 2). 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the Council of Europe on 24 April 2002 and based on 
Opinion No. 234 (2002) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, it assumed a 
series of commitments to be met following the accession. Commitment III.c is “to examine 
continuously the compatibility of legislation with the ECHR“. The initial Conference on 
compatibility of legislation of BiH with the European Convention on Human Rights and its 
Protocols and Case-law was held in Sarajevo on 12-13 December 2002, and in the follow-up a 
Study on compatibility of all Laws with the Convention was drafted, and monitoring teams set 
up. Meanwhile, the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe issued a number of opinions 
which discussed in detail specific provisions of the BiH Constitution and Election Law, and 
gave concrete proposals for changes. When Protocol 12 of the European Convention became 
effective on 1 April 2005 it strengthened guarantees for the protection of the right to equal 
treatment without discrimination. Specific provisions of the European Convention on Human 
Rights which relate to this case study are: 
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- Article 14 of the Convention provides: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set 
forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such 
as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” 
- Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention provides: “The High Contracting Parties 
undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions 
which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the 
legislature.” 
- Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention provides: “1. The enjoyment of any right 
set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, 
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. 2. No one shall be 
discriminated against by any public authority on any ground such as those mentioned in 
paragraph 1”. 
 
The relationship between EU norms and norms promoted by the Council of Europe was 
summarised to me by a CoE official: “all EU member states being CoE member states, the CoE 
norms can be also taken as European, even the Acquis, and this is the case when it comes to 
most of the aspects of democracy, human rights and rule of law in practice or in detail” 
(“Personal interview with CoE Official,” 2012). 
 
Country-specific documents. A key difference between this and the previous example 
on trust is that the normative basis upon which the EU has been able to promote equality as its 
own norm has been enshrined in a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights. The Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights found that the ineligibility of Dervo Sejdić 
and Jakob Finci to stand for election to the House of Peoples of BiH lacked an objective and 
reasonable justification and was therefore discriminatory. The ECHR also reminded BiH that 
by becoming a member of the Council of Europe in 2002 and by ratifying the Convention and 
the Protocols thereto without reservations, BiH has voluntarily agreed to meet the relevant 
standards, specifically to “review within one year, with the assistance of the European 
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), the electoral legislation in the 
light of Council of Europe standards, and to revise it where necessary” (“Case of Sejdić and 
Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2009). 
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In terms of the actual violation of specific European norms, the Court ruled that there 
had been a violation of the following articles of Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: 
- Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights as regards the applicants' ineligibility to stand for election 
to the House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
- Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 as regards the applicants' ineligibility to stand for election 
to the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
As pointed out by many authors, this is the first instance in the Court’s history that it 
challenged the constitutional order of a country, signatory to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. What is even more striking is that it 
has done so on the grounds of racial/ethnic discrimination (Hodzic & Stojadinovic, 2011). 
 
Nonetheless, the high level of importance attached to this issue by the CoE is 
demonstrated through the fact that the Committee of Ministers currently has around 8,000 cases 
on its agenda and holds four sessions per year devoted to the execution of judgements. The 
Sejdić and Finci judgement was examined for the first time at the session held from 2 to 4 
March 2010, so very soon after the judgement was actually made. It was again put on the agenda 
in June and December of 2010 (CoE Committee of Ministers, 2010). An interviewee from the 
CoE confirmed that even though sometimes they took years to implement, all judgements of 
the ECHR in the last 60 years have always been executed (“Personal interview,” 2012). 
 
Incompatibilities of this system with international norms on equality and non-
discrimination are expressed in the “concluding observations” on Bosnia and Herzegovina of 
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the body of independent experts 
set up to monitor the implementation of this treaty, which notes that ‘legal distinctions that 
favour and grant special privileges and preferences to certain ethnic groups’ are incompatible 
with the Convention (“Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of racial 
Discrimination - Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2006, para. 11). 
 
Properties of norms. As the previous section showed, inter-ethnic cooperation was 
sought through the creation of joint state institutions based on principles of ethnic power-
sharing. According to the ECHR ruling, “Fully aware that these arrangements were most 
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probably conflicting with human rights, the international mediators considered it to be 
especially important to make the Constitution a dynamic instrument and provide for their 
possible phasing out” (“Case of Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2009, para. 14). 
The subsequent prevailing assumption on the part of the international representatives was that 
power-sharing institutions of the state would proliferate under international supervision and 
sponsorship, diminishing the need to immediately eliminate discrimination. Rather, the 
Constitution which gives primary rights to ethnic communities and excludes all those who do 
not declare themselves as ‘constituent peoples’ from enjoying any political rights, as such 
creates fertile ground for entrenching discrimination also at the substantive level. On top of this, 
the legitimacy of the ethnic elites inherited from war, and which negotiated the DPA, was built 
into the system with the elections held in 1996 (less than a year after signing the DPA), based 
on the new voting rules they jointly designed in Dayton. Entrenching the political elites of the 
time so firmly and so early on into the political system ensured that the war-time legacies gained 
legitimacy and imposed even more firmly their visions of the society, crowding out any 
opposing political ideas. Following the same route of assessment as in the previous Chapter, 
three sets of properties of norms are assessed in terms of substantive equality: norm 
appropriateness, norm origin, and norm character. 
 
When it comes to considerations of why equality as a norm should be integrated into the 
constitutional and electoral system in BiH, the motivations of most politicians I interviewed 
were similar. Two key rationalist arguments were most prominent: because it is mandated by 
international conventions, and because it is a condition for further EU integration. However, 
the fact is that those motivations were not compelling enough to make the required changes 
before the new elections were announced, so as to have them conducted according to the new 
rules. This was true in spite of the fact that it constituted a clear breach of the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement, a breach of the actual judgement of the ECHR, and in spite of a threat 
of sanctions both on the part of the EU and CoE.41 On the other hand, the interviewees 
representing the EU clearly stress the substantive aspects of the appropriateness of this norm: 
“The protection of minorities and respect for human rights are values that are at the foundation 
of the European Union. They must remain essential elements of every aspect of the EU 
accession process” (“Personal interview with a senior EU official in Brussels,” 2012). 
 
                                                 
41 I will discuss these threats in the following section on EU mechanisms of norm promotion. 
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Because rationalist arguments were not sufficient to explain why this norm could not be 
adopted, it was necessary to look into the substantive subversions of equality. That process 
revealed that subjective motivations prevailed over rationalist reasoning. The true motivations 
that prevailed were a lack of political commitment to equality as an international norm, 
redefinition of the meaning of equality to accommodate the view through the ethnic lens, 
separate visions of diversity and pluralism in society, and fears of foreign conspiracies.   
 
It also has to do with self-perceptions. As examples of substantive subversions of 
equality showed, domestic political actors see themselves primarily as protectors of ethnic 
interests rather than as entrepreneurs of European human rights norms. They are thus mainly 
driven by the ideational commitment to their ethnic group and the EU norms are not necessarily 
seen as more ‘appropriate’. The continued attempts to ‘ethnicise’ every issue, regardless of how 
clear as an international norm, proved to be a detrimental factor in the process of 
implementation of this norm. This example shows the level of ideational resistance in the 
pursuit of a widely accepted norm. As I already said in the preceding section, the EU on its part 
accepted and even supported the process designed by the government in spite of the general 
opinion that it was not going to generate any results in the desired timeframe. On top of that, 
no European actors engaged in promoting the norm itself, but rather focused efforts on 
supporting the process. 
 
This also showed that individuals assigned as ‘norm implementers’ feel stronger 
affiliation with the ideals embodied in domestic norms of divisions and group identities even 
though norm implementation may not affect them directly. They feel stronger ‘ideational 
commitment’ and ethnic allegiance to the norms embedded in the Dayton Agreement, than new 
norms promoted by the CoE and EU. According to Rechel (2008, p. 83), the situation was 
similar in Bulgaria where historical legacy, domestic party constellations, and popular attitudes 
proved stronger factors than the EU or CoE norms. It was also the case in Lithuania where 
history and domestic elites proved more important than international intervention (Budryte & 
Pilinkaite-Sotirovic, 2008, p. 160).  
 
What was also striking in this example was that within the domestic political context, 
the need to eliminate racial discrimination was emphasised far less than the simple fact that this 
was an international commitment. Regardless of such a high degree of otherwise generally 
accepted ‘righteousness’ or ‘goodness’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 899) of equality and 
194 
 
non-discrimination, the strong commitment to social relations inside the country proved more 
powerful. Also, the strong commitment to group identities over individual interests, coupled 
with still fresh memories of war and inter-ethnic fears, obscure awareness of the form of 
discrimination created by ethnic allegiances. The commitment to domestic ‘norms’ as opposed 
to an international norm, was further entrenched by building a notion that EU norm promotion 
is a part of wider international conspiracies, and by a deliberate undermining of the credibility 
of international representatives.  
 
Important proof of how a procedural approach undermines substantive democratisation, 
is the EU’s view of their very presence or interest in this issue as a form of commitment: “The 
EU continues to supervise talks on implementation of the Sejdić/Finci  ruling. That shows that 
the EU is committed to the democratic processes in BiH” (“Personal interview with a senior 
EU official in Brussels,” 2012). However, this case-study showed that not only have the EU 
efforts faced ideological barriers created by the emotional appeal of domestic norms, but 
domestic political elites deliberately engaged in counter campaigns, aware that the EU 
commitment may be strong, but its substance is negotiable. I call that the counter-informational 
diffusion. Domestic actors resorted to the construction of conspiracy theories, to construction 
of an alternative meaning of equality and by withdrawing political will from any efforts to 
substantively change the constitution. By targeting the EU itself to undermine its credibility, 
and to portray its efforts as potentially detrimental to domestic values, political elites are seizing 
the public space at the expense of the EU’s informational campaign and thus diminishing its 
potential effects.  
 
As demonstrated in the section on the EU normative basis that defines equality, the 
international legal instruments provide a high degree of clarity of norms when it comes to 
equality and human rights as was the case in Chapter VI. Schwellnus (2008) points out that 
non-discrimination is a well-established norm of the EU common law, so the EU is not 
confronted with promoting double standards. He thus sees non-discrimination as a norm that 
due to its consistent and uncontested character is more acceptable to domestic structures (2008, 
p. 32). He also points out the importance of timing and argues that in Central and Eastern 
Europe, most countries accepted non-discrimination legislation towards the end of their 
accession process. However, the EU’s conditionality has actually prevented the country from 




Specificity of norms, and hence its credibility and consistency, was in this case provided 
through the ECHR judgement and in terms of the instruments at the disposal of the European 
institutions, this could be said to be the most specific way to relate a norm to the local context 
outside the EU structures. The clarity and specificity of the norms on equality and non-
discrimination provided their legitimation as well, but that legitimation was limited by the 
prevalence of domestic norms allegiances and commitments to the existing situation, thus 
establishing credible normative basis. However, as argued before, that in and of itself is not a 
guarantee that the EU would be predisposed to act normatively. 
 
As will be clarified further in the next section, but as quite evident from earlier 
examples, the intensity and prominence of European norms was in this case also quite strong in 
terms of the attention given to the implementation of the ECHR decision and the level of 
importance it has been assigned by European institutions. However, in spite of the high intensity 
of European norms, they proved impotent against the prominence of ethnic divisions in public 
life, institutional structures, decision making systems, and simply the general ‘view of the 
world’ on the part of domestic political actors. In this case, therefore, the question was not how 
intensive were the efforts of European norm entrepreneurs, but how resistant were the forces of 
nationalism.  
 
EU Mechanisms of Norm Diffusion. When looking at the properties of EU norms, I 
stated that the normative basis of the EU on equality has a strong substantive dimension that 
emphasises the ideational aspects of norm promotion. However, in this section I show the EU’s 
reliance on procedural instruments of norm promotion, as was also the case in promotion of 
trust. Evidence collected in this section once again supports my argument that the extensive 
reliance on procedural instruments limits its effectiveness and restricts the substantive 
internalisation of equality. The type and number of procedural instruments is evidence of a 
‘cookie-cutter approach’, which fails to recognise that equality is undermined in the very 
substance of the BiH Constitution that is based on discrimination. This lack of recognition of 
the nature of the issue misinformed the EU’s technical approach that was applied for years 
before the EU decided to adopt a new strategy to resolving this issue.  
 
However, even the change of the approach, which was meant to accommodate the 
political nature of the problem of discrimination in the Constitution, did not yield results, which 
can only be attributed, once again, to the nationalistic views on this issue. While accepting the 
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view of the nationalist elites that the search for a solution should be limited to the minimalist 
understanding of equality and participation in the sense of removal of discriminatory provisions 
of the BiH Constitution, the EU tacitly agreed to undermine the broader human rights issues 
which are implied by the ECHR ruling. Being more concerned with finding a pragmatic solution 
that would move the country forward, as I discussed in Chapter IV, the EU opted to turn a blind 
eye to the discriminatory nature of the entire system of governance in BiH. Although the 
pragmatic approach might serve the short-term interests of both the EU and nationalist elites in 
BiH, the EU is in fact just postponing the real debate about the built-in discrimination, which 
might come to haunt them once the country comes closer to EU membership. 
 
Procedural mechanisms. In the previous Chapter I argued that in the case of promotion 
of trust as an EU norm, the procedural mechanisms only go as far as the first stage – norm 
emergence. The characteristic mechanism of the first stage, norm emergence, is persuasion by 
norm entrepreneurs, which we saw being the case with the EU’s information campaigns. In this 
Chapter I argue that the promotion of equality as a norm went a step further, which I attribute 
primarily to the ECHR judgement as a powerful procedural normative instrument. However, I 
make a case that this example reveals some developments uncharacteristic of the norm ‘life 
cycle’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). I argue that although promotion of equality has gone 
beyond the first stage, it may progress through the second stage and even be internalised in 
procedural terms, i.e. integrated through constitutional changes, but that it may continue to lack 
features characteristic of substantive internalisation such as ‘mimicking’ and having the ‘taken-
for-granted quality’. 
 
Informational diffusion. As discussed in the preceding sections, it was the Council of 
Europe, Venice Commission and US administration which originally raised the issue of 
discrimination in the Constitution. When it comes to the EU, its individual institutions engaged 
to varying degrees up until the ECHR judgement. Before the judgement, the European 
Parliament passed one resolution in 2006 (“European Parliament resolution on the outlook for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, P6_TA-PROV(2006)0065,” 2006) which mentioned this issue,42 but 
only after the constitutional reform effort that was backed by the US. Prior to that the European 
Commission informed the Council in quite vague terms about a need in BiH to “respect 
                                                 
42 The previous three EU parliament resolutions were on the following issues: 14 April 2005 on the state of regional integration 
in the western Balkans, on 17 November 2004 on the European Union military operation 'Althea' in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and on 7 July 2005 on Srebrenica. 
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democratic principles and human rights as proclaimed in key international documents such as 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights… should form the basis of the domestic and 
external policies of parties to a SAA. ... BiH presidential elections are still based on 
ethnic/territorial principles” (“European Parliament resolution on the outlook for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, P6_TA-PROV(2006)0065,” 2006, para. 1). So, apart from 'noting' the situation, 
the Communication did not actually say that the mentioned constitutional provisions were not 
in line with the previously stated instruments for the protection of human rights. In the European 
Partnership with Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted by the Council in 2006, one of the mid-term 
priorities of the Partnership was to amend electoral legislation regarding the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Presidency members and the House of Peoples delegates, to ensure full 
compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights and the Council of Europe post-
accession commitments (“Council Decision on the principles, priorities and conditions 
contained in the European Partnership with Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2006, sec. 4). 
 
The European Parliament resolutions became more explicit in anticipation of the ECHR 
decision and in its aftermath. The 2009 Resolution stated that “all minority communities must 
enjoy the same rights as constituent peoples” (“European Parliament resolution on the situation 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009,” 2009, para. 6.d.). However, it was only after the ECHR 
judgement that the European Parliament resolution recognised that the issue was less to do with 
minority rights, but that it was about general discrimination which disabled a large number of 
individuals from full participation on the simple grounds that they did not declare to belong to 
one of the constituent peoples (“European Parliament Resolution on the situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 2010,” 2010). One of my interviewees confirmed that the judgement provided the 
EU with additional argumentation as to why constitutional reform was necessary (“Personal 
interview with an EU official in Sarajevo,” 2012).  
 
In the aftermath of the ECHR judgement, the EU engaged more openly in the 
informational diffusion of norms, including public statements by its highest ranking officials. 
During his visit to Sarajevo following the 2010 elections, Štefan Füle regretted that “the 
constitution and electoral law were not aligned to the European Court of Human Rights to allow 
citizens not belonging to the three constituent people to have full voting rights” (Turković, 
2010, p. 2). As the EU delegation officials and European Commission representatives showed, 
their priority remained the procedural aspect and instrumental equality. Their approach was 
thus to focus on the process of compliance rather than on norm internalisation. However, some 
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higher-level officials did engage in some normative efforts, as was the case with the President 
of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, who visited BiH in April 2011 and 
delivered a message that the Constitution needs to be amended to comply with the ruling of the 
European Court of Human Rights. Respect of minority rights and anti-discrimination are basic 
values for the EU. He stated: “So let us be clear: Bosnia is not alone. The EU is ready to help 
you through its reinforced presence and policies, and substantial aid. But Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has to do its own part“ (“Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting 
with the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2011). Catherine Ashton, High 
Representative of the European Union (EU) Foreign Policy and Security and Vice President of 
the European Commission visited Bosnia and Herzegovina on 17-18 February 2010 and 
stressed that it is necessary for furthering the integration process in the EU, and that the 
implementation of the HRC decision in the Sejdić-Finci case is an opportunity for substantial 
changes of the Constitution (“EU High Representative Catherine Ashton visited BiH,” 2010). 
 
Messages delivered by the CoE officials were of a more substantive nature, and made 
the threat of sanctions more explicit. During his visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina in March 2010, 
the President of the CoE Parliamentary Assembly, Mevlüt Cavousoglu, stated that BiH needs 
constitutional change “otherwise it faces the risk that its institutions are considered illegitimate, 
a flow of new complaints to the European Court and a possible challenge in the Assembly” 
(“Mevlut Cavusoglu u zvaničnoj posjeti BiH,” 2011). Therefore, it can be said the EU itself did 
not deliver clear or authoritative messages prior to the ECHR judgement. However, with the 
ECHR argumentation in hand, all of the EU institutions engaged in a very explicit diffusion of 
information about a need to comply with the European Convention and the judgement of the 
ECHR.  
 
Procedural diffusion. BiH signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) 
with the EU on June 16, 2008. Soon afterwards an Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-
related Matters (IA) came into force. By the end of 2010, all 27 members of the EU had ratified 
the SAA with BiH. However, it did not come into force immediately and its publication was 
delayed. Although the EU did not officially declare that the SAA implementation would be 
delayed, it became clear after it had not reached the EU Council several months later, and in 
interviews I conducted with EU officials it was confirmed that this was a deliberate policy.43 
                                                 
43 Due to a lack of formal decisions on this matter, interviewees were reluctant to speak on record on matters discussed in this 
section, but relevant information was provided nonetheless in confidence. 
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The reason for this is the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina was the only country in the region 
which breached the Interim Agreement by failing to meet the set deadlines for the commitments 
it undertook. This primarily refers to the failure to implement the Sejdić/Finci ruling. As 
confirmed through interviews with EU officials, legally speaking there are no real obstacles 
before the SAA could enter into force as the Interim Agreement has no provisions linked to 
human rights. Politically, however, the EU never provided clear direction as to the content and 
level of constitutional reform that is needed.  
 
The EU’s futile procedural approach was particularly evident through the insistence on 
a ‘credible effort’. The European Council pledged it would not give a green light to put the 
SAA into force until it saw ‘credible effort’ on implementing the ECHR judgement. However, 
it was not possible to clarify what would be accepted as a ‘credible effort’, particularly having 
in mind the experience with the working group that had been established previously for that 
purpose. Emphasis has been put on the process being locally owned, as stated by one 
interviewee: “The EU has not and will not give any suggestions related to constitutional changes 
to BiH authorities. BiH authorities need to find consensus, they must not isolate themselves 
from the process. The EU will not impose any solutions on constitutional reform. We tried to 
do that in the past and it did not work. The only sustainable solution for BiH is to enter the EU. 
But that takes time, we need to be patient and slowly help BiH achieve that goal” (“Personal 
interview with a senior EU official in Brussels,” 2012). As evident in Chapter IV, this approach 
was abandoned in 2014 upon the initiative of UK and German governments. What became 
particularly evident from this example is the lack of clarity of the EU’s ‘credible effort’. It 
nonetheless remains unclear how the EU would be able to judge the sincerity of a ‘credible 
effort’. The only answer I got to that end was that “The only criteria the EU expects to be 
fulfilled is that the system produces positive results and is compatible with EU values” 
(“Personal interview with a senior EU official in Brussels,” 2012).  
 
At the same time, the actual judgement in the Sejdić/Finci case is legally 
binding. However, some of the European collocutors confirmed that many of the EU member 
states have numerous cases pending before the ECHR, and BiH has only a few less than its 
neighbours. Though the precedent is the fact that breaches of the European Convention in the 
case of BiH are actually generated by the Constitution. This was explained to be the decisive 
factor in such a strong emphasis to implement the judgement, and also explains to some extent 




Transference. For several years since the Parliament failed to adopt the April package 
in 2006, the European Commission was reserving funds in the amount of one million Euro as a 
part of the IPA funds to provide expertise and technical support in the process of constitutional 
change. These funds remained available until 2013, when they were re-directed towards 
projects in the area of culture (“Personal interview with an EU official in Sarajevo,” 2013).  
 
Overt diffusion. Manners (2002, p. 245) points out that overt diffusion could also occur 
through monitoring missions that are deployed to follow up on a particular situation in the 
country. In this case again, however, it was the Council of Europe’s Monitoring Missions, 
which assess on an annual basis the fulfilment of post-accession commitments, which proved 
to be more categorical in protection of European principles, clear, specific and overt in 
communicating it to domestic authorities. They also questioned the sincerity of the government 
effort by saying that “Despite the stated readiness of the authorities and the apparent consensus 
among the key stakeholders in the country, that the Sejdić and Finci judgement must be 
implemented, no serious discussions took place within the working group” (Council of Europe, 
2010, para. 21). Compared to the language used in the CoE documents, the EU’s regular Annual 
Progress Report on BiH for 2010 does not appear as categorical and simply acknowledges the 
situation on the ground, therefore no real overt diffusion of norms takes place (European 
Commission, 2011, para. 1.2.).    
 
Substantive mechanisms. Substantive (constructivist) mechanisms include contagion, 
compliance, social learning, socialisation, role playing/mimicking, and persuasion. 
 
Contagion. In respect to ‘unintentional’ diffusion of ideas from the EU to domestic 
political actors, evidence presented in earlier sections showed that politicians in BiH have 
accepted the rhetoric on human rights after the ECHR judgement, but are more reluctant to use 
the words ‘discrimination’ or ‘equality’. This might indicate that although they agreed to 
discuss the issue of human rights in the context of the Sejdić/Finci case, intimately they may 
not see it necessarily as discrimination, neither are they concerned with the broader human 
rights issues. Their view of equality is prejudiced by the importance of collective equality 
between ethnic groups. This became clear through a series of conversations I conducted with 
various political figures, mainly members of parliament at all levels of government, the majority 
of whom did not comprehend the Sejdić/Finci situation as an individual inequality, and in 
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discussing solutions, their proposals mainly concentrated on mechanisms of representing 
groups rather than individuals.  In other words, there has been no real contagion. 
 
Compliance. I interviewed a number of senior EU officials and asked them to what 
degree the EU was willing to go in sanctioning political elites for the purpose of greater 
compliance with EU norms. The first answer I got from most of them is that ‘sanctions’ are not 
in the vocabulary of the EU, and the EU prefers to use the term measures (“Personal interview 
with a senior EU official in Brussels,” 2012). When it comes to breaching of contractual 
commitments already undertaken, as was the case with the breach of the Interim Agreement 
and failure to implement the ECHR ruling, the answer from the EU officials is that Bosnian 
politicians punish themselves for failing to comply because this way they personally delay 
Bosnia’s integration into the EU. Delaying the SAA implementation is seen as a punishment in 
itself. As in the previous Chapter, this again showed the degree to which EU officials fail to 
recognise the political elites’ priorities and interests. As was made clear in interviews with EU 
officials, they rely on an assumption that it is in the interest of elites to comply with a norm, 
oblivious to the fact that the status quo only works in favour of the elites, continuing their grip 
on power (Vachudova, 2014). Rewards promised through norm compliance are not perceived 
by political elites as greater than the costs of compliance. As I also argued in the previous 
Chapter, this showed the extent to which the EU officials perceive themselves primarily as the 
‘acquis-entrepreneurs’ and do not necessarily perceive themselves as entrepreneurs of norms, 
while the basic principle of conditionality, the cost-benefit calculation, has a very limited 
impact. 
 
The Council of Europe, on the other hand, has been far more explicit in expressing the 
need to execute the judgement. Hence, implementation of the judgement has been supervised 
by the CoE Committee of Ministers at a minimum twice a year.44 It has also been followed by 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) at political level based on the fact 
that BiH was failing to meet its CoE post-accession commitments. The CoE originally took a 
stance that if the 2010 elections were not conducted according to rules, legitimacy of institutions 
might be questioned. However, under the pressure from the EU, this position was abandoned 
in 2010 and again in the 2014 elections, both of which were held according to the old 
discriminatory rules. 
                                                 





Possible measures by the CoE that would be taken in case of non-compliance were also 
communicated and made public, although there were some doubts left as to the certainty of the 
use of those instruments. It was mentioned there could be possible challenging of credentials 
of the BiH Delegation to PACE on substantial grounds, and even excluding BiH from the CoE, 
but this never happened. This would have been a very rare case, almost a precedent, since 
something similar happened only in the case of Belarus, which was not a full member but an 
observer.  The former Special Representative of the Secretary General of the CoE spoke about 
those possibilities in various public events organised to discuss the implementation of the 
ECHR judgement.  
 
Social learning. This case study revealed several obstacles to norm promotion through 
social learning, primarily stemming from unfavourable scope conditions and formidable 
subversions to equality. As I discussed in the section on norm character and origin, equality as 
a democratic norm proved to be too conceptual for both norm entrepreneurs, as well as subjects 
to norm promotion. This is why social learning faced obstacles in the form of claims to cultural 
distinctiveness and specificity of social circumstances that are based on ethnic divisions. 
Ignoring this fact, in this case more so than in the example of trust, the EU engaged extensively 
in deploying procedural mechanisms of norm diffusion. But again, the nature of those activities 
was not sufficiently interactive and did not provide opportunities for social learning as such.  
 
Socialisation. Kelley (2004) and Vachudova (2014) argues that EU membership 
conditionality was the key rationale behind acceptance of EU norms in central and Eastern 
Europe. However, they also point out the importance of socialisation in terms of the 
sustainability of norms in the domestic context. Based on wide research throughout Central and 
Eastern Europe, Rechel (2008, p. 18) points out that socialisation alone cannot bring change, 
but it is an important factor that complements EU’s conditionality. Vizi (2008) argues that 
aspiration for EU membership was the key motivation behind Hungary’s acceptance of non-
discrimination norms and Rechel argues the same was the case in Bulgaria. 
 
Socialisation in the case of the implementation of the ECHR ruling was limited to 
occasional meetings with high level EU and CoE officials, participation of BiH delegation in 
PACE, meetings with CoE monitoring missions and occasional roundtables and public debates. 
However, even in those interactions, the emphasis of discussions was on conditionality and a 
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need to meet EU and CoE requirements in order to prevent a halt in integration processes and 
subsequently to unblock them. These limited socialisation efforts did not involve substantive 
promotion of equality as a wider norm that is at the core of the EU, it was purely promoted as 
instrumental and calculative, once again emphasising the EU’s procedural approach at the 
expense of substantive democratisation.  
 
Persuasion. As I argued was the case in the previous Chapter, here as well, persuasion 
was issue-based, and did not have a wider-base of ‘socialising’ political elites. Even as such, 
persuasion was rare and not so interactive. The interviewed EU officials believed they do 
engage in persuasion at some level while interacting with political elites. In this case, equality 
and non-discrimination were discussed more openly as value-driven norms. This case thus 
showed that persuasion can be effective if more narrowly focused, and not as a mechanism of 
wider appeal to conceptual norms.  The character and origin of a norm, as well as underlying 
scope conditions, presented far more decisive elements of norm promotion than the actual 
nature of persuasion, its intensity or duration. 
 
Conclusion - Level of Compliance with EU Norms on Equality  
 
In this Chapter I addressed more closely the EU’s own shortcomings in democratising 
BiH and transforming values in BiH society. Although the focus of this Chapter was on the 
EU’s lack of legitimacy and a ‘cookie-cutter approach’, the example used here also shows the 
impact of nationalism on EU norm promotion. However, even more so than the case study 
analysed in Chapter VI, this Chapter showed the extent to which the EU relies on a procedural 
approach, and how much it suffers from a confused international identity.  
 
Following my research approach, this Chapter included sections on case study 
description, theoretical propositions on equality, subversions of equality/participation, and the 
EU’s approach to the promotion of equality/participation. The framework of analysis has 
followed the same route as in the previous Chapter. I have accounted for the EU normative 
basis of equality, its procedural and substantive subversions, and procedural and substantive 
mechanisms for diffusion of EU norms. Each section has revealed obstacles of different nature 
and character, and this section analyses the level of compliance thus achieved. It emphasises 
equality as an antidote to any form of discrimination, stating that the equality of rights, 




This Chapter reveals that the EU operates on a very clear and well-structured normative 
basis, which makes it very explicit that equality is a core EU norm in broad terms, and is also 
engrained in narrower country-specific normative documents. The EU normative basis is 
directional, giving a very high importance to equality in its core documents. However, unlike 
the CoE documents, the EU adopts a procedural approach which prevents it from engaging in 
specifying remedies or proposing solutions for addressing the issues of discrimination and 
equality. As such, the EU appears to be less of a normative power than the CoE, or even the US 
in the case of constitutional reform. 
 
In assessing the role of the CoE and EU in norm promotion in Bulgaria, Rechel (2008) 
points out that they both played a key role. However, there was some distinction between them. 
In Bulgaria, the CoE was crucial in the process of adoption of norms, i.e. ratification of various 
international legal instruments. The EU, however, was crucial in adoption of the plan of 
implementation. The same could be said to have been the case in BiH in the case of acceptance 
of norms. However, as I argued in the example of the working group for the implementation of 
the ECHR judgement, it was the Council of Europe that was still more engaged at that stage. 
Based on the Bulgarian example, Rechel shows that the CoE was not vested with additional 
leverage from the European Commission. I argue that the same was the case in BiH up until the 
point when the ECHR passed its judgement. That was the tipping point when the EU decided 
to put its leverage behind its own and the CoE efforts. This is also different from the Bulgarian 
experience where the EC basically ignored ECHR rulings in the cases of the Roma and 
Macedonian minorities (Rechel, 2008, p. 85). In Rechel’s view, one of the reasons why 
Bulgarian government failed to change its constitution is because of a lack of consistent and 
persistent monitoring by the EC. 
 
The judgement itself is very categorical and specific, but its legitimation has been 
challenged conceptually with appeals to the exceptionalism of the Bosnian situation that is 
based on predetermined constitutional categories enshrined in the Constitution, which is part of 
an international peace agreement. The EU was thus faced with a powerful clash of values and 
visions of the present and future of BiH, which was justified and rationalised by beliefs in 
ancient hatreds and perpetuity of ethnic divisions. In such circumstances, domestic political 
actors proved uncompromising on their vision in which BiH is constituted of ethnic 
collectivities, rather than being a pluralist society that respects diversity and provides equality 
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of rights, and they even managed to transfer that vision onto the EU actors. This meant that the 
EU was faced with stronger affiliations and ideational commitment to local as opposed to 
European norms, and the EU itself showed weak allegiance to its norms.  
 
My research has revealed that instruments at the disposal of the EU for diffusion of EU 
norms provide avenues for both procedural and substantive engagement. On the procedural 
side, the standard EU toolbox contains a range of instruments that have been used extensively 
in this case. However, the EU has again limited itself to the use of procedural instruments, 
particularly in the service of conditionality. Unlike the case study of promotion of trust, in the 
example of equality, the ‘life cycle’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998) of the norm has gone a step 
further and it is in the stage of cascading and will likely proceed to internalisation. However, it 
needs to be pointed out that the EU mechanisms of norm diffusion come short of substantive 
engagement, and there are no broader understandings of why discrimination needs to be 
abolished. The motivations to comply with the norms on equality that were expressed are driven 
more by a sense of duty to implement a Court judgement, and not out of a principled belief in 
equality. The EU accommodated this approach, and rather than promoting a norm, the EU was 
promoting a procedure, i.e. implementation of the judgement for the sake of moving the country 
forward in the accession process. That in itself has been sufficient proof of the EU’s 
undermining of substantive democracy by a focus on the procedure.  
 
The Council of Europe, on the other hand, was more consistent in promoting a norm 
and being categorical about it. This is why domestic political actors engaged in strategic 
calculation as a mechanism of socialisation (Checkel, 2005, p. 809) - the choice was made 
between perceived social sanctions (status in PACE, shaming) and material rewards (financial 
assistance, enforcement of the SAA, acceptance of application for candidacy status). In this 
case, neither the threat of social sanction nor the promise of material rewards could outweigh 
the potency of the entrenched localised norms and the strength of belief in a need to protect 
collective over individual rights, and the interest in sustaining ethnic divisions.  Aware of the 
consequences of non-compliance, and also aware of the fact that rewards of compliance were 
not greater than localised rewards of non-compliance, particularly in light of the upcoming 
elections, and the favourable conditions which the existing system creates for nourishing 





The EU’s ‘cookie-cutter approach’ in BiH determined their choice of diffusion 
mechanisms and, in line with promotion of procedures rather than promotion of norms, the EU 
deployed a range of procedural diffusion mechanisms. This was evidenced by the fact that their 
efforts intensified only after the ECHR ruling, even though existence of discrimination was 
recognised quite early on in developing a contractual relationship with BiH. An interviewee 
from the CoE confirmed that this was the case: “CoE, through its various institutions, pointed 
out the problematic constitutional arrangements throughout the accession process of BiH to 
CoE and thereafter, but the discrimination with respect to elected offices became subject to a 
formal procedure only after the Sejdić/Finci judgement was issued and the Committee of 
Ministers became charged with the supervision of the execution of the judgement” (“Personal 
interview with CoE Official,” 2012).  
 
Based on the evidence presented, I argue that by the time of the October 2010 election 
(the first deadline for compliance set by the ECHR judgement), promotion of equality had gone 
as far as the second stage, low compliance. The elites publicly declared their political will to 
move to procedural compliance and institutionalisation in future, but that did not happen even 
after the EU applied a new, more political approach in 2015. If that does happen at some stage, 
internalisation would be achieved only once elections are held according to new rules, and 
newly elected officials have assumed their responsibilities. In terms of the broader acceptance 
of equality through transformation, that may take years and needs to be fully supported by the 
EU’s substantive mechanisms of norm diffusion. If the EU’s long-term goal is to internalise 
equality and seek social transformation that would value equality of individuals over collective 




Chapter VIII - Conclusion 
 
However hard nationalists try to amplify the ethnic divisions and evoke myths of ethnic 
hatreds, most of the people in BiH have not entirely buried the sense of tolerance and pluralism 
that is imperative in a multi-ethnic society. An extreme example of the way in which people 
instinctively resort to solidarity in order to raise themselves above the constructed differences, 
and the structural and political divisions, took place in May 2014, when BiH suffered from the 
worst floods in its history. The floods and landslides affected almost half the country’s territory, 
putting in danger hundreds of thousands of people, killing at least thirty. In a crisis of 
apocalyptical proportions, the issues of identity and ethnicity became irrelevant within hours, 
and people rushed to help their neighbours from another village, another city, another entity, 
regardless of their ethnicity or political beliefs. The entity lines got wiped out for a couple of 
weeks, people hopped onto rubber boats to save those who were stranded on upper floors of 
their houses and buildings, with little food and no running water or electricity. Women, children 
and the elderly were evacuated to the nearest safe places in FBiH and the RS. It was the 
manifestation of country-wide solidarity, in which basic human empathy prevailed over any 
social cleavages. People shared food, shelter, medicines, they helped dig out entire cities from 
the mud and landslides that accompanied the floods.  
 
The floods also exposed the absurdity of the Dayton constitutional structure and 
dysfunctionality of the system more than ever before. The Council of Ministers of BiH had 
previously put in place a Coordination Body for Rescue and Protection,45 but the RS 
Government decided to boycott it because they refused to be coordinated from the state level 
(“Personal interview with a representative of the BiH Ministry of Security,” 2014). The Law 
authorises the Coordinating Body to lead rescue efforts, to coordinate the entity and other 
authorities, including requests for international assistance. Because of the RS boycott, and 
under the pressure to provide emergency assistance, the state authorities resorted to bilateral 
agreements with the neighbouring countries in order to request helicopters, boats and water 
pumps, as well as other means of assistance. However, formal assistance from the EU 
Mechanism for Civil Protection could not be requested without declaring a state of emergency, 
which was not possible without the consent of ministers from the RS. Meanwhile, desperate 
calls and requests were coming from municipalities across the RS and FBiH, from mayors and 
                                                 
45 Established according to the BiH Law on rescue and protection of people and goods from natural and other disasters. 
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local police, and from cantonal authorities. The RS authorities tried for days to avert 
coordination through the state institutions, and declared that they would request international 
assistance on their own, and would take control of the rescue operations within the RS 
independently. Neither was possible, and they eventually sent their representative into the BiH 
Coordinating Body, after which the Council of Ministers was able to declare a state of 
emergency. Meanwhile, the BiH army forces had been rescuing people across the country with 
their helicopters and boats, which the entity governments would not have been able to do on 
their own, simply because of the lack of staff and equipment.  
 
The floods blew the whistle on the weaknesses of the constitutional structure, and 
exposed the absurdities of a decision-making system that is dependent on the political will of 
all levels of government, even in the most extreme situations. However, it also disclosed why 
nationalist elites are dependent on persistent projection of ethnic division upon the society. The 
fact that people in cities and villages mobilised independently to help those in need regardless 
of their ethnicity or entity borders, showed a craving for more normal ethnic relations and an 
instinct for pluralism that has survived decades of imposition of nationalist vision on the 
society. Only two weeks after the worst of the floods had passed, Dodik engaged in moderating 
the effects of the floods on multi-ethnic coexistence, by stating that the “floods had not wiped 
out the entity borders” (“Dodik: Poplave nisu odnijele entitetske granice,” 2014). He said that 
the perceived solidarity was a spin by the international community, which wanted to seize the 
opportunity to take away some of the responsibilities from the RS. 
 
In this thesis I have argued that BiH is an exceptional case in which nationalism has 
perverted the political and social life, the constitutional structures, functioning of institutions, 
the flavour and style of democracy. Nationalism, above all, has created numerous fault-lines in 
democracy, which create obstacles to the consolidation of democracy, and yet many 
international representatives, including the EU, still see those divisions as given and natural. 
Nationalism and democracy have had an ambiguous relationship in BiH since 1980s. 
Nationalism has become an integral part of the political culture in BiH, and the process of 
democratisation has been seen by the elites, as well as some international actors, through a 
nationalistic world view. In that sense, nationalism has superseded democracy.  
 
I have argued in Chapter II that democratisation was never nationalists’ goal, and they 
only used the rhetoric on democracy as a cover for their ambition to secure maximum power 
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for themselves and their respective ethnic groups. For that purpose they deployed the myths of 
eternal hatreds among ethnic groups, and imposed the view of inevitability of divisions and 
political turmoil. This view of relations in BiH instructed the EU’s failure to prevent and stop 
the conflict in BiH, and it still dissuades their policy of norm promotion in BiH. By accepting 
the view of nationalist elites that ethnic divisions are absolute or preordained, the EU 
underestimates the power of its own norms to reverse the effects of nationalism. As a result, the 
potency of the internal institutional, political and ethnic divisions in BiH prevails over the 
attempts of EU normative power to embed democracy in this country. This realisation informed 
my focus on norms and values, because I felt that the procedural view of the EU-sponsored 
democratisation could not adequately respond to the root causes of obstacles and obstructions 
in that process. 
 
I have claimed that the EU’s tolerance of nationalism in BiH cripples their efforts to 
democratise the country, and fails to address the root causes of obstacles and obstructions to 
democratic consolidation. Most importantly, and blatantly obvious after the floods, the EU fails 
to see that an ethnicity-based power sharing system is not functional enough to meet the 
demanding requirements of the integration process. The system is struggling to function even 
without the pressure of the negotiating process, and given the numerous obstacles to smooth 
decision-making, it is hard to imagine how the country will be able to move forward in the 
negotiating process. The EU’s failure to recognise that can be attributed to its focus on form as 
opposed to substance. The obstacles to the integration of BiH into the EU are of substantive 
nature, while the EU’s response continues to be formal and procedural.  
 
This is why I chose the concept of the EU normative power, which provided me with a 
framework for addressing the gap between substance and procedure/form. It enabled me to look 
into norms, which could highlight this gap, and provide insights into the substantive 
incompatibility between two normative systems. For me the focus on norms was the lens 
through which I could magnify the root causes of the incompatibilities and obstacles to the EU 
democratisation of BiH. That way I was able to see the striking absence of the ideational impact 
of the EU’s democratisation efforts on the fault-lines in BiH democracy. Although I have 
accepted the view that the EU is a normative power, my argument has been that the EU may be 
a normative power in principle, but it does not act as a normative power. Based on that basic 
premise, I have proposed three hypotheses. In the following sections, I summarise the main 




Conclusions Based on the Hypotheses 
 
1. First, the EU-sponsored democratisation suffers from a lack of self-perception that the 
EU is a normative power, which is why the EU is not ‘pre-disposed’ to act normatively. 
Secondly, the EU undermines ideational and immaterial aspects of democratisation in 
BiH, limiting its efforts to procedural aspects, which hampers substantive 
democratisation.  
 
The EU does not have a coherent and identifiable international identity, as claimed by 
Manners (2002). Its identity is confused and perplexed by a riddle as to whether the EU 
democratisation in BiH is a technical or political process. The EU identity is also torn between 
divergent self-perceptions of its various actors, who accept the EU norms internally, but 
willingly compromise them externally for pragmatic reasons. This confused international 
identity lacks assertiveness and decisiveness within BiH context, thus thwarting the effects of 
the EU’s conditionality.  
 
The EU suffers from a discrepancy between the EU principles and its policies, which 
results from the hesitancy to fully embrace the identity of a normative power. EU actors fail to 
substantially identify with the EU’s normative role, and lack understanding of how the EU 
norms need to inform their policies and actions. The EU thus acquires only partial identity of a 
normative power, but it acts as any other rationalist power. Therefore, the underlying thinking 
behind its approach to problems in BiH is essentially rationalist, while the challenges to its 
normative power are clearly social-constructivist. Responding to a social-constructivist project 
with rationalist instruments is what disables the EU influences against the nationalist rhetoric. 
 
Both case-studies showed that the EU has a very clear and concrete normative basis 
upon which to challenge those counter-norms, and it also has resources and instruments 
available with which to address them. In both empirical Chapters it was made clear that the EU 
normative basis is directional, giving a very high importance to equality and trust in its core 
documents. However, the EU allows itself the luxury of being dissuaded by declarative support 
by most of the political parties for EU integration of BiH, even though in practice some of them 
extensively obstruct those processes. The EU thus falls into a trap of searching for equidistance 
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and neutrality among different political parties, failing to support those which help its efforts to 
strengthen democracy, and failing to sanction those who obstruct it. This exaggerated political 
correctness disables the EU from finding the partners with whom it could constructively engage 
in the process of promotion of democratic norms.  
 
The lack of self-perception of the EU as a normative power was also visible through the 
contrast with the role ascribed to the Council of Europe. I noted quite a widespread perception 
that normative influences are more the responsibility of the CoE, which in most cases was not 
vested with additional leverage from the EU. To me this revealed a tacit division of 
responsibilities, attributing to the CoE a more normative role than to the EU. However, the 
second case-study showed that this may change, and was the case in BiH up until the point 
when the ECHR passed its judgement. The court ruling was the tipping point after which the 
EU decided to puts its leverage behind its own and the CoE efforts to promote norms on equality 
and participation. This was further evidenced in support of the hypothesis that the EU is not 
‘pre-disposed’ to act normatively, but only does so when prompted by an external intervention. 
However, unlike the CoE documents, the EU does not go as far as specifying remedies or 
proposing solutions for addressing breaches of its norms. 
 
I have argued at several points in this thesis that the EU’s procedural approach 
undermines substantive democratisation. First I have attributed this to the EU’s overreliance on 
procedural instruments of norm diffusion, which are not effective in BiH, and can, at best, lead 
to the stage of norm emergence and low compliance. Secondly, the EU’s focus on procedural 
democratisation distracts it away from the substantive elements of democracy, thus neglecting 
the need to democratise the country in a substantive sense before it is capable and ready for the 
procedural aspects of the accession process. Thirdly, the absence of deliberate application of 
mechanisms that would trigger processes of social construction revealed that the EU does not 
strategically approach normative compliance in BiH. The EU rather bases its approach on a 
false premise that democratic consolidation can continue routinely, without external 
intervention. This wrong presumption derailed EU democratisation efforts in the direction of 
superficial procedural requirements, while the core problems of BiH dysfunctionality as a 
democracy remain. And finally, the EU also wrongly assumes that BiH elites would be 
cooperative in the process of democratisation as that would bring them closer to the EU. 
However, that assumption neglects the deliberate and insidious decay of democracy that I have 




I have provided several examples that support those findings. In Chapter VI, I showed 
that the EU persists in the use of the procedural mechanisms, such as statements, declarations, 
progress reports, but does very little to show dedication and commitment to their norms, or 
preparedness to defend them. By tolerating Dodik’s rhetoric on the issues of state integrity and 
Srebrenica genocide, the EU denounces its own responsibility for protecting the norms of 
tolerance and peace upon which the EU itself rests. The EU delegitimises those norms by 
renouncing its ownership of those norms through inaction. In that way, the EU signals to 
domestic elites that their undermining of EU norms can go unpunished. 
 
The EU also undermines substantive norms by relegating them to a lower priority for 
the sake of perceived impartialness. The EU is not willing to risk looking partial to its norms if 
that could in any way imply partialness to any of the sides in BiH. This is another example in 
which the procedural aspects are given priority before the substantive aspects of 
democratisation, which harms the EU’s credibility and legitimacy. By staying impartial and 
thus neglecting its own norms, the EU fails to send a message that the counter-norms are not 
acceptable to the EU, which would somewhat weaken the support for the obtrusive nationalist 
elites. In the examples provided in Chapter VI, the EU juxtaposed the promotion of ‘trust’ 
against ‘domestic democratic dialogue’, giving preference to the procedural norm of 
‘democratic dialogue’ over ‘trust’ as the substantive norm.  
 
2. There is a deep normative gap between the EU and BiH, which is rooted in an 
integrationist view of democracy on the side of the EU, and disintegrationist values 
promoted by nationalists in BiH. The domestic values and norms are contradictory and 
incompatible with the normative basis of the EU, and the spread of EU norms is hampered 
by ‘subversions’ of democracy, i.e. features evident in unconsolidated democracies, 
which are taken for granted in ‘consolidated’ democracies.  
 
Domestic political actors proved uncompromising on their vision in which BiH is 
constituted of ethnic collectivities, rather than being a pluralist society that respects diversity 
and provides equality of rights. The EU was thus faced with stronger affiliations and ideational 
commitment to local as opposed to European norms. In Chapter VI, the narratives analysed in 
order to assess the scope conditions and norm appropriateness showed the role of counter-norm 
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entrepreneurs in constructing categorical trust and thus entrenching a belief in the 
appropriateness of domestic norms as opposed to EU norms. In Chapter VII, I showed that 
motivations to comply with the norms on equality were driven more by a sense of duty to 
implement a Court judgement and not out of a principled belief in equality. Instead of 
challenging such perceptions, the EU actors accommodated to this view of the world, failing to 
promote a norm, but promoting a procedure instead, i.e. implementation of the judgement. The 
Council of Europe, on the other hand, was more consistent in promoting a norm and being 
categorical about it. 
 
The EU overwhelmingly underestimates the domestic context, which is structurally and 
institutionally complex, it is volatile and unpredictable. Such context poses obstacles to the EU 
norms in the form of counter-norms and counter-narratives, which are in many cases 
purposefully crafted and deliberately deployed to construct new or to entrench the existing 
political realities. I have concluded that procedural and substantive subversions of trust do not 
necessarily impede norm diffusion, but are rather positioned as obstacles to their substantive 
internalisation. The EU misunderstands this context, mixing causes with consequences of the 
problem. Many interviewees that represented either the EU or member states, pointed to a need 
for Bosnians to face the new realities of ethnic divisions and start creating a society that would 
take into account that fact. They thus see ethnic divisions as a result, rather than as a cause of 
the subversions of democracy. They do not recognise the hypocrisy in promoting trust and 
integration as EU norms, while supporting the process of cementing ethnic divisions. 
 
Because this perception is almost uncontested among EU actors, it overshadows a 
perceptible normative clash between the supposed ‘realities’ and the actual EU norms. In other 
words, to many European interviewees the lack of trust in BiH was a given, seen as primordial 
and engrained in local mentalities, which is why it should not be contested, even by EU norms. 
This position also relates to the power-sharing mechanisms, which are seen primarily as 
pragmatic solutions for upholding peace and ensuring ethnic representation, even if in breach 
of some basic EU norms. That additionally weakens the EU’s potency to request a change and 
to insist on it. 
 
The substantive subversions of trust proved an even bigger challenge to the EU. In a 
similar fashion as with procedural norms, the EU takes those subversions for granted and 
assumes them to be prevalent over any EU norms. Because subversions of trust, however 
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undemocratically expressed, are justified as deep-rooted and entrenched in the local customs, 
mentalities, and ways of doing politics, many interviewees from the EU expressed a clear 
concern that changing subjective domestic norms would be ‘politically incorrect’ or 
inappropriate. What can be concluded from this is that not only are domestic norms successful 
in counteracting EU norms, but that the EU officials do not see it as their job to challenge any 
domestic norms. Furthermore, some of them even change their own perceptions under the 
influence of domestic context. This was evidenced by many responses which indicated that EU 
officials often play by the local rules of the game and even adopted some of the local rhetoric 
that is contradictory to that which would be an EU norm. This showed that the thick sense of 
identity within ethnic groups and strong ethnic allegiances proved far more powerful against 
the European confused international identity. 
 
 Another way in which the EU undermines substantive democracy is by failing to set 
the boundaries of what is normal in a democratic society. In Chapter IV I showed that the 
perception of what is normal in politics differs not only between domestic and EU actors, but 
even more among the various domestic actors who take very divergent positions on what would 
be appropriate behaviour in a democracy. By failing to take the side of ‘normal’ democratic 
behaviour, the EU sends a message that undemocratic behaviour is tolerable in the EU 
framework. 
 
3. The EU fails to recognise the exceptionalism of BiH, and applies a ‘cookie-cutter 
approach’ that treats BiH as any other transitional society. The EU’s ‘cookie-cutter 
approach’ underestimates the salience of ethnic nationalism in BiH, which presents an 
ideational obstacle to its democratisation and demands a tailor-made approach to the 
unconsolidated democracy in BiH. 
 
The question I asked in both case-studies was not only how intensive the efforts of 
European norm entrepreneurs were to counter the strength of nationalism, but how resistant 
were the forces of nationalism to EU influences. In that regard, I have illustrated how counter-
norms can be exploited by populism, negative and divisive rhetoric, hate language, radicalism, 
extremism and nationalism. Opting for the top-down approach and a focus on elites’ utilisation 
of populism, nationalism and negative rhetoric, I showed how entrepreneurs of counter-norms 
deploy fragile social relations to particularise trust at the level of a single ethnic community to 
215 
 
which they appeal. By over-utilising and sustaining the nationalist rhetoric, the nationalist 
parties polarised different communities along existing ethnic cleavages and revived strong 
feelings of past injustices and wartime memories in order to manipulate the public support for 
nationalism and secessionism. 
 
I found that European norms were ‘localised’ in an attempt to accommodate them to 
local norms and structures, rather than the other way around.  In the first empirical Chapter this 
was evident through the fact that SNSD put nationalism at the focus of their election campaign 
through different narratives, while the EU did not condemn such rhetoric in any aspect, or even 
pointed to norms or values that counter those proposed by nationalism. As already explained, 
the EU actors avoided that because they considered that this would have been seen as giving 
preference to a particular political option. The EU actors argued that this was the reason why 
they refrained from more assertively deploying substantive instruments during the election 
campaign. 
 
In the empirical Chapters I showed the EU’s extensive use of procedural instruments, 
which neglect the internalisation of norms and normative transformation. My research has 
revealed that instruments at the disposal of the EU for diffusion of EU norms provide avenues 
for both procedural and substantive mechanisms of norm diffusion. However, the EU limited 
itself to the use of procedural instruments. This finding is very much related to the previous 
arguments, that the inadequacy to recognise the nature of obstacles results in inadequate 
deployment of instruments. The lack of recognition of substantive subversions of democracy 
informs the choice of procedural rather than substantive instruments by EU actors. Procedural 
instruments can only go as far as affecting the procedural aspects of democratisation, while its 
substantive dimensions remain neglected.  
 
The use of procedural instruments thus limits the EU’s focus on the diffusion of norms, 
which travel only as far as low compliance, but rarely result in a transformation of local norms. 
This is evidence of a neglect of ideational aspects of the constitutive role of EU normative 
power, and its failure to influence the identities and interests of domestic actors. Interviews with 
EU officials revealed that at the technical level there is a widespread perception that the EU 
does not play a role in substantive democratisation. Most EU actors see themselves as ‘acquis-
entrepreneurs’ rather than as ‘norm-entrepreneurs’. This implies a very technical approach to 
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monitoring the implementation of the technical criteria, while normative and substantive criteria 
are seen as too abstract and not in their remit. 
 
The EU’s compromising of its norms reflects on its legitimacy and credibility as an 
actor, which have been considerably weakened as the EU showed numerous inconsistencies 
and lacked clarity in applying conditionality in BiH. The choice of conditionality as the main 
instrument of influence in BiH is at the core of the EU’s ineffective ‘cookie-cutter approach’. 
Although some literature argues that compliance may be high in cases when both linkage and 
leverage are high (Way & Levitsky, 2007), the case of the use of conditionality in BiH shows 
low compliance even in such situations. In the example of the EU’s new approach to BiH, in 
which the incentives are generous and costs very low, compliance still did not occur. The EU 
miscalculated the costs and benefits of compliance for the domestic elites, in spite of the 
evidence of numerous examples from the past when low compliance could not be explained in 
the simple terms of cost-benefit calculation. Rather than learning from its own experience in 
BiH, the EU bases its assumptions on the experiences in democratising the countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe, where compliance occurred through basic conditionality in many cases. I 
have attributed the low compliance in BiH to three factors: the existence of ‘gatekeepers’ to 
democratisation, the EU’s weakened legitimacy, and a volatile domestic and international 
context. 
 
  Even though I subscribe to the view expressed by Vachudova (2014) that the EU 
lowers the bar because it is desperate to see BiH move forward, as was the case with the entry 
into force of the SAA, it is nonetheless a proof of the EU’s unprincipled behaviour for pragmatic 
reasons. In spite of its good intentions and strong commitment, the lowering of the bar still does 
not help the country move forward because change, especially democratic change, is not in the 
interest of the nationalist elites. The oversimplified view that domestic elites in BiH would 
willingly adopt and internalise EU norms based on a cost-benefit calculation misinformed many 
of the EU’s policies. That position was founded on a wrong assumption that faster EU 
integration is in the interests of nationalist elites in BiH. That could not be further from the 
truth, given the fact that nationalist elites benefit from a status-quo which does not demand 
responsibility or accountability. Nationalist elites thrive on the status quo, in which they can 
continue to manipulate the public through emotional rhetoric and appeals to ethnic 
distinctiveness, benefiting from many divisions and fault-lines that have been created. The 
failure to recognise that is the primary reason for the lack of success in applying the ‘cookie-
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cutter approach’ through conditionality. Both BiH and the EU would benefit far more from a 
consistent approach, which would value EU norms and promote them more strongly. 
Otherwise, the EU signals indecisiveness, which is exploited and manipulated by nationalist 
elites.  
 
Nationalist elites have learned how to manipulate the EU over time, which has shown 
lenience and flexibility on issues that are more ethnically sensitive or identity-related. The 
nationalist elites have thus engaged in numerous projects of constructing ethnically sensitive 
issues, and fashioning the technical reforms into ethnic constructs. Nationalist elites act as 
‘gatekeepers’ (Tolstrup, 2014), who regulate the intensity and effectiveness of EU influences. 
‘Gatekeepers’ engage in ‘thinning’ the EU leverage, as could be seen in the cases of the norms 
on equality and trust. That way, they have been able to justify their resistance to EU reforms 
and failure to adopt EU conditions, while using those same excuses as a ‘political shelter’ in 
the eyes of the wider population. The EU has largely underestimated the ability of nationalist 
elites to manipulate EU conditionality, and divert their attention away from the required 
reforms. The EU have in particular refrained from using sanctions in any of their endeavours, 
even when the actions or rhetoric of nationalist elites threatened the integrity of BiH, or had the 
potential to reverse the previous state-building and democracy-building reforms. 
 
Another important factor in applying conditionality is the use of explicit and clear 
rewards, which in some examples in BiH was the case, but the criteria were not linked to 
conditionality reliably, i.e. the EU retained its flexible, pragmatic approach in order to be able 
to make compromises if necessary. Not only has that approach not worked, but it has in fact 
weakened the EU’s legitimacy and consistency. Without recognising that strong motivations of 
nationalist elites to integrate were absent, the EU was not able to develop the logic of 
appropriateness and remained limited to the logic of consequence. In that respect, BiH was 
looked at through the same lens as other aspirant countries before it, and the same tools and 
instruments are applied to its accession as to other non-post-conflict and better integrated states. 
A ‘cookie-cutter approach’ thus applied did not take into account the potency of counter-norms 
and counter-narratives, which undermine motivations to integrate into the EU.  
 
To conclude, by adopting a ‘cookie-cutter approach’, the EU neglects the underlying 
social, historical and cultural context, which is in the case of BiH very restrictive and limits the 
EU normative power. I have labelled democracy in BiH as ‘eclectically unconsolidated’ due to 
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the fact that it contains many features of the four types of unsuccessful democratisations 
discussed in Chapter III. Those features are not necessarily mutually related, they are 
unpredictable in terms of their scale and presence during democratisation, without any causality 
or consistency. Moreover, democracy in BiH can be described as ‘‘defective’’ (Merkel, 2004) 
due to the potency of the internal institutional, political and ethnic divisions to prevail over the 
external efforts to embed democratic norms. The restrictive context, the nationalist elites who 
act as ‘gatekeepers’ to democracy, and the EU weakened legitimacy in BiH, were all reasons 
that got in the way of the EU’s ‘cookie-cutter approach’. The fact that the EU has been unable 
to recognise the destructive effects of those factors only shows how poorly the EU is embedded 
in the local context in BiH, and that it continues to lack understanding of the core problems in 
BiH. The EU’s ‘new approach’ is new only in the sense of a different focus and more flexibility, 
but in terms of the instruments, actors, and results, it is still the same old ‘cookie-cutter 
approach’. 
 
Future Research  
 
A comparative analysis of the rhetoric of individual parties over several election cycles, 
and its reflection on the country's progress in the EU accession and intensity of democratic 
consolidation, would provide evidence about trends which the rhetoric has produced over a 
prolonged period of time and its effects on the EU accession process of BiH. Discourse analysis 
of the rhetoric of other parties applied in a similar way as in the case of the election campaign 
of SNSD, would provide a variety of perspectives on the country's future progress in European 
integration and democratisation. 
 
It would be interesting to apply the research model which I have used to assess two 
dimensions of democratic quality onto other dimensions related to the EU core norms, such as 
human rights, rule of law, etc., particularly to define the nature of subversions of democracy in 
those areas and to acquire a broader picture about the role of the EU as a normative power. In 
a similar fashion, the framework of analysis which I have designed for the purpose of this thesis 
could be applied in any other context of unconsolidated democracies in order to identify 
procedural and substantive subversions, and to evaluate the process of norm transformation. It 
would be particularly interesting to apply this model to media and civil society organisations in 
order to see how they are impacted by EU normative power, and whether democratic norms 




I would be personally interested to more deeply explore the notion that the self-
perception of the EU as a normative power substantively impacts the process of norm 
promotion. I am also curious about the wider aspects of the quality of democracy in BiH, 
involving a wide range of factors and dimensions, the totality of which is under-researched. 
 
I hope that my approach and findings widen theoretical debates about the EU normative 
power and the conceptual understanding of this subject, and that it inspires future interest in the 
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